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Abstract
Constitutional Amendments and the Consolidation of the Rule of Law in Democratizing
Francophone West Africa: Case Study of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal.
Bagnini Kohoun
Constitutional stability is usually perceived as an invaluable asset in democratic regimes.
Constitutional amendments become suspicious when they occur too often, particularly in
countries newly engaged in the democratic process. This dissertation argues that recent
constitutional amendments in democratizing Francophone West African countries are not
necessarily made to advance democracy or the rule of law. Instead, they are designed to
reinforce the political agenda of incumbent power-holders. Using a case study of three
Francophone African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal), I try to understand
why there are so many constitutional amendments in so short a period of time in these
fragile democratic countries. Is this phenomenon of frequent constitutional amendment
due to the nature of these countries’ constitutions that are made too easy to amend? Is it
rather due to the weakness of the opposition parties and civil society, or can the
phenomenon be explained by the absence of judicial independence, due to an
overshadowing of other branches of the government by the executive power?

Dedication

To my parents: Nonyèza Kohoun and Moussahan Fofana

iv
Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank my dissertation committee for all of your time and
contributions to this project. Dr. John Kilwein, Dr. Karleen West, Dr. Philip A.
Michelbach, Dr. Janice S. Spleth, Dr. Neil B. Berch.
Thank you, Dr. Kilwein for believing in this project from the beginning. Thank you
for your invaluable guidance through the development of this work, and for everything that
you have done to help me keep my graduate assistantship until I am done writing this
dissertation.
I want to especially express my gratitude to Dr. West for all of the guidance and
expertise that you have provided throughout this whole process. I could not have done it
without you.
To Dr. Spleth, I would like to say that this note of thanks does not do justice to the
amount of gratitude I feel towards you for everything you have done for me. You read this
entire dissertation multiples times and provided me with invaluable comments to make my
“Franglish” understandable to others. You kept your office’s doors always open to me
whenever I needed help.
Thank you Dr. Michelbach for your willingness to serve on my committee and for
providing me with the first article that served as a jump starter for me when I was stuck.
Thank you for your willingness to participate from oversees to my dissertation defense.
Thank you, Dr. Berch for your willingness to serve on my committee and for the
guidance and advice you have provided.
Thank you Dr. Loada G. Augustin for your willingness to participate in my
dissertation project as an adviser and for all the great contributions you have provided.
My Deepest thank to Ms. Jennifer McIntosh and the President’s Office for Social
Justice (The Division of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) for the financial support to this
project. Jennifer, my “American mother”, I mean my “Jamerican mother” as you would
prefer, you were known to us (Minority Doctoral Students) not as the Executive director
of the President’s Office for Social Justice, but as our mother who was always there to
provide us with all kinds of supports. I will always be grateful to you. I could not have
completed this dissertation without your invaluable support.
Thank you to my friend Jacob Sanwidi for your personal contribution to the success
of this dissertation.
Thank you to Yaning Mao, my “Chinese-African friend”, for your personal support
to this project.
Thank you to my Burkinabe family in Morgantown (the Sanwidis, Rouambas, and
the Tougmas) for your moral support.
Finally, I want to thank my Doctoral cohort colleagues and Friends - Saffa Lamine,
Kombe Kapatamoyo, Timothy Addai Balag’kutu Adivilah, Ellen Belchior Rodrigues.
Thank you for your camaraderie.

v

Table of Contents
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ v
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii
List of Appendices ........................................................................................................... viii
Chapter I: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
Context ............................................................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................ 4
Research Questions and Methodology............................................................................ 8
Why is this topic important? ......................................................................................... 17
Contribution to the literature ......................................................................................... 19
The way forward ........................................................................................................... 21
Chapter II: Literature on the constitutional amendment process ...................................... 25
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 25
Queries in the literature ................................................................................................. 25
The ways constitutional amendments happen............................................................... 30
The West African context ............................................................................................. 35
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 41
Chapter III: Non-consolidating constitutional amendments ............................................. 43
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 43
definition ....................................................................................................................... 51
Evaluation of non-consolidating amendments .............................................................. 68
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 105
Chapter IV: Openness of constitutional adoption process .............................................. 108
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 108
Diversity of participants in constitutional drafting ..................................................... 110
Information and transparency of the process .............................................................. 123
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 130
Chapter V: Mechanism of constitutional amendment .................................................... 137
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 137
Rigidity of constitutional amendment process ............................................................ 138
Referendum as a constitutional safeguard .................................................................. 144
Public right to petition ................................................................................................ 154
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 163
Chapter VI: Independence of the Constitutional Court .................................................. 165

vi
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 165
Selection of Judges to the Court ................................................................................. 166
Tenure of Constitutional Judges ................................................................................. 179
Procedures for removal ............................................................................................... 185
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 199
Chapter VII: The implications of non-consolidating amendments in ............................. 204
Francophone Africa ........................................................................................................ 204
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 204
Summary of findings................................................................................................... 204
Generalization of findings........................................................................................... 217
Extending the Dissertation .......................................................................................... 218
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 220
Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 222
References ....................................................................................................................... 226

vii

List of Tables
Table 1: Change of heads of state in Benin since Independence in 1960 ........................ 2
Table 2: Change of heads of state in Burkina Faso since independence in 1960 .............. 3
Table 3: Change of heads of state in Senegal since independence in 1960 ..................... 4
Table 4: identifying a non-consolidating constitutional amendment ............................ 51
Table 5: Overstaying a presidential mandate............................................................. 74
Table 6: Extension of MPs mandate ........................................................................ 77
Table 7: Packing the parliament .............................................................................. 80
Table 8: Revenge /Clientelist amendments ............................................................... 85
Table 9: Amendments for revenge against the President of the National Assembly ....... 89
Table 10: Amendments for overstaying a constitutional mandate ................................ 92
Table 11: Extending the Presidential Mandate .......................................................... 96
Table 12: Creation of a Vice-Presidency .................................................................. 99
Table 13: Summary of non-consolidating aspects of amendments ............................. 104
Table 14: Number and percentage of amendments per country since the adoption of the
current constitutions ............................................................................................ 107
Table 15: Openness of constitution-making process by country ................................ 130
Table 16: comparison of constitutional amendment strategy ..................................... 158
Table 17: Steps for constitutional amendment ........................................................ 162
Table 18: summary of Judges nomination process ................................................... 171

viii

List of Appendices
Appendix 1: Votes on constitutional amendments in Burkina Faso ........................... 222
Appendix 2: Burkina Faso Constitutional Council opinions and decisions from 19912008................................................................................................................... 222
Appendix 3 : First Legislature of Burkina Faso (1992-1997) .................................... 222
Appendix 4: Second Legislature of Burkina Faso (1997-2002) ................................. 223
Appendix 5: Third Legislature of Burkina Faso (2002-2007).................................... 223
Appendix 6: Fourth Legislature of Burkina Faso (2007-2012) .................................. 223
Appendix 7: Fifth Legislature of Burkina Faso ....................................................... 224
Appendix 8: First legislature of Senegal (2001-2005) ............................................. 224
Appendix 9: Second Legislature of Senegal (2007-2012)........................................ 225

1

Chapter I: Introduction
Context
Due to the frequency of military coups d’état since their independence in the
1960s, democratic process was not viewed as the primary mean for access to power in
most African countries (Posner & Young, 2007). With nine different presidents and seven
constitutions in its first ten years of independence, the Beninese experience is a good
illustration of the instability in Francophone West Africa before 1990 (Fondation Konrad
Adenauer, 2009) (see tables 1, 2 and 3 below). In the 1990s, under the pressure of the
international community and after what is now known as the historic “Discours de la
Baule” in 1990, Francophone African countries entered a period of democratization and
adopted new constitutions with the goal of stability and peace for their people through the
rule of law.
The La Baule Conference is important for Francophone African countries. After
their independence, most of Francophone African countries maintained close
relationships with their former colonizer. The newly independent countries needed the
international recognition that they could acquire by being close allies with France, a
developed and important political power on the world stage. More than any other colonial
power, France retained significant influence over Francophone Africa and has in the past
helped make or unmake African governments. The context of France’s influence over its
former colonies is what makes the 1990 La Baule conference such an important moment
for African nations and their leaders. The main message that came out of the La Baule
conference between France’s President François Mitterrand and African leaders was very
simple: African autocrats needed to abandon dictatorship and other types of military
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regimes and permanently embrace democracy. It is in the interest of African people to
experience regimes that can provide stability and peace through the rule of law.
President Mitterrand’s speech came at a crucial moment in world political history:
the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 that served as a premonitory sign for the breakdown of
the Soviet Union and the surge of democratization in the developing world. Mitterrand’s
speech was meant to convince African dictators that the world had changed and that
Western powers would no longer offer support to regimes that do not comply with
democratic rules. In other words, Mitterrand used the shifting international context to
make the point that Francophone Africa needed new constitutions and new democratic
regimes to enter the new world of post-Cold War.
After the La Baule conference, West African countries entered the era of
democratic regimes and adopted new constitutions. On December 2, 1990, Benin adopted
a new constitution following a sovereign conference that emphasized popular
participation. In Burkina Faso, the framers received instructions from the party in power
on what should be included in the new constitution. The people were presented with the
final draft of the constitution for amendment. On June 2, 1991, the Burkina Faso
constitution was adopted through a referendum. In Senegal, a committee of five experts
was chosen by President Wade to draft the Constitution. The Senegalese people did not
take part in the early stage of the process. The opposition parties were presented with the
final draft of the constitution for amendment. On January 7, 2001 the final document was
adopted through a referendum.

Table 1: Change of heads of state in Benin since Independence in 1960
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Name of the
President
Hubert MAGA

Period of mandate

Length of
mandate
2 years 10
months
4 months

Christophe SOGLO

Oct. 1963-Jan. 1964

M. S. M. APITHY
Congacou
TAHIROU
Christophe SOGLO
Maurice
KOUANDETTE
Alphonse ALLEY
Emile Derlin Zinzou

Jan. 1964. Dec. 1965
Dec 1, 1965-Dec 22,
1965
Dec. 1965-Dec. 1967
Dec 18, 1967-Dec. 21,
1967
Dec 1967-July 1968
July 1968-Dec 1969

Dec. 1960- Oct. 1963

Paul Emile De
Dec. 1969-May 1970
SOUZA
Presidential council May 1970-Oct. 1972
made of H. MAGA,
J.T.
AHOMADEGBE
and M.S.M.
APITHY
Mathieu KEREKOU Oct. 1972-April 1991
Nicéphore Soglo
Mathieu KEREKOU
Mathieu KEREKOU
Boni YAYI

April 1991-April 1996
April 1996-April 2001
April 2001-April 2006
Since April 2006

Reason for the end
of mandate
Putsch

1 year
22 days

Lost the 1964
elections
Resigned
Putsch

2 years
4 days

Putsch
Deposed

8 months
1 year six
months
Six months

Deposed
Putsch

2 years and six
months

Putsch

18 years and 3
months
5 years
5 years
5 years

Lost the 1991
elecions
End of mandate
End of mandate
End of mandate

Deposed

Table 2: Change of heads of state in Burkina Faso since independence in 1960
Name of the
President
Maurice
YAMEOGO
Aboubacar S.
LAMIZANA
Saye ZERBO
Jean-Baptiste
OUEDRAOGO
Thomas
SANKARA
Blaise Compaoré

Beginning of
Mandate
Dec 11 1959

End of mandate
Jan 4, 1966

Reason for the
end of mandate
Popular unrest

Jan 4, 1966

Nov 25, 1980

Coup d’état

Nov 25, 1980
Nov. 7, 1982

Nov. 7, 1982
August 4, 1983

Coup d’état
Coup d’état

August 4, 1983

Oct.15, 1987

Coup d’état

Since Oct. 15, 1987
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Table 3: Change of heads of state in Senegal since independence in 1960
Name of the
president
Léopold Sédar
Senghor

Beginning of
mandate

End of mandate

Reason for the end
of mandate

Sep 6, 1960

Dec.31, 1980

Abdou DIOUF

Jan. 1, 1981

April 1, 2000

Lost elections

Abdoulaye WADE

April 1, 2000

April 2, 2012

Lost elections

Macky SALL

Since April 2, 2012

Resigned

Statement of the Problem
Twenty years after the new democratic beginnings, many countries passed constitutional
amendments that seem to weaken the consolidation of the rule of law in West Africa
(Ebeku, 2006; Owona, 1985; Kanté, 1996; Hesseling, 1996). These types of
constitutional amendments, called non-consolidating amendments according to the Open
Society in West Africa (OSIWA), are what my study focuses on. Non-consolidating
amendments, or “Constitutionalisme rédhibitoire” (Owona, 1985), refers to constitutional
amendments that do not aim at reinforcing democracy or the rule of law. Instead, they are
designed to consolidate the political domination of individuals or a group of individuals
through crippling manipulations of democratic rules.
Three examples allow me to develop a better understanding of the concept of nonconsolidating constitutional amendments. On June 2, 1991, the people of Burkina Faso
voted by 93% for a new constitution. Article 37 of that constitution stated, that the
President of Burkina Faso was elected for seven years, and that he could be reelected
once. In 1997, the article was “undone.” It had been amended through legislative process
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and the new version states that the president is elected for five years and that he can be
reelected. As we can see, besides the change from seven years to five, what was taken off
the initial article is the portion about the limitation of the presidential mandate. In other
words, the president can be reelected indefinitely.
One might argue that there is nothing wrong about amending constitutions. After
all, constitutions are made to be amended at the right time according to a people’s
aspirations. Moreover, no constitution is perfect and there should always be room for
amendments. However, the problem with Burkina Faso’s 1997 Article 37 amendment is
neither about the legality of the process nor about the will to make the constitution a
better document. The problem has to do with the nature of the amendment. Looking at
the particular context of this amendment, one can understand that while the amendment
had the approval of all the National Assembly members of the ruling party (CDP), which
held more than 80 percent of the 111 members, it lacked legitimacy because the
amendment made President Compaoré indefinitely eligible. Changeover of power is part
of constitutional democratic principles that prevent one individual from staying in power
forever.1 Due to African leaders’ obsessions with presidency for life, drafters of the
1990s African constitutions designed constitutional provisions to force presidents out of
power at a certain period of time. This was done, not only to allow alternation in power,
but also to prevent unconventional seizure of power through coups-d’état, for instance.
The rationale is that in countries with a weak democratic culture, when a frustrated
opposition feels it has no way for ever getting to power, due to the ruling party’s unfair
manipulations of the democratic game, it might resort to any other means to achieve its

1

This argument will be addressed and clarified in chapter 3 dedicated to non-consolidating constitutional
amendments
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goal. The eventual consequences are rebellions and instability in Africa. By amending the
constitution to allow a sitting president to stay in office, the ruling party has disregarded
a constitutional commitment. Actually, it has changed the rules while the democratic
game was still ongoing, since President Compaoré was at the end of his second mandate
and was set to leave office according to the initial Article 37 of the 1991 Burkina Faso’s
Constitution.
One important issue that is worth noting is the amendment process. The
amendment in the particular case of Article 37 of the Burkina Faso Constitution has been
done through legislative process. The literature on constitutions distinguishes three
prominent methods of constitutional amendments other than a complete replacement of a
Constitution. These three methods are: formal amendment, legislative revision, and
judicial interpretation (Lutz, 1994). According to Lutz, the three methods reflect
declining degrees of commitment to popular sovereignty.
The point that I am making is that by choosing to amend Burkina Faso’s
Constitution through legislative process, the government chose to diminish the legitimacy
and the degree of commitment to the popular sovereignty of the people of Burkina Faso
in order to achieve a particular goal of keeping one person (the president) and his ruling
party in power. This particular way of using the constitution to advantage one person or a
group of persons is what Fall (2008) calls “instrumentalization” of the constitution with
the ultimate goal of preserving power or advantages. Constitutions are also used to block
opposition leaders from accessing power. A good illustration of this phenomenon is the
case of Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the sitting president of Côte d’Ivoire.
Before 1994, foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire were given the right to vote in city
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elections.2 Then an electoral code was introduced to end that privilege. In 2000, Article
35 of the Ivoirian Constitution was introduced to require not only that all presidential
candidates be Ivoirian by birth, but that their parents also be Ivoirian (Fall, 2008). Once
again, there is nothing wrong with amending a constitution. The problem has to do with
the context in which such an amendment happens. In 1990, the former Ivoirian president
Houphouet Boigny was visibly ill, and Ivoirians started thinking about who would
replace the founding father. Alassane Ouattara, due to his background (an economist
who obtained his Ph.D in the USA, worked as an associate director for the International
Monetary Fund and also served as Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire), was viewed as a
serious challenger to Henri Konan Bédié, the President of the Ivoirian National
Assembly. According to the Ivoirian Constitution as then written, Bédié was to replace
President Houphouet Boigny in case of his death and only for the rest of his mandate
until a new presidential election could be organized. To prevent the potential danger of
losing elections to Alassane Ouattara if he were allowed to be candidate, Bédié
introduced an amendment to the constitution requiring that both candidates for the
presidential election and their parents be Ivoirians.3 At that particular period, there was a
debate about the nationality of Ouattara’s parents. Some Ivoirians argued that Ouattara’s
parents were not Ivoirians, but Burkinabé. Ouattara was denied participation as a
candidate in the 2000 presidential election by the Constitutional Chamber of the Ivoirian
Supreme Court on the grounds that his parents’ nationality was doubtful. As described

2

I am referring to Article 25 of October 1985 electoral code that was modified on October 10, 1990.
Before the year 2000, this particular requirement was stated in Article 49 of the Ivorian electoral code
voted on December 13, 1994, just a year after the death of President Houphouet Boigny (December 7,
1993). Precisely because of the timing for the vote of this law, it was criticized by then opposition leader of
the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) Laurent Gbagbo as being unnecessarily xenophobic. The provision was
later constitutionalized in 2000 with the passage of Article 35 (Fall, 2008, p. 55).
3
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above, it seems that this particular amendment was aimed at disqualifying Mr. Ouattara
from the presidential elections.
In 1992, Prime Minister Koffi Koffigoh of Togo was viewed as a serious challenger by
those in power and was prevented from taking part, as a candidate, in the presidential
election due to an amendment to the Togolese Constitution that raised the minimum age
for presidential candidates to 45. Koffigoh was 44 years old in 1992. One could argue
that the intentions of the amendment were to prevent Koffigoh from competing for power
(Fall, 2008, p.59). Otherwise, how can one explain that as Prime Minister of his country,
Koffigoh was considered not mature enough for the functions of president, since the
raising of the minimum age was based on the assumptions that citizens under age 45 were
not mature enough or at least not ready to preside over the destiny of the Togolese
people. Many more examples of this kind can be given to show how political leaders in
Francophone Africa manipulate constitutions either to directly advance their interests, or
to prevent others from getting to power. These are the particular types of amendments
called non-consolidating amendments that my study addresses.

Research Questions and Methodology
Clearly stated, the objective of my study is to explore and understand the
emergence of non-consolidating constitutional amendments in Francophone West
Africa. Non-consolidating constitutional amendments are amendments that are not
intended to reinforce democracy or the rule of law. Instead, non-consolidating
amendments are designed to reinforce the political power of an individual or a group
through targeted constitutional changes engineered to manipulate electoral and other
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political laws in favor of incumbent power-holders. To determine whether an amendment
in question is non-consolidating or not, I analyze the official grounds4 for the amendment
then I contrast it with conventional principles and practices of constitutional democracy.
These conventional principles and practices will be defined in Chapter 3.
For an amendment to be classified as non-consolidating it must be designed to
clearly benefit an individual political actor or group holding power at the time of the
amendment’s adoption. Amendments that satisfy this criteria usually fail to fit common
sense democratic practices known in well-established democracies such as the US and
other major Western democracies. Clearly stated, I am looking at constitutional
modifications that either prevent incumbent powers from having to face the electorate,
e.g., term extensions, or that change the rules of the electoral process to advantage the
incumbent powers vis-à-vis their opposition.
Non-consolidating constitutional amendment is the dependent variable that needs
to be explained. Actually, this particular political phenomenon raises a major question
that begs for answers. Why are Francophone West African leaders inclined to modify
constitutions for their own interest? Three research questions help me respond to this
question.
1- The Openness of the constitutional adoption process
2- The Mechanism of Constitutional Amendment
3- The Independence of the Constitutional Court
By examining my three research questions across countries, I come to the conclusion that
the openness of the constitutional adoption process is the most significant factor in

4

The grounds or motivations for an amendment are usually contained in an official document known as
“l’exposé des motifs.”
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explaining the occurrence of non-consolidating constitutional amendments. I suggest that
my findings, though with some limitations, can be generalized as they hold truth for other
Francophone African countries. For my data sources, I used different sources including,
but not limited to: books, dissertations, journals, magazines, newspaper articles, speeches,
court cases, the constitutions of the three study case countries and also constitutions of
other countries not mentioned, reports of NGOs, and useful websites.
1.

Openness of the Constitutional Adoption Process

I assume that a more open constitutional adoption process would lead to fewer
non-consolidating amendments. In other words, the more transparent and inclusive a
constitutional process is, the more thorough and democratic its results would be and the
less likely it would be necessary to modify or replace it (Lutz, 1994; Adams, 1980;
Morgan, 1988). I argue that the openness of constitutional amendment process as a
variable has great explanatory power for the occurrence of non-consolidating
constitutional amendments. Actually, the process of constitutional adoption is the
foundation of the constitution itself. If a constitution has a strong foundation, it is
unlikely to be seriously amended as it would be supported and defended by the people
who ratified it (Loada, Fall, & Badet, 2008). This is what happened in Benin as will be
shown in chapter 3.The logic of this reasoning is that in countries where the adoption
process is not transparent and inclusive enough, there is no strong and contradictory
debate to produce a better quality of the constitutional document. In such conditions, the
probability of non-consolidating constitutional amendments occurring is higher, not only
because of the quality of the constitution itself, but also because of the indifference
people might show toward constitutional issues, leaving the government the freedom to
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engage in any kind of amendments. The question becomes how do I measure the
openness of the constitutional adoption process?
I use two indicators to measure the concept of openness: the diversity of the
participants and the availability of information during the constitutional adoption period.
I define the diversity of participants based not5 on how many ethnic groups, religious
groups or unions take part to the constitutional adoption processes, but on the concept of
consensus. I am interested in knowing whether the adoption process was consensual. I
consider to be consensual a constitutional adoption process in which the sitting
government reached out to political parties, Unions, religious leaders, civil society
organizations, the diaspora…all potential stakeholders and have had them participate in
the process from the beginning to the referendum vote of the constitutional draft. To
know whether a process was consensual or not, I look at the adoption process in each
country. A constitutional document that was drafted entirely by government officials, or
the party in power, and submitted to a referendum although it would have been approved,
would be classified as non-consensual (Haysom, 2007; Ghai, 2007; Bhattarai & Subedi,
2007). The commission that participated in the framing of the constitution needs to be as
representative as possible of the people in each country. If, for instance, the government
and the party in power have a higher number of representatives compared to the
opposition parties, the adoption process would be considered unfair and non-consensual.

5

In my three case study countries with 60 or more ethnic groups (Benin and Burkina Faso), around 20 in
Senegal, ethnic based political parties are forbidden by constitutional provisions (Article 13 in Burkina
Faso, Article 4 in Senegal and Article 5 of the charter for the political parties in Benin). Unlike in Latin
America (see Jones, 2008), ethnic political parties are viewed as dangerous for democratizing African
countries because of potential clashes that they might create in immature and weak constitutional
democratic countries
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The indicator about the transparency or the availability of information during the
adoption process is an important one. For the population to give their consent to a
constitutional document, they need to understand it. Once they understand and vote for it,
they would accept and defend it as their own (Haysom, 2007). I measure the availability
of information by enumerating and comparing across countries all initiatives taken by the
leaders during the transition period to make information available to the public. For an
important moment in the life of a country such as the adoption of the constitution, it is
common for governments to create a public awareness campaign on constitutional
matters (Haysom, 2007; Ghai, 2007). I measure the availability of information to the
public by looking at the official transitional documents for any such effort to inform the
public on constitutional matters. I assume that the public is not informed once it becomes
clear that the transitional government has not had any public awareness campaign plan.
2. Mechanism of Constitutional Amendment
The more difficult a constitutional amendment process is, the fewer nonconsolidating amendments a constitution would experience. I argue that the constitutional
design each country chooses can allow, slow down, or prevent the emergence of nonconsolidating amendments. I look at three indicators for answers on which one of my
three countries’ constitutional design is the best fit against the occurrence of nonconsolidating amendments. The three indicators are the following: the rigidity of the
constitution; the existence or not of referendum as a constitutional device for direct
democracy, and the opportunity or lack of opportunity for public petition as a
constitutional device for direct democracy.
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I define the rigidity of the amendment process as the mechanism included in the
original constitutional text with the explicit intention of making it harder to amend.6 To
measure this variable, I consider the steps required for any single amendment with the
assumption that the existence of more steps in the adoption process is synonymous with
greater rigidity that would limit the number of non-consolidating constitutional
amendments or prevent them from happening. This particular idea might look peculiar
and even suspicious to a Western analyst of constitutional amendments. It could look
even more suspicious to an American scholar. As Lutz (1994) argues, the best
constitution is not necessarily the most rigid one. According to Lutz, the U.S. federal
constitution is hard to amend, but this does not make it the best constitution in the world.
Even though I partially agree with this analysis, I argue, based on the literature on
African constitutionalism, that it makes sense to advocate for a rigid constitutional
amendment process in the African context where constitutions are easily amended to
satisfy particular and egoistic ambitions (Kanté 1996; Hesseling, 1996; Okoth-Ogendo
1996; Hyden 2006; Lindberg 2009; Maltz 2007; Posner and Young, 2007; van de Walle,
2009). The reasoning is that because of the fragile nature of democracy in these countries,
constitutional amendments often lead to political instability when constitutions are
modified to help incumbent power holders stay in office indefinitely. One needs to keep
in mind that in most Francophone democratizing countries, electoral laws and
redistricting rules or changes in the number of parliament members are usually not
entrenched or made part of constitutions. In addition, incumbent power holders have
control over the timing of elections. With all these discretionary powers in their hands, all

6

I will define more extensively the concept of rigid constitution in chapter V.
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ingredients seem to be in place for incumbent power holders to have an open-ended free
ride to unlimited power, unless the constitution is safeguarded against politically
motivated amendments. It is in such a context of an uneven playing field that my
suggestion of making constitutional amendments harder makes sense. On this issue,
Pascal Lissouba, a former president of the republic of Congo is well-known for his
infamous claim that in Africa, one does not organize elections in order to end up being
the loser (Kokoroko, 2009).
I suggest that a requirement of a referendum for all constitutional amendments
could slow down or prevent the occurrence of non-consolidating amendments. Nonconsolidating amendments often lead to instability or civil wars in certain countries. An
illustration of this particular idea is the 2002 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. Alassane
Ouattara, the current president of the country, was prevented from taking part in the 2000
presidential elections by the Ivorian Constitutional Court on the grounds that his parents
were not Ivoirians. Although there is no evidence to show that the 2002 war was the
immediate result of such political behavior, analysts of Ivoirian politics agree that the
dismissal of Ouattara has played an important role in the political turmoil after the death
of President Houphouet Boigny (Fall 2011, p.75). Since a referendum is financially
costly and may be politically damaging, leaders might think twice before engaging in the
process of constitutional amendment if they are required to go through referenda. As
constitutional amendment literature suggests, the use of a referendum carries the great
advantage of legitimacy (Adams 1980: Morgan 1988). We can measure the use of
referendum by looking at each country’s initial constitution.

15
I argue that the right of the public to petition is an interesting indicator that can play a
role in controlling the unwavering will of certain leaders to manipulate the constitution.
This constitutional tool gives the ability to the people to put together signatures in order
to get the National Assembly to act or to prevent it from action on particular issues. My
assumption is that if there is a provision in the constitution that institutes this particular
tool as a right for the people, it can be useful in slowing down the zeal of some politicians
who want to use the constitution to advance their personal political agenda. The
mechanism of constitutional amendment will be further addressed and explained in
chapter 5.
3. The Independence of the Constitutional Court
In this chapter, I argue that more independence for the constitutional court would
lead to fewer non-consolidating constitutional amendments: however, this can only be
achieved when there is fairness in the way judges are appointed. Three indicators are
examined in this section in order to clarify what I mean by fairness: judges’
appointments, their tenure, and the way they leave office. I measure the fairness of their
appointment process by reading the rules about appointments that are included in the
initial constitutions of my case study countries. My point is that a constitutional setting in
which all members of the constitutional court are appointed by the executive power or by
the party in power does not promote judicial independence. One might note that I am
focusing my analysis on the constitutional court instead of the judicial system as a whole.
The reason is that the Francophone countries included in my study are from the civil law
tradition and they do not have one Supreme Court such as in the US. The constitutional
court is the institution that solely deals with the constitution and electoral matters.
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Another variable I considered to be a good indicator of the court’s independence
is judges’ terms in office. This variable is important for many reasons. A judge who is
nominated for one year might not have the same will or determination to work as one that
is chosen for life. Job security is an important factor in developing countries where
unemployment is known to be a great issue. I measure the term in office indicator by
comparing the rules in the countries included in my study to the conventions existing in
old democracies such as in the US.
The indicator concerning the removal of judges is closely related to the one about
the term of office even though both processes differ in many ways. I argue that when
judges fear for their jobs, they might be inclined to decide in favor of the politicians who
hold the power to remove them. I am interested in knowing how easy it is to remove
judges from office according to the rules in the countries I study. Constitutional
documents and other judicial official documents provide me with information in regards
to practices on the issue. I analyze those practices based on constitutional democratic
principles (addressed in chapter 3) that are used in established democracies and I decide
whether practices in a given country advance judicial independence and the rule of law.
This approach might be viewed as unfair since I am analyzing African constitutionalism
from a Western perspective. I argue that formal constitutional democracy7 is a Western
concept and that it is not necessarily wrong to evaluate practices of imported democracy
in Africa through Western criteria.

7

By formal constitutional democracy, I mean a system of government in which the power of government is
defined and limited based on the fundamental law (constitution) adopted by the people. Constitutional
democracy requires the principles of checks and balances and the separation of powers (Akiba, 2004). The
notion of the rule of law embodied in constitutional democracy requires that all citizens, including
government officials, be subjected equally to the same rules and laws (Marryman & Pérez-Perdomo, 2007).
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Why is this topic important?
There are three main reasons that make my topic particularly interesting: France’s
dominance over its former colonies and the La Baule conference of 1990, the
distinctiveness of the sovereign conference phenomenon in Francophone Africa, and “the
fact that Francophone Africa has been slighted – not to say ignored – in Anglo-American
settings”(Clark, 1997 p. 2). First of all, it makes sense to mention that the wave of
democratization I refer to in my study did not affect Francophone Africa only. It also
affected the English-speaking part of the continent. Actually, my topic addresses a crucial
political reality that many African countries (Francophone and Anglophone) now face
and that has received few scholars’ attention certainly due to the novelty of the
phenomenon. My interest, however, in the Francophone part of the continent is due in
part to the way the wind of democratization blew in this particular part of Sub-Saharan
Africa.8
The new constitutionalism and the whole movement of democratization in
Francophone Africa have the particularity of being instigated by the 1990 La Baule
Conference, which is not the case in Anglophone Africa. Actually, France, more than any
other colonial power, has retained close relations with its former colonies and in contrast
with the United Kingdom, it is known for making and unmaking African governments
(Reynjens, 1991). According to this author, Francophone Africa, compared to
Anglophone Africa, has suffered more from bad management and gross human right

8

Although there have also been national conferences in Anglophone Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Namibia,
South Africa), they haven’t had the same importance as in Francophone Africa where Benin with its
sovereign conference was seen as a model to follow (Robinson, 1994).
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violations from incompetent and corrupt authoritarian regimes. When the opportunity
came for democratization, the populations in this part of Africa and also the international
community showed some impatience with the status quo. This is the reason why the wave
of democratization in Francophone Africa was more spectacular. Of the eighteen
Francophone states included in Reynjens’s study, fourteen (78 percent) were under a
military regime when the wind of democratization started to blow, compared to five (36
percent) countries from the fourteen English-speaking African countries with military
regimes for the same period of time. Military regimes in Africa are known for their lack
of respect for human rights and their undemocratic governance. Comparing Francophone
and Anglophone Africa in terms of their legal inheritance, Joireman (2001) suggests that
the English-speaking African countries inherited a better legal system than the
Francophone ones. Common law system, according to him, does a better job at providing
citizens with the rule of law than does the civil law system. A similar argument is made
by Zakaria (1997).
Although, there are striking differences and resemblances between Anglophone
and Francophone African countries that deserve to be studied, I find it more interesting to
focus my work on Francophone Africa. Besides the French colonial legacy, one
important phenomenon that makes Francophone African a good case for my analysis is
the phenomenon of national conferences. This new political phenomenon observed in
most Francophone countries did not exist to the same degree in Anglophone Africa.
National conferences were unique to Francophone countries’ new constitutionalism,
compared to Anglophone African countries, where democratization happens not through
a group movement, but rather through some very diverse forms (Robinson, 1994).
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Among the three countries included in my case study, Benin is the leading
example of the success of national conferences in Africa. Moreover, Benin is the only
state of the three that has not made any amendments to its 1990 Constitution. The other
two countries have different constitutional experiences. In Burkina Faso, there was a
presidential election in November 2010. President Compaoré was able to take part in that
particular election as a candidate due to an amendment made to the country’s
Constitution (Article 37). Blaise Compaoré, Burkina Faso’s sitting president, has been in
power since 1987. In Senegal, a constitutional debate ended up with the Constitutional
Council interpreting the law to allow President Wade a third term in office.
My topic is an interesting one as it addresses a phenomenon that is part of an ongoing
debate in Francophone Africa. This very fact might also be a handicap to the study, since
events may change quickly. Another problem that I face in this study is that even though
there is some literature about constitutionalism in Africa, there is little work done on the
particular topic of non-consolidating constitutional amendments.

Contribution to the literature
The contribution of my study and its distinctiveness reside in the following facts:
while other studies in the literature are concerned with constitutionalism or constitutionmaking in Africa, my study not only includes that part of the argument, but addresses a
new phenomenon: the “undoing” process of constitutions (what I refer to as nonconsolidating amendments) in a particular part of Africa that is distinctive by its civil law
tradition.
Why study Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal in particular? Although historically
there is not much difference between these countries and other Francophone West
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African countries, they have the advantage of representing a kind of microcosm of the
political reality when it comes to constitutionalism engineering in West Africa (Loada,
Fall, & Badet, 2008). Actually, Benin can be viewed as an outlier in the sense that even
though there have been some attempts, its 1990 constitution has never been amended.
Moreover, it has successfully implemented a sovereign conference that led to the drafting
of its Constitution. Why is Benin then part of my study countries since it has not
experienced any constitutional amendment? Let’s remember that the ultimate goal of my
work is to understand why there are so many constitutional amendments (in so short
time) in the early stage of Francophone West African constitutional democratic
experience. By choosing to do a comparative study, I needed a case study sample that
represents the broad experience of constitutionalism in the region. My challenge was to
find a country where there has been no amendments, another country with a moderate
experience of amendments, and a third one with more frequency of amendments.
Choosing only countries with constitutional amendment experience would have the
disadvantage of excluding counties with no amendments, although those countries are
viewed as having the best democratic experience because of their constitutional stability.
As a matter of fact, the phenomenon of frequent constitutional amendments in emerging
democracies is viewed by many scholars, not only as an indicator of dangerous political
instability, but also as a sign of absence of democratic consolidation (Fall, 2008, 2009,
2011; Loada, Fall, Badet, 2008; Badet, 2009; Kanté, 1996; C.G.D, 2008). Burkina Faso is
in the middle when looking at the number of times its constitution has been amended in
comparison with other West African countries, six times, since 1991. Senegal is another
extreme, because of the frequency (every seven months on average) with which its
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constitution has been amended since 2001, according to the Open Society in West Africa.
These three countries, due to their previously mentioned specificities, represent the
various degrees to which constitutional amendments are being considered and dealt with
in Francophone West Africa.

The way forward
In the remainder of my work, I outline a broader understanding of how
constitutional amendment usually happens in a regular context, which allows me to make
a clear distinction between regular constitutional amendments and the not so regular type
of amendments, the non-consolidating constitutional amendments that my study is about.
In chapter 2, I begin with a comprehensive overview of the literature on constitutional
amendments focusing on the four ways constitutional amendment usually happens. This
chapter allows me to examine the most important questions raised in the literature on
constitutions such as: what is the best constitutional design? Should constitutional
amendments be made rigid or flexible? How rigid? How flexible? Why should
constitutions be amended? These major queries in the literature on constitutional matters
help me set the stage to introduce constitutionalism in West Africa in a way that makes it
easier to notice the strange nature of what I call non-consolidating amendments in
Francophone Africa. Non-consolidating amendments are changes to constitutions that are
often done with no popular consent. They involve a roll back of provisions considered
fundamental democratic principles (C.G.D, 2008). Chapter 3 offers a precise definition of
these amendments and provides some clues on how to identify them. In chapter 3, after
defining the concept of non-consolidating amendments, I enumerate all non-consolidating
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amendments made in each of the countries in my case study. I then apply my definition to
each amendment to show why the amendment is not consolidating democracy or the rule
of law. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that non-consolidating amendments could be
avoided in the Francophone West African if certain conditions are met.
One of these conditions is addressed in chapter 4. In this two-section chapter I
argue that an open constitutional amendment is more likely to produce a comprehensive
and more consensual constitutional document. Such a thorough and consensual document
is less likely to be revised for political purposes, my assumption being that it will be
protected and defended by the parties involved based on the consensual context in which
it was created (see chapter 4). The first section of this chapter examines the diversity of
the participants in the drafting of the constitutional document, and the second one is
concerned with the availability of information during the constitutional adoption period.
The point is that the entire process leading to the adoption of a constitution matters for
the quality of the final document that is produced. In other words, the openness of the
constitutional adoption process has a great explanatory power when it comes to
understanding the occurrence of non-consolidating constitutional amendments in
Francophone West Africa; however, the constitutional adoption process is not the only
factor that can be used to explain the entire phenomenon of non-consolidation
amendments. One also needs to look deeply inside constitutional documents to see
whether or not these documents themselves contain provisions that make them easier to
abuse. As a matter of fact, most modern constitutions contain procedures for their own
amendment. I argue that the design of these mechanisms of amendment can help
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understand how easy or hard it is for a constitutional amendment to be made. This is
precisely the issue that my next chapter addresses.
In other words, the question in chapter 5 is whether there are provisions in the
initial constitutional documents that make it easier to modify them. I examine the
safeguards that each country’s framers have engineered to address leaders’ egoistic
tendency to commit what Ouedraogo (2011) calls “constitutional frauds,” i.e., nonconsolidating constitutional amendments. Actually, three points will be addressed here:
the rigidity of the constitutional amendment process, the referendum as an amendment
feature, and the public right to petition. As one can see, this chapter suggests that making
constitutions harder to amend is a good idea in the particular West African context.
Common sense, though, might suggest that constitutions should not be too hard to revise,
as constitutions are made for people, and people have different needs from generation to
generation. Moreover, in the context of Francophone Africa with a civil law tradition
where judges are not as activist as their peers in the common law system, fundamental
changes to the law might only happen through constitutional amendments, instead of
through the judiciary. Why make constitutions hard to amend then? Chapter 5 responds to
this particular question.
In chapter 6, I discuss the independence of the Judiciary, and particularly, the
independence of the constitutional courts of the three countries included in my study, the
argument being that an independent constitutional court would prevent illegitimate
changes to the constitution. To assess the independence of the courts, I comparatively
analyze in my case study countries: the appointment of judges to the court; their term in
office, and the way they are removed from office. To measure the independence of the
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courts, I also take a look at litigations involving government officials and cases about
elections to see how constitutional courts deal with them.
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter in which I discuss all my findings. I
comparatively discuss the three factors that I used to explain non-consolidating
constitutional amendments (my independents variables): openness of the amendment
process; mechanism of amendment; and the independence of the judiciary. I show how
these variables individually affect the phenomenon of non-consolidating constitutional
amendment. I conclude that the single most important factor in preventing nonconsolidating amendments is the openness of the constitutional adoption process. I
suggest that my findings about the phenomenon of non-consolidating amendment can be
generalized beyond my three study countries. They can be applied to any democratizing
country with similar characteristics specified in chapter 3.
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Chapter II: Literature on the constitutional amendment process
Introduction
Constitutional stability is commonly perceived as an indicator of the state of
democracy in a given country. In other words, frequent constitutional amendments are
viewed as suspicious in the sense that they raised some doubts about the commitment of a
country to democratic principles (Lutz, 1994; Sturn, 1970). The conventional wisdom
suggests that as the frequency of constitutional revisions increases, the likelihood of the
executive branch of government getting more powers at the expense of civil rights
increases (Roberts, 2009).9 Based on these assumptions, some scholars (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Riker, 1982) believe that new democracies should adopt rigid
constitutions to secure freedom and rights for citizens against potential tyranny from the
executive power or the majority. The point is that there are potential risks of tyranny
whenever constitutions are being revised. The question then becomes why do countries
not make unchangeable constitutions once and for all?

Queries in the literature
While safeguards could sometimes preserve constitutions against unnecessary
alterations, amendments are still inevitable. Sometimes, they are even desirable:
We are not to expect perfection in this world; but mankind, in modern
times, have apparently made some progress in the science of government.
Should that which is now offered to the People of America, be found on

9

The author only mentions the idea, but he does not support it. He argues in contrast with this idea, that in
post-communist Europe, amendments tend to reduce the power of executives and provide for more human
rights.
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experiment less perfect than it can be made, a Constitutional door is open
for its amelioration. George Washington cited in Vile (1992, p.49)
According to Vile, the first president of the free United States of America and the
Founding Fathers of the United States knew about Hebrew history from the Bible and
classical Greek and Roman history, and they certainly learned from them while designing
Article V of the US Constitution. Both sources, according to the author, demonstrate that
unchangeable laws might have unintended consequences. Constitutions should not be too
flexible neither should they be too rigid. This brings us to a major debate about
constitutional amendments. What is the best constitutional design and how should
constitutions be revised?
According to Lutz (1994), any people who are serious about constitutionalism
will amend their constitution when needed instead of using unconventional or extra
constitutional means. As the constitutional literature shows, many scholars believe that
something is fundamentally wrong when constitutions are too often altered (Sturm 1970).
A moderate amendment rate is a sign that the people living under a particular constitution
are taking constitutionalism seriously (Lutz 1994). Actually, the amendment rate is the
most important factor considered by many scholars (Loada, Fall & Badet, 2008).
A successful constitutional system would seem to be defined by a
constitution of considerable age that has a total number of amendments
which, when divided by the constitution’s age in years, represents a
moderate amendment rate – one that is to be expected in the face of
inevitable change. A less-than-successful constitutional system will have a
high rate of constitutional replacement (Lutz 1994, p.367)
The question then becomes, what should be perceived as a moderate rate of
amendments? Roberts (2009) and Lutz (1994) try to address the issue through some
hypotheses. Even though both authors worked based on the same hypotheses (the former
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repeatedly citing the latter), they end up with different views on how important an
amendment rate is for a constitution. While Lutz focus on amendment rate to determine
the seriousness of a country’s attachment to constitutionalism, Roberts (2009) is more
concerned about the results of constitutional amendments. His study focuses on postcommunist Europe and concludes that amendments made to constitutions after the
breakdown of the Soviet Union do not increase executive power. They rather help
entrench human rights. Without clearly saying it, Roberts (2009) seems more concerned
with amendments’ results, instead of their rate. Other authors such as Holmes and
Sunstein (1995) argue that it makes more sense to have a very flexible amendment
process, suggesting then that the amendment rate should not raise any red flag when it
comes to a country’s commitment to constitutionalism. After all, a flexible constitutional
amendment process helps a transitional country deal with the many changes (economic
and political) that necessarily occur when a country moves from a non-democratic system
to constitutional democracy.
One thing that scholars seem to agree on is that the longer a constitution is the
higher its amendment rate will be. May (1987) and Lutz (1994) argue that one of the
reasons state constitutions are frequently amended in contrast with the U.S. national
Constitution is that they include more provisions with many details that make them
targets for amendments. In other words, the shorter a constitution is, the lower its
amendment rate will be. Reanalyzing Lutz’s data, Ferejohn (1997) argues that, legislative
procedures, not referenda, drive constitutional amendment rates higher. This idea is
similar to the point made by Roberts (2009) when he argues that constitutions with
elements that resemble ordinary legislation tend to be altered like ordinary legislation
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(frequently). Because long constitutions tend to possess such features (elements that
resemble ordinary legislation), it is not surprising that they are usually more frequently
amended than shorter ones.
Legislative procedures drive the constitutional amendment rate higher, and
amendments done through legislative means usually require legislative supermajorities.
In others words, for a government to use legislative procedures for amendments, it needs
a supermajority in the parliament. In countries with weak opposition parties, it is easier
for a government to obtain a supermajority in the parliament (Robert, 2006). A
government with a supermajority in democratizing countries is likely to engage in
frequent constitutional amendments (Loada, Fall, & Badet, 2008). This idea confirms my
assumption in chapter 3 that without a strong opposition party in the parliament, the
ruling party is likely to have a free ride to politically motivated constitutional
amendments. I show in my case study that besides Benin, where no government has yet
been able to obtain a supermajority in the parliament, the ruling party constantly has a
supermajority that ends up with more amendments to the constitutions.
Another assumption that seems to draw consensus among constitutional scholars
is that more restrictive amendment rules lead to fewer amendments. However, as Lutz
warns, this assumption has not been formally tested. According to him, the assumption
may not be easy to test unless one is able to develop an index for measuring the degree of
difficulty associated with an amendment process. Roberts (2009) acknowledges this idea,
but he adds that one important factor that should not be left out is the manner in which a
constitution is adopted, what I refer to in chapter 4 as the openness of the constitutional
adoption process. The author cites Bunce and Csanadi (1993) who make the point about
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postcommunist Europe that constitutions adopted in haste are more vulnerable to
amendments because of correctable flaws and also because of the failure to include all
important actors in the drafting process.
Whatever differences might oppose scholars on constitutional amendment
procedures, one main idea seems to unite them: constitutional amendments are
indispensable. There are many reasons that make constitutional amendments necessary.
The expansion of state functions, technology development, rapid urbanization or
population growth, economic changes, the need for fair treatment of minority groups (for
instance women’s emancipation in West Africa) are among some of the factors that
require a new legal environment. In some countries, namely countries with common law
tradition, many of these changes can be dealt with using judicial interpretation. In the
civil law tradition where the stare decisis doctrine is “not accepted,” one cannot expect
the judiciary to fill in for any lack of constitutional amendments, for the simple reason
that in the civil law tradition, judges look more like “operators of a machine designed and
built by legislators. The judicial function is a mechanical one” (Merryman & PerezPerdomo, 2007, p.36). The point is that constitutional amendments are indispensable
particularly in Francophone West Africa with the civil law tradition, where judicial
activism seems more restricted. Consequently, for a viable constitutional democracy,
there needs to be a fair and good constitutional amendment mechanism. We are then back
to a major question in the constitutional amendment literature: What is the best
constitutional design? The next section reviews the literature that addresses this question
by examining different methods used for constitutional amendments. In this section, I
also review the different features that can be used to make amendments more difficult

30
with the objective of preserving constitutions against unwanted or non-consolidating
amendments.

The ways constitutional amendments happen
Constitutional amendments and particularly the effects of amendments are an
under-investigated area of research with few empirical works (Congleton & Rasch,
2006). The authors cite Lutz’s (1994) pioneering investigations on constitutional
amendment procedures, constitutional length, and the amendment rate. In fact, a
constitution’s length, the difficulties of its amendment process, and the rate of
amendment give us a sense of what principles could guide a constitutional design. He
distinguishes four ways through which constitutional amendments happen: periodic
replacement of the entire constitutional document; formal amendment process; legislative
revision, and judicial interpretation. According to him, the last three prominent methods
of constitutional modification reflect declining degrees of commitment to popular
sovereignty. In other words, the level of commitment to popular sovereignty is a key
factor for defining the nature of a political system. The modern written constitutions, first
developed in America, were primarily grounded in the doctrine of popular sovereignty
(Adams 1980; Morgan 1988).
American politicians used the language of popular sovereignty even before
Locke’s Second Treatise was published to stress the concept of consent that gives power
and popular sovereignty to a constitution (Lutz 1980; 1988). Popular sovereignty, as
colonial America perceived it, required that a constitution be written by a popular
selected convention and ratified in a process that elicited popular consent, which can
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ideally be reached through a referendum. The point to be made is that early Americans
understood the difference between a regular law-making process and constitutional
matters which require a distinctive and highly deliberative process. Such a process is
usually longer and more difficult than the one used for normal legislation. Because
fallibility is part of human nature, colonial America believed that more seriousness
should be put into constitutional drafting even though there is still room for change once
experience shows the need to do so.
In this line of reasoning, Sturm (1970) distinguishes between major and minor
constitutional alterations. He calls major modifications of constitutions “revisions” and
minor ones “amendments.” Actually, there is no consensus in the literature about the use
of these terminologies. Lutz (1994) uses “amendment” to refer to the formal process of
constitutional modification, and he uses “alteration” to describe a process that uses the
legislature or the judiciary. It is important to distinguish between formal constitutional
amendments and those used as “window dressing” (Lutz 1994), because as mentioned
above, the method chosen for a constitutional revision always reflects the degree of
commitment to popular sovereignty. An amendment made through the legislature
(particularly when a parliament is dominated by one party) with no involvement of the
population through a referendum carries less legitimacy than one done through a full
participation of the people.
Although there seems to be a consensus in the literature about the necessity to
distinguish constitutional matters from ordinary legislation (Lutz 1994; Lijphart 1999;
Anckar and Karvonen 2002; Lorenz 2005), the question that remains unsolved is whether
constitutional amendments should be made rigid or flexible, how rigid and how flexible?
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Several authors suggest different techniques. For instance, Hylland (1994) cited in
(Congleton & Rasch, 2006) proposes four techniques: Delays, confirmation by a second
decision, qualified majorities, and participation of actors other than the National
Assembly. Lane (1996, p.114) suggests six mechanisms: referendum, confirmation by a
second decision, delay, qualified majorities, confirmation by subnational government,
and no change. Lijphart (1999, p. 219) lists four methods of amendments: ordinary
majorities, between two-thirds and ordinary majorities, two-thirds majorities or
equivalents and supermajorities greater than two-thirds. Elster (2000, p.101) suggests:
adoption by a majority in parliament, absolute entrenchment, requirement of a higher
quorum than for ordinary legislation, delays, state ratification, and ratification through
referendum. Lutz (1994) presents four general amendment strategies: legislative
supremacy, intervening election (double vote), legislative complexity (referendum threat)
and required referendum. I have chosen to pay closer attention to the strategies suggested
by Lutz because his pioneering empirical investigation work in this field of constitutional
amendment has been acknowledged by many scholars, including Congleton & Rasch
(2006): Ferejohn (1997); Roberts (2006), Giovannoni, (2003).
After focusing on American states and national constitutions, Lutz (1994) uses 32
national constitutions to point out the particular specificities attached to each of the four
amendment strategies he proposes. The feature used in the legislative supremacy strategy
is to make one legislative vote sufficient to amend the constitution. According to the
author, it does not matter what the size of the required majority is for the vote; this
strategy when used, most of the time, leads to higher amendments rate to the constitution.
Moreover, legislative supremacy strategy reflects a minimal commitment to popular
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sovereignty. It also reflects a minimal commitment to deliberative process. That is to say
this strategy does not privilege consensus as much as other strategies such as the
legislative complexity or the referendum strategy do. Since one legislative vote is
sufficient to amend the constitution, a government may only need to have enough seats in
the parliament to introduce any kind of amendment that is likely to be adopted by the
National Assembly, due to the simplicity of the mechanism. Non-consolidating
amendments may easily pass through this type of strategy that is not radically different
from a procedure used to pass ordinary laws.
The intervening election or double vote technique requires that the national
legislature adopt an amendment by votes in two sessions with an intervening election. In
other words, the first legislature that votes on the amendment may not be the exact same
legislature to vote for the second time on the same amendment. Here there is a notion of
delay made necessary because of the second vote, something that gives more chances to
the legislature to have a second look at an amendment before it is formally adopted. In
this procedure, there is a clear distinction made between constitutional matters and
ordinary or normal legislation through the double vote and an intervening election.
Another advantage of this strategy is that with the intervening election, citizens are given
a chance to influence the process by using their votes to put into office those whom they
trust to take care of a proposed amendment. According to Lutz, the introduction of
difficulties into the amendment process in this strategy translates in a lower amendment
rate.
Legislative complexity adopted by countries such as France, Italy, Spain, and
Sweden is usually characterized by the use of multiple paths for the amendment process.
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A particular characteristic of this strategy is the use of a referendum threat. A president
can use this feature to bypass the legislature and obtain a referendum on a given issue.
Usually a referendum can be called by the executive, or by a relatively small number of
parliament members (this number varies depending on the country considered). A
referendum can also be called on the initiative from a small percentage of the electorate.
Because of the complexity of the referendum and how it can be called, this strategy is
viewed as more deliberative. Moreover, the strategy as presented also emphasizes the
difference between a normal legislature process and constitutional matters, which shows
the degree of importance given to the constitution as the fundamental law in the land.
Legislative complexity produces a lower constitutional amendment rate compared to the
other two strategies presented above (Lutz 1994).
The author argues that his last and fourth suggested strategy, called the
referendum strategy introduces the most direct form of popular sovereignty. It not only
emphasizes more strongly the deliberative process of constitution adoption, but it also
sets a clear distinction between constitutional matters and ordinary legislation. Countries
that adopt this strategy (Australia, Denmark, Japan, Switzerland, Venezuela, Ireland, and
the U.S.) require referendum as the final step of the amendment adoption process.
A quick summary of constitutional literature shows how scholars have been
struggling to theorize a viable constitutional design, from Buchanan and Tulloch (1965)
to Lutz (1994). Different authors use different terminology to address the same question.
For instance, Weingast (2004, 2005), Robinson (2004) and Fearon (2000) refer to the
issue of the best constitutional design using the concept of self-enforcing democracy.
Gibbons and Rutten (1996) prefer to talk about self-enforcing constitutions. The question
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though is how this western literature applies to the particular African context that I am
concerned with. In other words, how does the constitutional literature I just reviewed help
me study the constitutionalism of developing West African countries that seems to take
place in a different context? Based on culture and also the developing stage of the
countries studied, it is worth mentioning the difference of context between
constitutionalism in the West and that in West Africa; however, as van de Walle (2009)
suggests, differences should not be used as an excuse to avoid comparisons. Seen in a
certain way, constitutionalism matters in West Africa may not be as different from
constitutionalism in the West as it seems. First of all, Francophone African constitutions
are notorious for their similarities with France’s 1958 Constitution (Assistance, 1998).
My case study countries, like France, practice legislative complexity, as a constitutional
amendment strategy.
When theorizing about new democracies, scholars are often concerned about
democratic consolidation (Diamon 1999, p.66). Linz & Stephen (1996, p.5) argue that
consolidation only occurs when democracy is the “only game in town.” I argue that there
is a gap in the constitutional literature regarding the phenomenon of non-consolidating
constitutional amendments. Essentially, non-consolidating constitutional behavior is a
particular characteristic of constitutionalism in West Africa that needs to be examined.

The West African context
Constitutions that brought most West African countries into statehood (in the
1960s) generally established multiparty systems modeled after their respective former
colonizers (Abutudu 2009). Post-colonial Sub-Saharan African governments had
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constitutions that provided for the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and the
protection of human rights. However, constitutional practices in the newly independent
countries did not last long. They succumbed to military takeover and single party systems
(Akiba 2004), two post-colonial phenomena created by political practices in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In many countries, military coups and counter-coups have become the mode of
political succession in power. When the military gets into power, the very first action is
usually the suspension of the constitution; consequently the separation of powers or the
independence of the judiciary have little or no real meaning.
According to Akiba (2004), the widespread adoption of single party rule was the
most important phenomenon that ended up killing constitutionalism and the rule of law in
Africa. The single party system is characterized by the official or unofficial proscription
of all opposition parties. Power is concentrated in the hands of the ruling party.
Proponents of the single party system argued in the 1960s that the Western constitutional
model of government with its multiparty system was bound to fail in Africa because
“Western constitutionalism represented a foreign idea that had no place in African
history, tradition and practice; that individual rights and the separation of powers were
incomprehensible to the African masses,” according to President Julius Nyerere cited in
(Akiba, 2004).10 This view, which was widely accepted by early African elites, helped
develop a form of governance that heavily relied on presidential supremacy. The view

The quotation belongs to President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and can be found in: Ujamaa – the Basis
of African Socialism: 1977, Oxford University Press. This view has been discredited in wider intellectual
circles. Contemporary wisdom in many African countries suggests that individual rights and the separation
of powers should be subject to generally accepted rules and not to arbitrary government decisions Ojwang
(1990), Ekeh (2004) strongly disagrees with the idea that constitutionalism is incompatible with Africa
values. He shows that in most pre-colonial African countries the sovereignty belonged to the people.
Things only changed with the impact of Europeans imperialism and the Arab influence in Sub-Sahara
Africa.
10
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was based on the assumption that weak new African countries needed strong leaders. The
executive was then set, from the beginning of most African states, to be the dominant
branch of the government with a very limited check of power (Prempeh, 2010). Another
argument used by proponents of this system was based on the assumption that rapid
economic growth in Africa requires some form of authoritarian control.
This argument not only reinforced the postcolonial African nationalistic view
suggesting that a strong nation needs a strong government, but it also has had some
support from the former colonizer, namely France, which cared much more about
stability than democracy in West Africa. While national conferences were taken place in
Africa, Jacques Chirac, then Prime Minister still insisted that multiparty system might not
be right for Africa (Clark, 1997. p 2). A similar idea is developed by Akiba (2004) about
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, institutions that he believes are
often too quick to scarify civil and political rights in the pursuit of economic
development. Authors such as Akindele (2003) points out that economic liberalization
was the main agenda of the Breton Woods agencies even though at the end, their push for
good governance and political accountability through what is known as “conditionality”
helped deliver more transparency and democracy. The problem today is not any more
whether West African countries have entered the era of democratization. The pressing
issue is rather how to consolidate the new democratic institutions in countries where a
new phenomenon has emerged: the non-consolidating constitutional amendment
phenomenon that consists in African presidents using their often overwhelming majority
in the parliament to modify constitutions for personal interests.
This poses a stability issue in these developing countries where the practice of
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personal rule largely trumps the practice of the rule of law as it exists in consolidated
democracies such as the US.
When I say politics … it is not a question of the art of governing the State
for the public welfare in the general framework of the laws and
regulations. It is a question of politician politics; the struggles of clans –
not even ideological tendencies – to place well oneself, one’s relatives,
and one’s clients in the cursus honorum, that is the race for preferments
(Jackson and Rosberg 1984, p .421)
This quotation from former Senegalese President Léopold Sedar Senghor effectively
summarizes what is meant by personal rule or the paradigm of the big-man.
According to Jackson and Rosberg (1984), there is no indication that the political
behavior of personal rule is about to decline in Africa any time soon. Others share
opposite views (Posner and Young, 2007; Sklar, Onwudiwe & Kew, 2006). These
authors suggest that the formal rules of the political game in Africa are beginning to
matter in a way they previously have not. They reject the long held assumptions among
political science scholars that Africa is a continent where formal institutional rules are
largely irrelevant. To make their point, Sklar, Onwudiwe & Kew (2006) use the case of
former Nigerian president Obasanjo, whose party attempted in vain to amend the
Nigerian Constitution in order to maintain him in power.
Actually, formal institutional rules matter, since leaders even when they intend to
go against democratic ideals (for example when they choose to overstay their mandate in
power) usually feel the need to go by the rules in order to amend the constitution in ways
that make it favorable to them (Posner and Young , 2007). Empirical data collected by
these authors from 46 sub-Saharan countries and including 227 leaders on how leaders
exit power show that from the 1990s to the year 2005 the trend has changed and more
African leaders leave power following natural death, voluntary resignation, or losing an
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election instead of through a coup d’état or through assassination. This optimistic
assessment about the practice of the rule of law in Africa, however, may not reflect
reality of the state of democracy in Francophone West Africa. As a matter of fact, by
using legal means to modify constitutions for personal interest African politicians
necessarily weakens the rule of law and creates the same kind of unhealthy political
environment that characterized the era of personal rule (before the 1990s).
According to Owona (1985), the use of democratically unhealthy maneuvers to
circumvent constitutions that are supposed to entail the free will of a sovereign people is
a practice he calls (in French) constitutionalisme rédhibitoire, which refers to nonconsolidating constitutionalism. Maltz (2007) suggests that presidential term limits be
clearly stated in any African constitution to make the costs of modifying this particular
provision domestically and internationally very high for any president who dares to touch
it. For him, presidential term limits are now being perceived as a key feature of
democratic governments and should be watched and protected against malicious and
dangerous interference by selfish and egoistic politicians. The truth is that African leaders
use their countries’ constitutions for their personal interest because they do not have any
deep commitment to constitutional and democratic values imported from the former
colonizers (Okoth-Ogendo, 1996).
According to this author, the failure of constitutionalism in Africa is due to what
he called four fallacies. Africa’s colonizers assumed that colonialism was a preparatory
phase in the evolution of constitutional government. The British and the French thought
their mission in Africa was to “civilize” indigenous Africans by introducing basic arts of
government so that when it came time to take over, Africans would be able to replicate
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what they had learned. Many African scholars share this view, however, what needs to be
emphasized is that the art of governing that was taught to indigenous people had nothing
to do with true democracy or true constitutionalism (Converse et al., 1992).
What the British and the French were doing in London and Paris in terms of
democratic practices was qualitatively different from what they were teaching in Abidjan,
Ouagadougou, Cotonou, or Dakar. “Nowhere in Africa could the system of government
under colonialism be classified as constitutional or democratic in the Westminster or
Montesquieulian sense” (Okoth-Ogendo, 1996, p.50). Actually, colonialism was an
autocratic, despotic, and repressive government. Consequently, when African leaders
took over, they continued exactly the autocratic form of government that the colonizers
had taught them. To be fair, it makes sense to acknowledge that the colonizers are not
necessarily responsible for the authoritarian behavior of the founding fathers or leaders of
African countries. Of course, colonization was not democratic and the practices that the
colonial administration taught to the would-be African founding fathers were all, but
democratic. However, as Loada and Ibriga (2007) argue, the African leaders’
authoritarian behavior has some roots in pre-colonial African culture which considered
power as sacred since leaders obtained their power from divinity. Such a conception of
power creates the tendency toward authoritarian behavior from leaders who cannot stand
any criticism.
Moreover, because of colonial history, constitutions were viewed as a colonial
heritage that ignored African specificities and this is the main reason for the failure of
constitutionalism in Africa (Kanté, 1996). Leaders perceived constitutions as instruments
for the conservation of political power. To suggest that western liberal democracy is
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incompatible with African values, however, is an argument that many African leaders do
not support, because such reasoning undervalues African culture (Conac, 1993).
For Abutudu (2009), constitutionalism in Africa after independence faced two
major issues: the military takeover and the slide toward single party rule. The new wave
of democratization and constitutionalism that started in 1980 also faces a serious
challenge: the prominence of the presidential type of regime in many African countries.
This particular type of regime, where the executive branch holds too much power, has
almost reduced the legislative branch to an appendage of the executive. Consequently, the
oversight function of the legislature is not taken seriously since the parliament members
seem to be there only to approve whatever the executive suggests (Fayemi, 2001).
Abutudu proposes a debate on ethics and power in politics in order for Africa to enjoy a
real culture of constitutionalism, the type of constitutionalism that includes the principles
of the rule of law in the sense of Lon Fuller’s “internal morality of law” (Fuller, 1969).

Conclusion
As one can see, African constitutionalism has been addressed in various ways.
Some authors have studied the adaptability problems of imported constitutions (Kanté,
1996; Hesseling, 1996; Okoth-Ogendo, 1996). Other authors studied constitutional
politics and elections in Africa (Hyden, 2006; Lindberg 2009; Maltz, 2007; Posner and
Young, 2007; Van de Walle, 2009). There is still a gap in the literature when it comes to
the new phenomenon of non-consolidating constitutional amendments that my
dissertation addresses. The phenomenon consists of incumbent political leaders to
engineering targeted constitutional changes in their favor with the ultimate goal of
staying in power .i.e., they undo constitutions to overstay their mandate or to protect
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particular interests. This practice less known for outside observers creates an uneven
political playing field that usually guarantees reelections for incumbents, because
incumbent power holders often have disproportional access to state resources, media, and
legal system, that they abuse (Levitsky & Way, 2010). “The advantages of incumbency in
Africa are so great that elections – even free and fair elections – are not enough to put
meaningful limits on presidential power” (Posner & Young, 2007, p. 65). Greene (2007)
addresses the same issue of incumbent advantages in terms of a single-party dominance.
The author shows that dominant parties often turn public resources into patronage goods.
This practice allows them to bias elections in their favor. As a matter of fact, it allows
them to “virtually win elections before election day without resorting to electoral fraud or
bone-crushing repression” (Greene, 2007). Although 81% of Africans desire free and fair
elections that would remove incumbents (Diamond, 2010, p. 53), incumbent presidents
lost only fourteen times out of a hundred reelection bids in 46 Sub-Saharan African
countries between 1990 and 2005 (Posner & Young, 2007).
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Chapter III: Non-consolidating constitutional amendments
Introduction
In the 1990s, a democratic reawakening in Africa was informed by the adoption of new
constitutions to mark a rupture with the past series of military coups d’état that the
continent had previously experienced. After over twenty years of democratic governance,
however, certain states particularly in Francophone West Africa have started rolling back
some of the basic democratic principles included in their initial constitutions. This
phenomenon has created an unfriendly environment for the rule of law. Constitutions that
were adopted through referendums are being modified through National Assemblies.
Clearly, there is nothing wrong with amending a constitution from time to time in
order to adapt it to the evolving needs of the people (Fall, 2011; Garané, 1997; Vile,
1992). The problem has to do with the ways constitutional amendments are being done
and the nature of the amendments themselves. Changes to a constitution that are done
without consensus and that involve a rollback of provisions considered fundamental
democratic principles are necessarily suspicious and probably troublesome. Amendments
done under such conditions are the ones I call non-consolidating amendments.
In this chapter, I first define the term non-consolidating constitutional
amendment. Next, I enumerate all constitutional amendments made in each of my case
study countries. I then apply my definition to each amendment and decide whether it is
consolidating or non-consolidating of democracy. I conclude that there has been no
politically motivated constitutional amendment in Benin since the adoption of its
Constitution in 1990. Burkina Faso has experienced three non-consolidating amendments
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out of a total of six amendments since 1991. Of fifteen amendments done in Senegal from
2001 to 2012, ten are non-consolidating constitutional amendments.
One needs to keep in mind that my case study countries are newly democratized
nations. To be fair or more realistic, let’s say that they are democratizing countries as
these former authoritarian countries are making their first steps into constitutional
democracy. In other words, I am studying countries with a young and fragile democratic
culture. It is in this context of young democratic experience that the concept of nonconsolidating constitutional amendment is used to refer to particular types of changes to
constitutions that do not advance democratic principles. I argue that a constitutional
amendment can either advance democracy or slow the process of democratization down.
Those amendments that help advance democracy and the rule of law are referred to as
consolidating, others are deemed non-consolidating.
“An important issue in the conceptual debate on consolidation is: How do we
recognize it? Certainly no single indicator will do. And it is easier to recognize the
phenomenon in its absence: the signs of fragility, instability, and non-consolidation”
(Diamond L. , Plattner, Chu, & Tien, 1997, p. xxi). According to Linz & Stepan (1997, p.
15), consolidated democracy refers to “a political regime in which democracy as a
complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has
become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town.’ Consolidation requires self-binding
procedures of governance that can only be altered by exceptional majorities.
However, a democracy in which a single leader enjoys or thinks he or she
enjoys ‘democratic’ legitimacy that allows him or her to ignore, dismiss or
alter other institutions – the legislature, the courts, the constitutional limits
of power – does not fit our conception of rule of law in a democratic
regime. (Linz & Stepan, 1997, p. 19).
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This particular argument is consistent with my suggestion that the amendment of Article
37 of Burkina Faso’s constitution is a non-consolidating amendment as it dismisses the
constitutional presidential term limit of a particular leader in the middle of the democratic
game. Constitutional democracy is about binding rules that should not be changed while
the game is in process.
The consolidation of constitutional democracy is not just about free and fair
elections. Free and fair elections can take place with no democratic consolidation because
of the uneven democratic playing field and the non-consolidating political behavior of
leaders (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Sartori, 1976; Diamond 1999). This is why many authors
challenge Huntington’s double turnover theory of democratic consolidation (C.G.D,
2008). For Beetham (1994), when talking about democratic consolidation it is necessary
to go beyond procedural definitions of democracy based on fair, honest, and periodic
elections to more normative ideas. The point that the author makes is that even with free
and fair elections a long-lived democracy may not be consolidated because of a lack of
sincerity in the democratic game (this is what I refer to in my work as non-consolidating
behavior). Free, fair, inclusive, and competitive elections constitute basic principles of
democracy: however, political and social freedoms (not only during elections, but also
between elections) need to be taken into account when deciding about the fairness of
competitive elections (O'Donnell, 1994, p. 41). According to the author, many analysts
skip this important indicator of electoral fairness because they do not see elections as
institutions, and more importantly they only focus on legality. Actually, nonconsolidating behavior is not only about politicians breaking formal rules, it is also about
informal rules.
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For example, Przeworski argues that democratic consolidation occurs
‘when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions.’ But
this does not preclude the possibility that the games played ‘inside’ the
democratic institutions are different from the ones dictated by their formal
rules. (O'Donnell, 1994, p. 47)
For example, it is not because a president has the required majority to modify a
constitution to stay in power that doing so means consolidating democracy. By doing so,
a president does not violate democratic rules; however, he or she does violate the spirit of
the rules by changing the rules while the game is still ongoing. This is what I refer to as a
non-consolidating constitutional amendment. Bratton (2010) addresses the phenomenon
using the term informal institution. Clientelism (the expression of political loyalty to
providers of patronage) is an informal institution. Although a constitution might limit the
presidential term in office, a president through clientelism can easily secure an
amendment and claim that he or she did nothing wrong since the formal rules were
followed to get the constitution modified. The thing that usually goes unnoticed by
outside observers is the informal rule or clientelism that allows a president to secure
support even for unpopular political behavior. In African presidential regimes,
Regardless of constitutional arrangement . . . power is intensely
personalized around the figure of the president . . . He is literally above the
law, controls in many cases a large proportion of state finance without
accountability. . . . (van de Walle, 2003, p. 310).
Democracy refers to regimes that hold elections in which the opposition has some
chance of winning and taking office (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 1997).
Democratic consolidation, however, goes beyond pure legality. It requires that robust
democratic culture be part of people’s daily lives. This means that even through a
difficult crisis political leaders with strong support from the public will still adhere to
democratic procedures (Dahl, 1997). As the literature review shows, scholars suggested
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many definitions of democratic consolidation. They, however, seem to agree that there is
more to the concept of consolidation than just elections, whether fair or not (Dahl, 1997;
O’Donnell 1994; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 1997; van de Walle, 2003;
Braton, 2010; Beetham, 1994; Lewitsky & Way, 2010).
Constitutional democracy is a system of government in which the power of
government is defined and limited based on the fundamental law (a constitution) adopted
by the people. Constitutional democracy requires the principles of checks and balances
and the separation of powers (Akiba, 2004). The notion of the rule of law embodied in
constitutional democracy requires that all citizens, including government officials, be
subjected equally to the same rules and laws (Marryman & Perez-Perdomo, 2007). To put
this broad concept of constitutional democracy in the African context, let’s say that the
basic principle of constitutional democracy is about the predictability of a state’s action.
Capriciousness or unpredictability is the mark of tyranny or dictatorship (Zoethout,
Pietermaat-Kros, & Akkermans, 1996). The main goal of constitutionalism is to set up
fundamental rules that assure predictability of a government’s action. When constitutions
are frequently modified, the predictability of a government’s action is jeopardized, and
the return to tyranny is imminent. This is why constitutional amendment raises concerns
in democratizing countries, particularly in those where there is a tendency to reverse
course on major issues that are viewed as signs of progress toward consolidation of
democracy (Fall, 2011). Presidential term limit is one example among others (CGD,
2008). To deal with this issue Article 23 (5th clause) of the African Charter for
Democracy, Elections, and Governance clearly states that any constitutional amendment
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that jeopardizes the principle of alternation in power is unconstitutional and should be
punished by the African Union.
According to Stéphane Bolle, cited in Fall (2011), in democratizing countries that
experience authoritarian regimes, a constitutional amendment is always dangerous when
it touches issues such as presidential term limits (the length or the number of mandates);
eligibility to the highest office of the country (the issue of nationality); immunity for
former presidents against judicial action; and the creation of a Senate to assure
domination of the party in power. The amendment of presidential term limits is
dangerous for the consolidation of democracy mainly because it raises legitimate
questions about the opportunity for change. “The advantages of incumbents in Africa are
so great that elections – even free and fair elections – are not enough to put meaningful
limits on presidential power” (Posner & Young, 2007, p. 131)”. In countries where
incumbents always win every single election even when international observers attest to
the fairness of elections, a desperate opposition that believes it has no chance of ever
getting to power is poised to used illegal means such as coups-d’état to achieve change.
Although 81% of Africans desire free and fair elections that would remove incumbents
(Diamond, 2010, p. 53), incumbent presidents lost only fourteen times out of a hundred
reelection bids in 46 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2005 (Posner &
Young, 2007). To address this issue, African drafters of the 1990s constitutions created
presidential term limits. By the end of 2005, thirty-three African constitutions contained
provisions on presidential term limits (Prempeh, 2010).
Due to African leaders’ obsessions with presidency for life, drafters of new
constitutions tried to curb presidents’ powers by making it mandatory for them to leave
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office at a certain period defined by the constitution. By forcing incumbent power holders
to leave office at a certain point, opposition leaders have some gleam of hope for
accessing the highest electoral office. More importantly, by providing hope for the
opposition, presidential term limits also provide hope for the survival of democracy in
former authoritarian countries where democratic rules have not always been the means
for getting into power. Due to the history of presidential power abuses I just described,
one can understand why alternation through presidential term limit is considered a key
provision in the 1990s African constitutions. I am not however, suggesting that
changeover of power automatically produces democracy, nor do I suggest that alternation
is synonymous with democratic consolidation. Instead, I argue that alternation or
changeover of power is one fundamental aspect in the process of democratic
consolidation, particularly in countries where presidents are known for abusing their term
in office.
The issue of nationality is a dangerous one for reasons similar to those involving
presidential term limits. Questionable laws of nationality are often used to prevent serious
contenders from taking part in elections. In the introduction to my work, I have already
mentioned the case of current Ivorian president Alassane Dramane Ouattara who was
prevented from taking part in the 2000 presidential election after Article 35 of the Ivorian
Constitution was passed. War broke out in the country that culminated in the then sitting
president Gbagbo being brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC) where he
is still awaiting trial. The creation of a Senate follows the same logic of conservation of
power by incumbents. Incumbent power holders usually turn to the creation of Senates
when they do not have the required majority to amend the constitution to allow the
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president to stay in power. This is the case in Burkina Faso where the president is set to
leave office in 2015 and needs to amend the constitution to stay. The real problematic
issue with the creation of Senates is that presidents get to nominate a considerable
numbers of Senators who then become their clients and help them pass favorable laws
through congresses11
This survey of non-consolidating amendments is not complete as there are other
types of amendments that are difficult to classify. Actually, they can best be described as
amendments for revenge. Here is an example: Karim Wade, the son of former Senegalese
President Abdoulaye Wade, was given the task of organizing the Islamic summit to be
held in 2008 in the capital city of Senegal. After the event, Macky Sall, the President of
the National Assembly, asked Karim Wade to present an accounting of the money spent
for the summit. President Wade was enraged that the parliament would dare to ask his
son to appear before the National Assembly (Scales-Trent, 2011, p. 92), so he used a
constitutional amendment to remove the President of the National Assembly. Article 62
of the initial Senegalese constitution of 2001 stated that the President of the National
Assembly is elected for the full length of the legislature (5 years). The constitutional law
2008-67 of October 21, 2008 was introduced to modify the first clause of Article 62. The
amendment consisted in taking that particular clause out of the constitution into the
internal rules of the Assembly. The internal rules of the National Assembly state that the
president of the National Assembly is elected for one year only. One of the reasons for
moving the provision of Article 62 into the internal rules of the Assembly is that the
National Assembly’s rules deal with the kind of internal parliamentarian business that

11

More details on issues considered dangerous for democracy or its consolidation are given in the analysis
of each amendment below.
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attracts less attention from the media than the constitutional amendment process. These
internal rules are easier to manipulate. Moreover, the National Assembly internal rules
include a provision that allows its members to vote their president out if needed. At the
time, President Wade’s party held a comfortable majority at the National Assembly (131
out of 150 seats). Macky Sall was ousted. This is the particular context in which I am
defining the concept of non-consolidating constitutional amendments.

Definition
Non-consolidating constitutional amendments are amendments that are not
intended to reinforce democracy or the rule of law. Instead, non-consolidating
amendments are designed to reinforce the political power of an individual or a group of
individuals through targeted constitutional changes engineered to manipulate electoral
and other political laws in favor of incumbent power-holders. To determine whether an
amendment in question is non-consolidating or not, I consider five indicators: the general
context of governance in a given country; the specific context in which an amendment is
made; the motivations for the amendment; the consolidating principle that the
amendment can be tested against; and the non-consolidation aspect of the amendment.
This is shown in table 4 that serves as a sample table for my non-consolidation test to
identify amendments.
Table 4: identifying a non-consolidating constitutional amendment
The Amendment
General characteristic of countries with non-consolidating amendments
 Uneven playing field: incumbent power holders control the state resources, the
media, and the legal system (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
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 Executive hegemony with a dominante political party (Diamond & Plattner,
2010; Fall, 2008).
 Incumbent party holds the majority of seats in the parliament (C.G.D, 2008).
_________________________________
Specific context of the amendment
Motivation for the
amendment
(the rationale for a
constitutional amendment)

Principle in Violation
(the principle that is
being violated when a
non-consolidating
amendment is made)

Non-consolidating aspect
(the particular aspect that
makes an amendment
questionable or unfit in
term of constitutional
democracy)

General context of governance: Because non-consolidating constitutional
amendments are prevalent in countries with certain characteristics of governance, the first
step in identifying a non-consolidating amendment is to look at the state (the health) of
democracy in a given country. This is important because a similar amendment that is
considered non-consolidating in a democratizing country may not be considered so if
done in a consolidated democratic country. For example, if the US were to amend its 22nd
amendment to remove the presidential term limit, such an amendment would not a priori
be a non-consolidating amendment for many reasons. Democracy in the US does not
present the symptoms of non-consolidation such as instability, fragility, clientelism,
absence of commitment to constitutionalism.
For an amendment to be classified as non-consolidating, it must be designed to
benefit an individual political actor or group holding power at the time of the amendment
adoption. Amendments that satisfy this criterion usually fail to fit common sense
democratic practices known in well-established democracies.12 Non-consolidation is

12

What I refer to as common sense democratic practices include principles such as the respect for
constitutionally established institutions and the principle of checks and balances, as well as the commitment
of politicians to defend and respect their country’s constitution––all things that constitute the core values of
constitutional democracy.
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recognizable at the declining commitment on the part of major actors to the rules of the
constitutional democratic game (Diamond, 1999; Mattes & Thiel, 1999). According to
Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle (cited in O’Donnell, 1994), there are five indicators
of democratic consolidation: alternation in power between former rivals; a continued
strong support for democracy during times of extreme economic hardship; regime
stability in the face of some radical structuring of party system; successful defeat of
strategically placed rebels; the complete absence of antisystem party or social movement.
Democracy in a given country cannot be defined as consolidated when the country
experiences signs of instability or fragility or when leaders use informal rules such as
clientelism in their daily practices of governance (O’Donnell, 2010; Linz & Stepan, 2010;
van de Walle, 2003).
One of the major symptoms of non-consolidation is what Levitsky & Way (2010)
call the uneven playing field. According to these authors, democratic competition is
undermined less by electoral fraud or brutal repression of opposition than by unequal
access to state institutions, the media, and state resources.
“We define an uneven playing field as one in which incumbent abuse of
state generates such disparities in access to resources, media, or state
institutions that opposition parties’ ability to organize and compete for
national office is seriously impaired. These disparities rarely emerge
naturally; rather, they are usually rooted in illicit or autocratic behavior,
including partisan appropriation of state resources, systematic packing of
state institutions and state-run media and politicized distribution of state
resources, concessions and licenses” (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 58).
One might argue that incumbent advantages exist everywhere, even in advanced
democracies where pork-barrel spending is a common practice. Yet, there is a big
difference between a regular incumbent advantages and what Greene (2007) calls “hyperincumbent advantage.”
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In a developed country with many media outlets, incumbent control of stateowned media may not have the same dramatic and negative effects on democratic quality
compared to a similar situation in a developing country like Burkina Faso where only
state-owned radio can reach remote areas to spread government propaganda. In poor
countries, incumbents can use state-owned 4X4 vehicles to access remote areas that
remain inaccessible to impoverished opposition leaders. Moreover, incumbent power
holders may use state policy to punish businesses that finance the opposition. In Ghana,
entrepreneurs who supported opposition parties in 1992 were denied government
contracts (Oquaye, 1998, cited in Livitsky & Way, 2010). In many democratizing
countries such as Burkina Faso and Senegal, incumbents control the judiciary13 and the
electoral authorities. This ensures that major electoral and other legal disputes are
resolved in favor of the ruling party. A skewed playing field is not always visible for
outside observers of democracy who evaluate the fairness of elections based on a time
frame that does not include the period between elections. Unfair competition between
elections determines the results of futures elections. An outsider observer of elections in a
democratizing country will certainly label as a violation of civil liberties a government’s
closing of an opposition-owned media or the arrest of an opposition leader, but he or she
may not understand the multiple informal techniques used by incumbents to starved
oppositions to submission. For example, Article 4 of the Burkina Faso opposition status
law states that members of opposition parties are not allowed to occupy high level state
offices. With an underdeveloped private sector, government jobs are important revenue
sources in many developing countries. By preventing opposition members from
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occupying prestigious offices, the ruling party is inciting ambitious leaders to switch
parties in exchange for well-paid and prestigious jobs. Similar behavior from former
Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré led the country to be almost without
opposition as major opposition leaders joined the ruling party.
Another major sign of democratic non-consolidation is the presence in a country
of a dominant executive power with one dominant political party that usually holds the
majority of seats in the parliament. This particular indicator or sign often exists in cases
of incomplete transition to democracy from single-party rule.
“Single-party regimes tend to fuse the state and ruling party, creating a highly
politicized state in which bureaucrats are also party properties, and resources from
state agencies are systematically deployed for partisan use. Transition to
multiparty rule – often accomplished via a simple constitutional change or the
calling of elections – do not necessarily alter these patterns . . . and this helped
incumbents to retain power in a multiparty context” (Levitsky & Way 2010,
p.64).
As a matter of fact, a skewed playing field is often a legacy of an incomplete transition to
democracy such as in Burkina Faso where President Compaoré, a military leader who
came to power through a coup d’état, successfully negotiated transition to democracy and
multiparty system in which he and his new party CDP14 retain hegemonic party control
over the country. This hegemonic one-party control secures a political environment in
which an uneven political playing field is created and nurtured.
Poverty and underdevelopment facilitate the creation and maintenance of an
uneven political playing field. In countries with an underdeveloped private sector,
opposition parties cannot rely on the private sector to finance their election campaigns. In
such conditions, the public sector takes on disproportionate importance because
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government officials use public buildings, public employees, public vehicles, public
media, and any other public resources for the campaign. This helps governments to coopt
opposition leaders, activists, and even businessmen who are interested in getting
government contracts. All these advantages make incumbency a too great advantage visà-vis the opposition in countries with extreme poverty. Using Mexico as a case study,
Greene (2007) shows that many analysts fail to understand the importance of the
disproportional resource advantages that incumbents enjoy. The point is that the general
context of governance is an important indicator to consider when trying to identify a nonconsolidating constitutional amendment in a given country. Through my brief description
of the terrain in which informal rules, corruption, and clientelism flourish, I made the
point that non-consolidating amendments mainly occur in fragile, unstable countries with
weak democratic culture and therefore a weak commitment to the rule of law or
constitutionalism. The second indicator to look at for a sign of non-consolidating
constitutional amendments is the specific context of the amendment.
Specific context of the amendment: The best way of using this indicator is to
ask the following questions: When, why, where, and how is the amendment being made.
As a reminder, non-consolidating amendments are designed to reinforce the political
power of an individual or a group of individuals through targeted constitutional changes
engineered to manipulate electoral and other political laws in favor of incumbent powerholders. Before asking the other questions one needs to know what is amended. By
asking what provision in the constitution is amended, one gets to understand the
importance of a given amendment. As mentioned above there are specific issues that are
considered vital or essential for the survival and consolidation of democracy in unstable
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and fragile democracies. When constitutional provisions like presidential term limits,
amnesty for political leaders, and the creation of a Senate are made, there is a great risk
for political turmoil or retreat of democracy. By asking the question when a specific
amendment is made one gets to focus on the circumstances and political environment
surrounding the specific time frame of an amendment. The specific circumstances help
understand the real motivations and practical implications of an amendment even when
government officials suggest otherwise. Suppose a president’s party just lost the majority
in the National Assembly, the president is one year away from the end of his mandate,
and he has already suggested that he had no intention in leaving office. The president
then introduces a draft of a constitutional amendment that would create a Senate in which
he would have the right to nominate more than a third of the Senators. The point that I am
making here is that the specific context matters in understanding the real motivations for
the amendment.15 Knowing why a particular amendment was made allows one to focus
on the real and hidden reasons for the amendment. When asking the question why this
amendment, one implies why this amendment instead of a different one. This leads to a
consideration of all possible reasons that might determine whether the amendment really
helps democratic consolidation process or not. Knowing where the draft of the
amendment comes from is a valuable information. It helps one get a clear idea about the
real implications of an amendment, because politicians are strategic actors and usually act
in their own interest (Lida, 1998). If the amendment comes from the legislative branch, it
matters to know who the author is. It also matters to know whether the initiator is from
the opposition or the ruling party. According to Fall (2011), the executive branch often
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The specific case of the Burkina Faso constitutional amendment to which I am referring will be
addressed at length later on when I discuss each individual amendment.
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uses individual MPs to draft unpopular amendments to which they do not wish to attach
their name. By asking how the amendment is made, I can discover whether there was a
consensus during the adoption of a particular amendment at the National Assembly. In
other words, I can know whether the ruling party passed the amendment alone or with
some opposition members. This is important in contexts where there are different types of
opposition parties, some being called radicals and others, moderates.
Motivation for the amendment: It is important to know the official reasons that
led to the suggestion or adoption of a particular amendment. Once the motivations for the
amendment and the amendment itself as a new constitutional provision are known, one
can objectively evaluate the practical implications of such a constitutional change and
decide whether it promotes democracy or an individual interest. The motivation for an
amendment is known in Francophone West African National Assemblies as l’exposé des
motifs (the rationale for the amendment). It usually consists of a written statement that
lays out the rationale for the law to be voted on. L’exposé des motifs is an official
document. When reading such a document, a reader needs to objectively evaluate the
practical implications of the amendment instead of relying on the reasons given by
government officials as the real motivations behind an amendment are not always clearly
presented (Fall, 2011, p.98). My task is to compare the official rationale for an
amendment to the real and practical implications of the amendment in the light of
democratic principles I cited above, such as the commitment to constitutionalism (Akiba,
2004; O’Donnell, 2010; Linz & Stepan, 2010; Van de Walle, 2003), the need for
changeover of power (Huntington, 1991), the respect for formal rules (Prosner & Young
2007; Braton, 2010) and the commitment to free and fair elections (Przeworski, Alvarez,
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Cheibub, & Limongi, 1997) instead of the politics of an uneven playing field (Levitsky &
Way, 2010; Sartori, 1976; Diamond 1999; Greene 2007). Here is an illustration of what I
mean by objectively evaluating the practical implications of an amendment.
Article 37 of Burkina Faso’s initial Constitution states that the president of the
country is elected for seven years and he can be reelected once. The constitutional law
002/97/AN of January 27, 1997, was introduced to change this provision. The new
Article 37 now states that the president is elected for seven years and that he can be
reelected. Only one word (once) was taken out of the old version of Article 37. However,
the omission of this single word dramatically changed the meaning of the provision. The
objective implication of the new provision is that there is no limits on the president of
Burkina Faso seeking reelection. While one can argue that a president is elected by the
people who may give him or refuse him their votes, I suggest in my literature review
above, using Greene (2007) and Levitsky & Way (2010), that the great advantages for
incumbents in poor and fragile democratic countries together with the informal practices
of an uneven political playing field make the reelection of African incumbents almost
always certain. Previously indeed, incumbent presidents lost only fourteen times out of a
hundred reelection bids in 46 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2005
(Posner & Young, 2007). This is why changes to a constitution that give an open-ended
option for reelection of a president is problematic in countries with a long history of
authoritarian regimes. President Compaoré came to power through a coup d’état in 1987,
and he has been in office since then. Moreover, the initial intent of the constitutional
framers was to limit the presidential term in office. This particular provision was included
in the constitution with the precise formulation based on a minimal consensus between
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the opposition and the ruling party (C.G.D, 2008). More importantly, by amending the
constitution in the middle of the democratic game to allow President Compaoré to stay in
power, the ruling party showed no commitment to constitutionalism. Constitutional
democracy is about predictability of a state’s action. When rules are being modified in
the middle of a game, there is obviously a problem of fairness (Zoethout, PietermaatKros, & Akkermans, 1996). The danger with this amendment is that it might give an
incentive to the opposition to use unconventional means to seize power once convinced
that democracy does not offer any real path for ever getting into power.
According to President Compaoré’s party, the new provision restores fairness and
obeys democratic principles that require freedom for citizens to elect whoever they want
as Head of State. The new change was then introduced to allow citizens to enjoy their
civic and political rights laid out in Article I of the Burkina Faso’s Constitution. Article I
states “discriminations of any sort, notably those based on race, ethnicity, region, color,
sex, tribe, cast, political opinion, financial situation and birth, are prohibited” (Loada,
Fall, & Badet, 2008, p. 20). For the initiators of the amendment, the original Article 37
that limited presidential terms to two was discriminatory against President Compaoré
who is a Burkinabe citizen like anyone else. Although the official reason for this
amendment does not say that the new provision gives President Compaoré a green light
for an unlimited presidency, it is obvious in the light of the explanations given above that
the new version of Article 37 does give the president precisely that opportunity. This way
of interpreting and understanding the new Article 37 is what I refer to as objectively
evaluating the real implications of an amendment.
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Some critics might suggest that there is nothing wrong in modifying the
constitution to let a president stay in power as long as the amendment is done legally.
Actually, non-consolidating constitutional amendments are not necessarily illegal. What I
am suggesting is that they are illegitimate because they are against basic principles of
constitutionalism, such as the commitment to the rules of the democratic game (Loada,
2003). I argue that the amendment of Article 37 serves the interest of a single individual.
The original Article 37 was voted through a referendum and later modified through
legislative means. In democratic constitutionalism, a referendum carries more legitimacy
than a vote made by single-party members (International IDEA, 1998, p. 68).
Open-ended questions in the Round 3 AfroBarometer survey suggest that
Africans usually deﬁne democracy in terms that value alternation of power
(“majority rule” or “change in government”) instead of using language
such as “power sharing” or “working together” (LeVan, 2011, p. 38).
This can be explained by the lack of confidence in African governments due to the
overwhelming domination of the executive branch in these presidential and semipresidential regimes.
In those countries with a highly centralized and hegemonic executive branch,16
the ruling party usually holds the majority of seats in the parliament. In such conditions,
the National Assembly becomes a proxy or a pulpit for the executive branch instead of
being an institution with the ultimate mission of controlling government’s action (Fall,
2008; Prempeh, 2010). When the executive and the National Assembly are led by the
same party, politicians behave as if they were in a one-party regime type in which the
parliament exists just to approve drafts of laws sent by the executive (Thomas &
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Sissokho, 2005). “Conscience voting and open display of independence by a majorityparty legislator are frowned on and harshly punished…such undemocratic and oligarchic
party control over legislators invariably inures to the benefit of presidential power”
(Prempeh, 2010, pp. 26-27). As a matter of fact this is how the situation looks in Burkina
Faso and Senegal where there have been several constitutional amendments.
According to Fall (2012), the electoral system used in Senegal allows the
emergence of supermajorities. For legislative elections, Senegal uses a party-list ballot
system wherein candidates are first chosen by their national party’s committee. There are
no political party primaries as in the US. Candidates are chosen by their party then put on
the party’s list ballot. Voters go to the polls to vote for the party and not necessarily for a
particular candidate, because there are no individual lists of candidates. Candidates are
introduced in the race by their party. Consequently, Members of Parliament (MP) have to
obey17 their party whose leader is the president of the country. They rarely vote against
an executive constitutional amendment draft for fear of losing their seat. They may not be
on the party’s list for the next legislative elections if they challenge the president in the
parliament. The president, as the party leader, gets to choose who is allowed on the
party’s list for elections. This practice is seen as favoring irresponsibility on the part of
elected officials since MPs are not individually responsible before their constituencies
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Constitutional democracy provides for two different types of mandates for Members of Parliament
(MPs): an imperative mandate that is the result of the popular sovereignty theory and a representative
mandate that comes from the national sovereignty theory. MPs with an imperative mandate are delegates
with a mandate from their electoral constituencies. This type of mandate does not allow a MP to vote
according to his or her personal judgment. He or she must vote according to the preferences of the
constituency. With a representative mandate, an MP is not required to vote according to his or her
constituency because the MP represents the nation and not a particular constituency. This type of mandate,
used in all three of my study countries, has the disadvantage of making MPs unresponsive to their
immediate constituencies. Consequently, MPs are more responsive to their party than to their
constituencies, which adds to the power of the president who can easily control Members of Parliament
through party discipline.
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(Good, 2003). The worst fallout from the list ballot system is that it guarantees party
discipline and more importantly, it guarantees MPs’ loyalty to the president. “Contrary to
conventional wisdom, cohesive and highly disciplined political parties do not always
strengthen the legislature” (Barkan, 2010, p. 45). Highly disciplined political parties may
be very useful and desirable in parliamentarian regimes. This is not necessarily the case
in presidential or semi-presidential regimes, because a prime minister who abuses power
is more likely than a president to be checked through a vote of no confidence by the
opposition or even a loss of support from his fellow party members. Early elections are
one option often used to deal with crises in parliamentarianism. These options are not
available in presidential regimes or semi-presidential ones (Linz & Stepan, 1997, p. 20)
such as in Burkina Faso or in Senegal where the president is not even responsible before
the National Assembly. While a Prime Minister can be removed by a vote of no
confidence, a president can only legally be removed by the process of impeachment
because he or she is elected for a constitutional prescribed period. While a Prime
Minister’s decision-making process is guided by the principle of collegiality with other
ministers, the president has only advisers and subordinates whose advice he or she can
freely ignore when deciding (Lijphart, 1999, p. 118). In case of serious crisis, presidents
often fire their prime ministers or the entire government, but rarely leave office. These
practices make the executive a hegemonic branch of the government with a president
who gets to enjoy a very limited check on his governance (Prempeh, 2010; Fall, 2009;
CGD, 2008).
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Unlike Benin, which uses proportional representation with the largest remainderHare formula,18 Senegal has a mixed legislative electoral system that uses proportional
representation and plurality. Although the use of plurality can be justified by the fact that
a government needs some kind of majority to govern, the formula of plurality used in
Senegal is one of the least proportional electoral systems Katz (1997) cited in (Creevey,
Ngomo, & Vengroff, 2005). In the 2001 legislative elections,19 with only 59.6% of the
votes, the party in power (PDS) won 89 of the 120 seats at the National Assembly. The
party that came second in the race (PS) only got 10 seats with 17.2% of the votes. This is
the type of electoral system that Linz & Stepan (1997, p. 19) suggest is not likely to be
conducive to democratic consolidation. The Senegalese parliament is similar to the
Burkinabe parliament that also uses the same practice of the list ballot system. The
difference is that in Burkina Faso the electoral formula is the proportional representation
with the highest average-Hare formula.20 This particular formula is considered the least
proportional of all proportional representation formulas. It allows an over-representation
of the ruling party (Santiso & Loada, 2003). The point that I am making is that the
electoral system chosen in Senegal and Burkina Faso contributes to making the executive
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The proportional representation with the largest remainder-Hare formula that is used in Benin is
favorable to small parties (Zarka, 1996, p. 27). This method consists of allocating the rest of seats to the
largest remainders of unused suffrages. This means that even parties that were not able to have the electoral
quotient might still get a seat at the National Assembly. As a reminder, the electoral quotient is calculated
by dividing the total suffrages of an electoral circumscription by the number of seats available for that
particular circumscription (Loada & Ibriga, Droit constitutionel et institutions politiques, 2007, p. 266).
This electoral system was used in the 1991 Beninese legislative election. With this system is it hard for a
single party or a coalition of parties to obtain the required majority in the Beninese National Assembly in
order to amend the constitution (Loada, Fall, & Badet, 2008).
19
In the 2001 legislative elections, 65 seats were allocated based on a plurality system and 55 on
proportional representation.
20
This formula was used before the changes to the electoral code adopted in July 2001. The changes consisted
in replacing the highest average-Hare formula by the largest remainder-Hare formula. Two types of electoral
districts were introduced. 90 members of parliament are now elected from 13 regional districts instead of 45
districts, and 21 members of parliament are elected on a national list (Santiso & Loada, 2003).
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a too powerful branch that can freely manipulate the constitution for political purposes.
Moreover, unlike in the English-speaking African countries, in many countries of the
Francophone world electoral codes are not included in the constitution. Consequently,
they are manipulated at will by politicians to stay in power. The electoral code in Burkina
Faso has been modified seven times from 1991 to 2002 (Loada & Ibriga, 2007, p. 265).
Changes in the electoral code to win elections became such a prominent practice that the
ECOWAS21 protocol of 2001 on Democracy and Good Governance forbids partner
countries from making any significant political changes six months before any national
election.
Principle in violation: After evaluating an amendment through the analysis of
the general context of governance in the country where the amendment is made, and after
studying the specific context in which the amendment was done, and after analyzing the
motivation for the amendment, the time has come to review the democratic principles
that a non-consolidating amendment would violate with its passage through the
legislature. These principles have already been mentioned above in the literature review
and also in the section where I examine the motivations for an amendment. They are: the
commitment to constitutionalism and respect for the principle of the balance of power,
the commitment to free and fair elections, and the respect for formal rules instead of the
practices of clientelism and the politics of the skewed political playing field. All these
basic democratic principles require respect for civil rights and due process of law,
including checks on executive power and the independence of the press. For example, a
journalist has been jailed in Côte-d’Ivoire for suggesting that President Bédié’s presence
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at a soccer game had brought bad luck to the Ivorian team, a clear case of the lack of
freedom of the press. It also shows that the executive controlled the judiciary, and more
importantly it shows how overly powerful executive power can be. The point is that
consolidation of democracy involves the widespread internalization of democratic culture
that would provide support and acceptance of democratic procedures (Dahl, 1997). As a
matter of fact, consolidation requires more than the so-called double turnover test
promoted by Samuel Huntington. Karl (1996) warns against the specter of a “fallacy of
electoralism” that consists of measuring democratic consolidation based on the single
criterion of elections. While you cannot have democracy without elections, you can
indeed have elections without democracy (Bratton, 1999). The point is that free and fair
elections can coexist with systematic abuses of the political rights of the opposition and
all other types of non-consolidating political behaviors from the ruling party. For
example, incumbents who are intent on retaining their office can engineer electoral rules
that would keep serious contenders out of the electoral race. For example, they can either
use an age requirement or create a “nationality clause” in the constitution or the electoral
code designed to exclude potential opponents (Monga, 1999, p. 51). This was the case for
former president Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Alassane Ouattara in Côte-d’Ivoire
(Gyimah-Boadi, 1999, p. 37). Incumbents can also purposely alter the timing of elections
to increase their chances of holding power. If elections that are supposed to be held in
two years are suddenly due in one year, this can be a major handicap for an opposition
party that lacks crucial financial means and may not be ready on time for competition. All
these non-consolidating political practices are prominent in what Zakaria (1997) calls
illiberal democracy.

67
The Non-consolidating aspect: this refers to the element in the constitutional
amendment that makes it a non-consolidating amendment. The determination of the nonconsolidating aspect of a law is the final step in the process of identification of a nonconsolidating constitutional amendment. One can only get to this step after a meticulous
analysis of the general context of governance in a given country, the specific context of
an amendment that is being examined, the motivation or reasons for the amendment in
question, and the democratic principle that is considered to have been violated or
disregarded. It is only after this process that one can reasonably and convincingly argue
about the non-consolidation or the anti-democratic nature of a constitutional amendment.
Non-consolidation is multiform. Broadly defined, non-consolidation includes all the
informal rules or techniques engineered by politicians to circumvent formal democratic
rules for political gain. This includes any sophisticated political behavior aimed at
creating and maintaining an uneven playing field, corruption, clientelism, abuses of state
resources by incumbents, the monopoly of public media for propaganda in favor of
incumbents, and the use of the law to favor the incumbent’s political agenda. The latter
aspect of democratic non-consolidation is the focus of my work: the use of the
constitution to advance the individual interest of a politician or the interest of the ruling
party. This is what I call non-consolidating constitutional amendments. When reading a
constitutional amendment, one needs to look for signs of the different non-consolidating
aspects I mentioned above using democratic consolidation literature. After describing the
process used to detect and identify non-consolidating constitutional amendments, time
has come to put my formula to the test.
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The process is as follow: I first describe the amendment in question, then I
proceed to individually evaluate the non-consolidating indicators described above. To
avoid repeating myself while examining each individual amendment, I will no longer be
describing the general context of governance as the context described above applies to all
the amendments I discuss below. In other words, the democratic non-consolidating
indicators that I will be evaluating in each individual amendment are: the specific context
of the amendment, the motivation for the amendment, the consolidating principle that
applies to specific amendment, and the non-consolidating aspect that makes me conclude
that a particular amendment is a non-consolidating one. There is a summary table that
introduces each individual amendment. In other words, the written text below each
amendment summary table is the detailed description of all the indicators mentioned
above for respective amendments. As a reminder, there are three non-consolidating
constitutional amendments for Burkina Faso ten for Senegal and none for Benin.

Evaluation of non-consolidating amendments
Among my three study countries, Benin is the only country that has not
experienced any constitutional amendment. Although there has been no amendment to
the Beninese 1990 Constitution, there have been some unsuccessful attempts that need to
be exposed. By looking at the failed attempts of amendment in Benin one can have a
better understanding of how other countries with the same political environment could
avoid unnecessary and dangerous constitutional amendments that often lead to political
instability.
The stability of the Beninese Constitution is not due to the sole factor of
constitutional rigidity. One needs to look at the conditions of adoption and the popular
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legitimacy of the constitution for clarification. The fact that the Beninese people are
willing to fight to protect the constitution has to do with the perceived legitimacy of the
fundamental law (Badet, 2009). According to the author, the proof for this claim was
given two years before the end of President Kérékou’s second term when a small group
of Kérékou supporters started a debate about amending the constitution to remove its age
limit provision22 and the presidential term limit.23 In July 2003, a civil society
organization called Elan started a vast campaign known as “Touche pas à ma
Constitution” (Hands off my Constitution). The campaign consisted in using big posters
in Benin’s major cities with messages against constitutional amendment. This had a snow
ball effect. Media got interested in the issue and a national debate was started. For the
movement Hands off my Constitution, a constitutional amendment about the provisions
cited above, would necessarily damage the foundation of the consensus reached through
the 1990 national conference that would result in a roll back of hard-won democratic
principles (Adjovi, 2006). Faced with silence from President Kérékou on his intentions
for a third term, thirty-three associations and civil society organizations joined Elan to put
pressure on the president. In July 2005, President Kérékou announced that he had no
intention in seeking a third term.
I would have considered an amendment allowing President Kérékou to stay in
office to be a non-consolidating amendment for similar reasons I invoked earlier to make
the case against the amendment of Article 37 in Burkina Faso. Benin as a newly
democratized country, fits the prototype of countries whose general context of
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Article 44 of the Beninese Constitution requires that presidential candidates be between 40 and 70 year
old.
23
Article 42 of the constitution states that in no circumstances a president should serve more than two terms.
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governance I described as fragile, unstable with a weak democratic culture. Table number
1 shows the long period in which the country was under an authoritarian regime. It only
emerged from that dark period in 1991 and was at its second turnover of power when the
attempted amendment happened. In 2005, Benin was still struggling with all the nonconsolidating political diseases such as uneven playing field, corruption, and clientelism
(Wantchekon, 2003; Adjovi, 2006). There is a specific context that qualifies this
attempted amendment for non-consolidation of democracy. President Kérékou had been
in power before from 1972 to 1991. He had only left power after a sovereign conference
forced him out. He returned to power after defeating Nicephore Soglo in 1996. More
importantly, President Kérékou was at his last mandate when his supporters suggested an
amendment to the constitution to remove the only two provisions (Articles 42 and 44)
that could prevent him from running for another term in office. The practical implications
of any amendment to remove these two articles would necessarily be the possibility for
President Kérékou to run for office again. The non-consolidating aspect for such an
attempted of amendment is the lack of commitment to the democratic game as stated in
the 1991 Beninese Constitution. The democratic consolidating principle against which
such a non-consolidating aspect is tested is obviously the commitment to constitutional
democracy. Failing to respect that basic democratic principle necessarily leads to nonconsolidation of democracy. In this particular case, the amendment did not occur because
President Kérékou under pressure from the Beninese people, announced in July 2005,
that he had no plan to run for office.
The second attempt of constitutional amendment was proposed by two groups of
individuals supporting President Kérékou. They suggested that because of the high cost
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of elections it would be a good idea to have presidential, legislative and communal
elections held altogether on the same day. This would save money for the nation. The
Finance Minister also supported the idea arguing that the state had no money, but when
the United Nations Program for Development and the European Union offered their
financial support, Kérékou’s government declined it. Since the government was citing the
lack of financial means to hold elections as planned in the constitution, a nongovernmental organization offered to lend money to the government (Dossa, 2005). The
government rejected the offer. Civil society organizations started a voluntary citizens’
fund for the Autonomous National Election Commission (CENA). It consisted in asking
ordinary citizens to contribute financially to the organization of national elections. Seven
millions CFA (around $14000.00) were collected and given to the electoral commission.
Moreover, ordinary citizens offered their own trucks to the electoral commission for the
distribution of electoral material, and others offered computers. When all these initiatives
were rejected, it became clear to the Beninese people that the government was trying to
do away from its constitutional obligations to organize elections separately and in a
timely fashion (Adjovi, 2006, p. 193). On June 23, 2006 the National Assembly went
ahead and successfully passed an amendment (71 votes out of 83 members) to allow
themselves to overstay their mandate by one year. The proposed amendment consisted in
modifying Article 80 of the constitution so that MPs could stay in office for five years
instead of four. By law DCC 06-74 of July 8, 2006 the Beninese Constitutional Court
voided the amendment in these terms:
Given the fact that the four year tenure which is a constitutionally established fact
is the result of a national consensus arrived at by the Conference of the bone and
sinew of the nation in February 1990 and dedicated by the Constitution in its
preamble stating again the fundamental opposition of the Benin people … to
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power confiscation ; that even if the Constitution made provisions for the
modalities of its own amendment, the determination of the Beninese people to
create a State of law and pluralistic democracy, the safeguard of the legal security
and the national cohesion impose that all amendments take into account the ideals
that led to the adoption of the December 11, 1990 Constitution, especially the
national consensus, a principle of constitutional value. Consequently, articles 1
and 2 of the constitutional law n° 2006-13 adopted by the National Assembly on
June 23, 2006, not respecting the principle of constitutional value, are contrary to
the Constitution, and that there is no need to render a decision on other means.
(Loada, Fall, & Badet, 2008, p. 15).
In my description of the reasons that the first amendment attempted in Benin
would have been a non-consolidating had it occurred, I cited literature to make the point
that the general context of governance in Benin makes it eligible for the occurrence of
non-consolidating constitutional amendments. In other word, the governance context in
Benin fits my first criterion for the occurrence of non-consolidating amendments. I
therefore proceed to examine my second indicator of non-consolidation: the specific
context of the amendment. The particular context in this case is that the National
Assembly members were at the end of their mandate in 2005. President Kérékou had a
year left before the end of his second term. Suggestions were made to have all three
elections (presidential, legislatives and local) held the same day in 2008. The practical
implication of these suggestions was that President Kérékou and the National Assembly
member would overstay their constitutional mandates. President Kérékou was supposed
to leave office in 2006 and the National Assembly members had a mandate that expired
in 2005. As the Constitutional Court’s decision shows, the parliamentarians’ mandate is
four years long. Postponing elections even for one year supposed changing the
constitution to allow more time for MPs in office, a move that required changing the rules
while the democratic game was in progress.
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The motivation for the amendment is that having three elections altogether would
save money for the country, which makes sense. The problem is that constitutional
democracy comes with commitments. For the democratic game to work smoothly, all
actors need to commit themselves to pre-established rules of the game (Dahl, 1997).
Regularity of elections is part of these pre-established rules (Bratton, 1999).
Predictability is a sign of stability and confidence, while capriciousness or
unpredictability is the mark of tyranny or dictatorship (Zoethout, Pietermaat-Kros, &
Akkermans, 1996). The consolidating principle in this case is the commitment to the rule
of democratic game. Overstaying a mandate is a non-consolidating political behavior.
The initiators of the second attempt amendment in Benin cited financial issues as a reason
for postponing elections. Yet, when the government was offered financial support, it
repeatedly rejected the offer. Such behavior becomes suspicious, because among the
multiple informal techniques used by incumbents to stay in power, there is one known as
the practices of alteration of elections timing (Bratton, 1999). Opposition parties are often
financially vulnerable to changes of elections timing. When elections are shortened,
opposition may not gather enough resources in time to compete fairly. When multiple
elections are held together the same day, opposition parties might have concerns about
losing big if they are not ready or if elections are not transparent. By having multiple
elections at different dates it minimize losses, since one might lose today and have a
chance to catch up tomorrow in the next elections. By voiding the amendment, the
Beninese Constitutional Court sent a message that the Court has no intention of setting a
precedent for politically motivated constitutional amendments. Moreover, the Beninese
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people are fond of their constitution and they become nervous about any suggestion of
constitutional amendment (Badet, 2009).

Table 5: Overstaying a presidential mandate
Amendment 002/97/ADP of January 1997
Specific context of the amendment
 President Compaoré came to power through military coup d’état since 1987
 President Compaoré was set to leave power at the end of his second term in 2005
Motivation for the
Principle in violation
Non-consolidating aspect
amendment
 Initial Article 37
Commitment to
Unlimited term in office
discriminates against
constitutionalism
President Compaoré
 Freedom of citizens to
elect whom they want

In Burkina Faso, there have been six constitutional amendments since the
adoption of the constitution in June 1991. I consider three of them to be nonconsolidating amendments. The first one is the amendment 002/97/ADP of January 1997.
This is the amendment of Article 37 regarding the presidential term limit I mentioned
earlier. The amendment allowed members of parliament to remove some spelling errors
in the constitutional document (Article 13 & 59). Some expressions with revolutionary
connotations were also removed from the constitution. The part of the 1997 amendment
that got more attention from media and that was seen as the real reason for the
amendment was related to the presidential term limit (C. G.D, 2008, p. 16). The
amendment made the presidential mandate an open-ended one by changing Article 37 of
the Constitution to make it read that the president of Burkina Faso is elected for five
years and that he can be reelected. “Although it was in conformity with Article 164
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paragraph 3 of the Constitution, [the 1997 amendment] affects an element, which is
capital for our young democracy: the principle of political change made obligatory by
the Constitutional Law of 1991” emphasis added (Loada, 2010, p. 53). According to
Garané (1997), another change in the constitution that makes the 97 amendment
undesirable is that it requires that proposals of amendments coming from the National
Assembly be submitted to the government for opinion. This, according to the author
contradicts the spirit of Article 163 of the initial constitution. One of the missions of the
parliament is to act as a check on governmental power. That is why the parliament is
given the prerogative to decide on both drafts and proposals of amendments. Having the
last word on drafts and proposals of amendments is a restricted domain of competence for
the National Assembly. It is not to be shared with the executive for the good reason that
doing so undermines the constitutional principle of balance of power. By allowing the
executive to give its opinion and eventually decide whether a proposal of amendment
should be allowed, the 1997 amendment increases the power of the executive branch that
can now influence amendments or laws from the National Assembly.
Since I have already discussed this particular amendment of Burkina Faso Article
37 above in the section where I explained how to identify a non-consolidating
amendment, I will only briefly summarize the reasons why the amendment qualifies as a
non-consolidating one. The specific context of the amendment is as follows: President
Compaoré came to power through a coup-d’état in 1987. Then, he was in office until
1991 when he led the country to the transition to democracy and won elections the same
year. In 1997, Article 37 was amended to allow an open-ended presidency in Burkina
Faso. The official reason for amending Article 37 was to correct so-called discrimination
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against President Compaoré. The discrimination in question is the presidential two term
limits included in the initial Burkina Faso Constitution of 1991. Another motivation for
the amendment raised by the ruling party stated that by limiting the presidential terms in
office to two, the initial constitution might impose mediocre candidates for the highly
important office of head of state in Burkina Faso. The suggestion here is that besides
President Compaoré, Burkina Faso lacks qualified candidates for the presidency (Loada,
2003, p.151). Such a motivation does not seem to stand up to any serious examination.
After all, President Compaoré is not eternal and, when he is gone, Burkina Faso will still
exists, as it has been the case for other presidents before him (Maurice Yameogo,
Sangoulé Lamizana, Seye Zerbo, Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo, and Thomas Sankara). The
non-consolidating aspect of this amendment is the unlimited presidency for one
individual: President Compaoré. As a matter of fact, President Compaoré won all
presidential elections and has now spent twenty-seven years in office. I already
mentioned why the initial constitution adopted, like many other constitutions in Africa,
carries a provision for presidential term limits: African incumbents rarely loose elections
(Young & Prosner, 2007; Loada, 2003). The consolidating principle that allows me to
argue that this particular amendment is non-consolidating of democracy is the principle
of commitment to constitutionalism. Democracy is a political game with predictable
principles that require commitment from all actors. Changing the rules while the game is
in progress is nothing, but cheating the system.24

24

On October 30, 2014, the Burkina Faso National Assembly was convened to vote on a constitutional
amendment of Article 37 that could have allowed President Compaoré to stay in power for fifteen more
years. The drafted amendment stated that the President of Burkina Faso was elected for a five-year term
and that he or she could be reelected twice. As stated this amendment would have qualified as a nonconsolidating constitutional amendment according to my study had it become a law. Non-consolidating
constitutional amendments are amendments that are not intended to reinforce democracy or the rule of law.
Instead, they are designed to reinforce the political power of an individual or a group of individuals through
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Table 6: Extension of MPs mandate
Amendment 023-2012/AN of May 18, 2012
Specific context of the amendment
 The legislature was dominated by the ruling party
 The mandate of the legislature was set to expire on June 3, 2012
Motivation for the
Principle in violation
Non-consolidating aspect
amendment
 Upgrading of the
Commitment to
Overstaying a
elections system
constitutionalism
constitutional mandate
 Need to assure regular
functioning of
parliament

In its decision number 2012-008/CC, the Burkinabe Constitutional Council
voided the constitutional law number 001-2012/AN of March 22, 2012, that was
supposed to modify Article 81 of the constitution to allow the National Assembly
members to overstay their mandate by at least six months and until a new legislature was
sworn in. The fourth legislature was set to expire on June 3, 2012. The initiator of this
voided amendment (President Compaoré) argued as a motivation for the amendment that
because of the upgrading of the electoral system, the National Independent Electoral
Commission (CENI) needed more time to get ready for the elections. The amendment
was then introduced to keep the National Assembly in place to ensure continuity until the

targeted constitutional changes engineered to manipulate the democratic game in favor of incumbent
power-holders. After 27 years in office, President Compaoré was being given another chance to stay in
power. The proposed amendment angered the Burkinabe people and provoked a popular uprising that
brought President Compaoré and his government down. This uprising comes as a confirmation of my claim
about the danger of non-consolidating constitutional amendments to the survival of democracy in
democratizing countries. As a reminder, the initial Article 37 of the 1991 Burkinabe Constitution stated that
the president was elected for seven years and that he could be reelected once. Therefore, President
Compaoré was set to leave office in 2005 after his second term. In January 1997, Article 37 was amended
and the word “once” was taken off implying that the president could be reelected indefinitely. Due to these
terms of the new Article 37 and the reading that the Constitutional Council of Burkina Faso made of it,
President Compaoré was able to stay in office for two more terms. In October, 2014 President Compaoré
was at his 27th year in office when he was ousted.
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new legislature could take over. The Constitutional Council voided the amendment on the
ground that it was addressing a specific issue although constitutional law should be made
to address general issues, not specific ones. The amendment was then corrected and
reintroduced with a general purpose as suggested by the Constitutional Council. The new
law (023-2012/AN of May 18, 2012) would allow MPs to overstay their mandate
whenever the government and the absolute majority of the National Assembly decide it is
necessary.
I argue that this amendment does not consolidate democracy in Burkina Faso. As
mentioned earlier, the official motivation for an amendment does not always state the
practical implications of the amendment. Allowing MPs to overstay their constitutional
mandate in office for whatever reason violates a constitutional obligation. The 1991
Constitution states that the National Assembly members are elected for five years. By
taking it on themselves the right to extend their mandate MPs violate the initial contract
between themselves and the people who voted for the constitution. If the National
Assembly decides to extend its mandate, the new law should not apply to the sitting MPs:
otherwise, it could be interpreted as a violation of voters’ trust. The issue here is not
whether there can be legitimate conditions that call for the government to postpone
elections, instead the pertinent issue is a precedent that is being set and that can be used
to manipulate the timing of elections for political reasons25 (Bratton, 1999). In a country
with a well-established democratic tradition, this amendment would not raise any
eyebrows, but in a country with new democratic experience, the issue take on greater

25

I explained earlier in discussing the second failed amendment in Benin how elections timing could be
used in favor of incumbent power holders
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importance. When the Beninese National Assembly used similar reasoning to amend the
constitution, the Constitutional Court voided it on the ground that it was not consensual.
To put this amendment through the test, we take a look at the specific context of
the amendment. The legislature was dominated by the ruling party and the mandate of the
legislature elected on May 6, 2007, was set to expire on June 3, 2012. Appendixes 3 to 7
below present the number of seats held by political parties in the Burkinabe National
Assembly from the first legislature in 1992 to the fifth in 2012. A quick reading of these
appendixes lets us understand that the ruling party has always dominated the National
Assembly. This specific context is important because the electoral system of list ballot in
Burkina Faso allows the president to control individual MPs who are essentially yesvoters, not only because of the clientelist system (Bayart, 1989; Walle, 2003), but more
importantly because voting against an executive draft of an amendment may cost an MP
his seat (Prempeh, 2010). This is the case in many African countries. In 2001, the
Zambian ruling party expelled 22 legislators for their opposition to President Chiluba’s
bid for a third term in office. In Malawi, the consequences of an MP voting against his
party is grounds for forfeiture of his seat. Article 77 of the 1991 Sierra Leonean
Constitution explicitly states that MPs who vote against their party necessarily lose their
membership in the party. An MP may be aware that a particular amendment is not
consolidating of democracy, but might still vote for it to save his or her seat in the
parliament. The consolidating democratic principle that was violated in the case in
question here is the same as the one mentioned earlier in the case of presidential term
limits: lack of commitment to constitutionally agreed upon principles of the democratic
game. The MPs changed the rules while the game was still in progress. Abiding by rules
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is a constitutional constraint and a democratic duty. Overstaying a constitutional mandate
is not consolidating of democracy, particularly not in countries with fragile democratic
experience. In countries like Burkina Faso where democratic culture is not yet strong, it is
not a good idea to set such a precedent as overstaying an electoral mandate. Because in
African countries with a long history of authoritarian or military regimes, citizens judge
democratic progress based on regular elections and alternation in power (LeVan, 2011;
Loada, 2003), for a public long lasting commitment to democracy, people need to see that
power use in a democratic regime is qualitatively different from power use in an
authoritarian regime. This is important to create and maintain confidence in democracy as
the “only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1997).
Table 7: Packing the parliament
Amendment 033-2012/AN of June 11, 2012
Specific context of the amendment
 The ruling party lost the absolute majority in the National Assembly
 The President is in his last term in office, but shows no intention of leaving office.
 The amendment to create a Senate comes after a similar institution was suppressed
Motivation for the
Principle in violation
Non-consolidating aspect
amendment
 Consolidation of
Commitment to checks
Packing the parliament
democracy in Burkina and balances of power
 Better quality of laws

Amendment 033-2012/AN of June 11, 2012 was broad. The initial constitution
had 173 articles. The June amendment modified fifty-six and created five new ones. Two
articles qualify this amendment for non-consolidation of democracy: Article 78 that
introduces the Senate as a new institution and Article 168.1 that offers a complete
amnesty to all former presidents of Burkina Faso. The Senate (89 members) as the 2012
amendment suggests contains elected members and members appointed (31) by President
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Compaoré. The day the amendment was passed with 88 votes an opposition
parliamentarian group walked out of the National Assembly in protest against the
amendment. According to Afro-barometer,26 only 23% of the Burkinabe people support
the creation of a Senate. Another element that makes the amendment so unpopular is that
even Senators who are not appointed by the president are indirectly elected. One needs to
be a local elected official to be allowed to vote or to be a Senatorial candidate. Besides
the unpopularity of the creation of the Senate, Article 168.1 of the amendment offers a
complete amnesty to all former presidents of Burkina Faso. The rationale for this
provision is, according to the initiator, to provide the peace and stability that are
necessary for the development of the country. In other words, all human rights violation
cases and corruption that happened in the past should be forgiven for the sake of peace
and stability. The major problem here is that an amendment of such importance is being
made through a parliament that is dominated by the party in power with 73 seats out of
111. The Burkina Faso opposition suggests that President Compaoré had this amendment
made to guarantee a safe haven for himself in case he happened to be out of power.27
They think that an amnesty in this particular context is hardly anything but the
legalization of impunity. The particular context they refer to is as follows: The
amendment was passed through a National Assembly dominated by the ruling party; the
2012 legislative elections have changed the configuration of the legislature and the ruling
party no longer has the supermajority it enjoyed earlier; President Compaoré is closed to

26

Afro barometer is an independent research project that measures public attitudes on economic, political,
and social matters in sub-Saharan Africa. It was cited in a Burkina Faso online newspaper entitled Le faso.net
(May 20, 2013) (http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article54272
27 See declaration of the Burkinabe opposition leader of September 11, 2013.
http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article55868
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the end of his last term in office and will necessarily need more seats in the parliament if
he decides to amend the constitution to stay in power as he already did in 1997, and more
importantly, President Compaoré has shown no intention of leaving office at the end of
his current mandate. Added to this context is the fact that Burkina Faso had already
experienced a House of Representatives earlier. The experience was not a good one since
the institution was suppressed in 2002 on the grounds that it was inefficient and costly for
the country. Critics wonder why Burkina Faso needs a Senate now and why create an
institution of such importance using a National Assembly dominated by the ruling party.
In the African context, Senates are often created to guarantee the executive control over
parliaments. Senegal represents a good illustration of such abusive used of Senates (Fall,
2011).
The official reason for a Senate is that it would help consolidate democracy in
Burkina Faso by providing a better representation for the people in public affairs. Due to
its function of double checking (together with the National Assembly), the Senate would
provide a better quality of laws produced by the parliament. The Senate, unlike the House
of Representatives that was suppressed in 2002, is fully as competent to deliberate and
control the government’s action as the National Assembly does. These official reasons
seem to be compelling arguments. The issue is that the official motivations for the
amendment do not mention the practical implications of the creation of the Senate. Out of
the 89 Senators, the president will be nominating 31. Due to the context of corruption and
clientelism that seems to be part of the daily political behavior in countries with weak
democratic culture, the president’s choosing a third of the Senate members raises some
concerns about the legitimacy of the institution created in a non-consensual political
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climate. Even if the loyalty of the 31 presidential nominees is not necessarily guaranteed,
the general political context dominated by informal practices makes it very likely that the
president’s nominees would vote alongside the ruling party. Moreover, the remaining
Senators to be elected are chosen among local officials. This makes the process unfair,
since the ruling party holds the majority of municipalities and would consequently win
almost all Senatorial seats. The consolidating principle that is in jeopardy in this case is
the principle of balance of power. The practical implications of the executive packing the
parliament is a lack of legislative control over the executive branch that is already known
to have too much power in semi-presidential and presidential Francophone African
regimes (Fall 2011; C.G.D, 2008).
Parliaments often give African executives wide leeway in the exercise of
authority: “even the selection of the speaker of parliament, which is everywhere the
common prerogative of legislators, is in many instances ceded to presidents in Africa,
enabling them to interfere with the day-to-day business of the legislature” (Prempeh,
2010, p. 24). In my three study countries, there is no confirmation process for presidential
nominees. Consequently, African presidents are free to use their nomination power to
coopt influential legislators. President Chiluba in Zambia appointed nearly half of
legislators to ministerial positions. Legislators in fragile democracies are often more
concerned with winning executive appointment than playing their constitutional role of
controlling government action (Barkan, 2010). Because African countries often depend
on foreign aid rather than domestic taxes, the Finance Minister’s office through which
external donors provide financial support is often more powerful than the legislature that
depends on the good graces of the executive for resources. Consequently, lawmakers
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“become even more vulnerable to the lure of executive patronage and capture” (Prempeh,
2010, p. 25). According to this author, as long as the president is willing to use public
funds and other resources to care for his supporters, the party’s support for the president
is all but guaranteed. It is in such a context that the right of a president to nominate a third
of his country’s Senators looks suspicious and problematic. The non-consolidating
element in this amendment is that the president is seeking to pack the parliament for his
political ambitions. Supporters of a Senate as described argue that this practice of
nominating Senators exists in other countries.28 The reality that is lost in such an
argument is that countries do not have the same democratic experience. Burkina Faso
does not have a democratic experience as strong as the Canadian one, for example. By
suggesting in December 2013 that he intends to consult the people on a possible
amendment of Article 37, the Burkinabe president is in a certain way confirming what the
literature on the creation of African Senates suggests: Senates are often created to help
incumbents hold on to power. As a matter of fact, President Compaoré can no longer
legally stay in office after 2015 unless Article 37 is amended once again. The ruling
party, however, no longer has the required majority to do so. By creating a Senate, the
president can achieve his goal of modifying the constitution, since it is very unlikely that
he will nominate Senators from the opposition who might vote against him.

28

In a response to a journalist who wanted to know why in Burkina Faso the president is allowed to
nominate a third of the Senators, former President of the Burkinabe National Assembly Mélégué Maurice
Traoré said that this practice exists in Canada, a country with a strong democratic tradition
(http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article54272) .
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Table 8: Revenge /Clientelist amendments
Amendments: 2003-15 of June 19, 2003; 2007-06 of February 12, 2007; 2008-31 of
August 7, 2008; 2008-32 of August 7, 2008
Specific context of the amendment
 Lack of consensus – lack of legitimacy in the creation of institutions for a
president’s friends in exchange of political support (Hesseling, 2010; Fall, 2011)
 Dissolution of an institution to remove its president (Thiam, 2007, p. 150)
 Creation and dissolution of Senates as revenge on the part of President Wade (Fall,
2011).
Motivation for the
Principle in violation
Non-consolidating aspect
amendment
 Facilitate a social
Checks and balances of
Clientelism (CRAES,
dialogue (CRAES)
power
CES)
 For a better
Packing the parliament
representation of the
(Senate)
country (Senate)

Among my case study countries, Senegal is the one with the newest constitution,
and yet the one with the largest number of constitutional amendments (15). I consider ten
of them to be non-consolidating. For procedural purposes, I discuss four amendments
classified as non-consolidating for similar reasons together: the amendment number
2003-15 of June 19, 2003 that created the Republic Council for Economic and Social
Affairs (CRAES); the amendment number 2007-06 of February 12, 2007, creating the
Senate; the amendment number 2008-31 of August 7, 2008 suppressing the CRAES; and
the amendment 2008-32 of August 7, 2008, creating the Economic and Social Council.
The non-consolidating nature of these institutions resides in part in the historical context
in which they were created. In 1998, President Abdou Diouf, by the constitutional law
number 98-11 of March 2, 1998, created a Senate against the will of the opposition led by
Abdoulaye Wade. The opposition was strongly opposed to the creation of a Senate.
Abdoulaye Wade promised the Senegalese people to dismiss the institution once in
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power. Two years later, he became president and kept his promise. The Senate was
removed. Wade thus took his revenge, but that is not the whole story.
The specific context of the amendments tell us more about their real political
implications (see table 8 above). By removing the Senate, President Wade removed a
good part of the opposition party, since the Senate was dominated by MPs from the party
of former President Abdou Diouf. The Senate that disappeared in 2001 was recreated in
2007 (amendment number 2007-06 of February 12, 2007). Out of a total of hundred
Senators, President Wade nominated 65, and the remaining seats were filled through
indirect elections by an electoral college made up of MPs and local officials (Hesseling,
2010; Fall, 2012, p. 33). According to Cabanis and Martin (2005), the creation of Senates
in the African context usually obeys the needs for politicians to offer their friends
political offices in return for their support for unclean or illegitimate political maneuvers.
This was the case for Cameroon in 1996, Côte d'Ivoire in 1998, and Togo in 2003. By
nominating more than half of the Senators, President Wade’s goal was to consolidate his
grip on power. The real implications of the creation of the new institution is that Senators
are given constitutional power to participate in the process of constitutional amendment.
Needless to say, a sitting president in the African context I described above would not
nominate opposition members who might vote against him. In other words, what is at
work here is the informal practices of clientelism in which a politician offers goods and
services for political support (Walle, 2003).
The creation and suppression of the CRAES happened in circumstances similar to
the ones that led to the creation of the Senate under President Abdou Diouf: there was no
consensus (Hesseling, 2010). The opposition Socialist Party (PS) was strongly opposed to
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it, but the party in power, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) did not bother to reach
out (Fall, 2011). President Wade created the CRAES and later removed and replaced it
with a similar institution that has a different name: The Economic and Social Council
(CES). The rational used to defend the creation of the CRAES is the same rationale that
was put forward to explain the creation of the CES, which is to facilitate a social
dialogue. Why remove one institution to create another institution when the only
difference between them is just the name? Actually, there was more than the mere change
of name according to Fall (2011, p.195). President Wade did not want M’baye Jacques
Diop as the president of the CRAES anymore. He suggested that Diop resign, but Mr.
Diop refused to do so. The President then chose to eliminate the entire institution to
remove the head of the institution, Mr. Diop. The fact is that President Wade had already
promised the presidency of the CRAES to Mrs. Aminata Tall, a longtime member of the
PDS who became a dissident and whom President Wade wanted back into the party. The
sitting president of CRAES, Mr. Diop was originally from the PS, the former party in
power. He only joined President Wade and the PDS during the 2000 presidential runoff
elections. Legally, President Wade could not remove him as he was supposed to serve as
President of the CRAES for five years (Thiam, 2007, p. 150). President Wade then
dismissed the entire institution to achieve his goal (Hesseling, 2010). Proceeding that way
was much easier for the president, since his party had more than the required majority in
the Parliament to amend the Constitution (see appendixes 8 & 9).
According to Hesseling (2010), the context of the four constitutional amendments,
the reasons used to defend their necessity, and their real implications seem to confirm
that they are all politically motivated. For instance, the official motivation for creating a
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Senate was that the institution would help consolidate democracy by reinforcing local
representation. If this were the real objective of the amendment it seems contradictory
that 65 of the Senators are chosen by the president and not by the people that they are
supposed to represent. Moreover, the opposition led by Wade under President Diouf
rejected a similar amendment in 1999 on the grounds that a senate was unnecessary and
too costly for the country. The same opposition also boycotted the Senatorial elections
arguing that the rules and settings for the election were too advantageous for the ruling
party, although Abdou Diouf the former president only nominated 12 senators. When
Abdoulaye Wade became president he took his revenge by dismissing the Senate and
recreating his own in which instead of 12 he nominated 65 senators, five times more
senators than President Diouf.
Besides the cost and the unnecessary nature of institutions such as the CRAES
and the CES in a bicameral institutional environment, the non-consensual context of the
creation of these institutions poses a serious problem of legitimacy and a problem of
efficiency. To state it clearly, I am not doubting the importance of a Senate as a vital
institution in the structure of constitutional democracy. The point is that a Senate and
even the CRAES or CES can be useful institutions that can help consolidate democracy:
however, the problematic context in which they were created not only undermines their
efficiency, but it also makes them non-consolidating institutions (Fall, 2011). The
consolidating democratic principle that I argue has been disregarded or violated in the
particular context of these amendments is checks and balances of power. By packing the
parliament with members of the same ruling party in the context of a strong presidential
regime added to a widespread practices of clientelism, what is being denied to the people
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is the principle of checks and balances (Prempeh, 2010; Monga, 1999; Wantchekon,
2003).
Table 9: Amendments for revenge against the President of the National Assembly
Amendment 2007-26 of May 25, 2007 & Amendment 2008-67 of 21 October 2008





Specific context of the amendment
Since 2007, personal relationships between President Wade and the president of the
National Assembly, Macky Sall were shaky (Fall, 2011, p. 192)
The president of the National Assembly asked Karim Wade (the son of President
Wade) to present an accounting of money spent for the organization of the Islamic
summit that he led. President Wade was enraged (Scales-Trent, 2011, p. 92).
President Wade was more than eighty year old and there was a probability that he
would leave office before the end of his term in 2012
The President of the National Assembly has been stripped of power to approve and
sign constitutional laws (Fall, 2011).

Motivation for the
Principle in violation
amendment
 The president of the
Separation and
Senate as the second
balances of power
highest official is a
logical consequence of
the creation of a
Senate
 Need to treat all
legislators equally

Non-consolidating aspect
 Use of the
constitution for a
personal revenge
(getting Macky Sall
out for someone
who does not
challenge President
Wade)

Amendment 2007-26 of May 25, 2007 made the president of the Senate (instead
of the President of the National Assembly) the second highest ranking official in the
country. Amendment 2008-67 of October 21, 2008 that I already described in the
beginning of the chapter removed the five-year mandate of the president of the National
Assembly. Based on unspecified troubled relationships between President Wade and the
then president of the National Assembly, Macky Sall, Article 39 of the 2001 Senegalese
Constitution that held the president of the National Assembly as the second highest
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official in the country was modified (Fall, 2011). According to the new law, the president
of the Senate replaces President Wade in case of a vacancy. President Wade was more
than eighty years old and there was a probability that he would leave office before the
end of his term in 2012. As a matter of fact, while the President of the National Assembly
Macky Sall was being deprived of his constitutional power in favor of the President of
the Senate, the internal rules of the National Assembly were also being modified to strip
him of his power to approve and sign constitutional laws. When in 2008, Macky Sall as
President of the National Assembly asked Karim Wade, the son of President Wade, to
present an accounting of money spent for the organization of the Islamic summit that he
led, President Wade felt humiliated. He was enraged that the Parliament would dare to
ask his son to appear before the National Assembly (Scales-Trent, 2011, p. 92). The
immediate consequences were the removal of Macky Sall from the presidency of the
National Assembly. Amendment 2008-67 of October 21, 2008, was passed and MPs
voted to remove Macky Sall. Senegalese constitutionalists classify this amendment as
revenge (Fall 2011). The different aspects of non-consolidating amendments summarized
in table 13 say a lot about how constitutions are being used by West African politicians.
Actually, in Senegal, there has never been a military coups-d’état; there are only
constitutional coup-d’états. In this particular context one can safely say that in Senegal,
constitutions do not limit the power of those who govern. Rather, constitutions are legal
instruments in the hands of officials for personal use. This is what Kanté (1989) means
when he says that Senegal is an example of stability and continuity, but it is also an
example of constitutional instability. Based on the official motivations, it can be argued
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that there is no proof of bad intent behind the two amendments mentioned above.
Moreover, they were done legally.
As a matter of fact, official motivations usually do not present all the practical
implications of an amendment. The official motivation for making the president of the
Senate the second highest official in the country only states that the president of the
Senate is the second highest government official as a consequence of the creation of the
Senate (Fall, 2007, p. 244). Such a statement does not provide sufficient information for
anyone who is interested in understanding why instead of the President of the National
Assembly (as stated in Article 39 of the initial constitution), the amendment makes the
president of the Senate the second highest official. As mentioned above, there have been
some internal ruling party disputes between President Wade and Macky Sall the president
of the National Assembly. The draft of the amendment and the removal of the president
of the National Assembly came right after the dispute and after Macky Sall requested that
Karim Wade, the son of President Wade, testify about his use of public funds (Fall,
2011).
One might argue that the connection between the amendment to change the
official protocol and the shaky relations between President Wade and Macky Sall is not
obvious; however, one needs to remember the context. We are talking about a country
where the use of constitutional amendments for personal revenge is known. President
Diouf, when faced with a similar situation in 1984, had Habib Thiam, then president of
the National Assembly, removed through a constitutional amendment. Once Mr. Thiam
was removed from the presidency of the National Assembly, the article was reinstated
exactly as it has been initially (Fall, 2011, p. 190). President Senghor used a similar
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manoeuver to remove his adversary and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in 1962. An
important fact that is worth mentioning is that Macky Sall, the former evicted president
of the National Assembly, won the 2012 Senegalese presidential election and is the
current president of Senegal. Karim Wade, the son of former Senegalese president
Abdoulaye Wade is now in prison on charges of embezzlement. This seems to confirm
the political nature of the amendments against the former president of the National
Assembly who is now taking his revenge.
Actually, the official reasons for the amendments are neither clear, nor
convincing. One thing that seems clear and convincing, however, is that President Wade
and the ruling party disregarded the constitutional principle of separation and balances of
power by removing the president of the National Assembly who was, according to the
initial constitution, the second highest ranking official in the country and had a five-year
mandate in such position. Non-commitment to constitutionalism and the informal use of
the constitution for retaliation are the non-consolidating aspects I argue are behind
Amendment 2007-26 of May 25, 2007 and Amendment 2008-67 of October 21, 2008.
Table 10: Amendments for overstaying a constitutional mandate
Amendment 2006-11 of January 20, 2006, & amendment 2007-21 of February 19,
2007
Specific context of the amendment
 Senegal was less than four months away from legislative election (Fall, 2011.
 Unclear and confusing motivation for the amendments.
Motivation for the
Principle in violation
Non-consolidating aspect
amendment
 Flooding and lack of
Commitment to
Overstay of MP mandate
financial means.
constitutionalism
 Commitment to the
Senegalese electoral
code.
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Amendment 2006-11 of January 20, 2006, and amendment 2007-21 of February
19, 2007, that modified the previous amendment were both made to allow MPs to
overstay their mandate. They were criticized by the opposition for being crafted to
change the electoral schedule for political purposes (Fall, 2012). The Senegalese
opposition suggested that these two amendments were a way for the ruling party to create
uncertainty about the elections in order to win. The ruling party (PDS) and its affiliated
parties ended up winning the 2007 legislatives elections 133 seats out of 150. The point is
that the two amendments by postponing elections successfully disturbed the electoral
calendar and frustrated the opposition, which claimed to have been cheated in the whole
process. As a matter of fact, the rationale for the amendment was not strong enough to
convince an objective observer about the need to amend the constitution. According to
the President who initiated the 2006 amendment, the amendment was justified by the
heavy rain that forced many Senegalese out of their homes and that resulted in a
government relocation program. Faced with these unusual circumstances, the government
had to reallocate financial resources to deal with the crisis. Consequently, no money was
left to hold elections as scheduled (Fall, 2011, p.154). President Wade then suggested that
the constitution be modified in order to have both Presidential and legislative elections
held altogether. This was the official reason for the January 2006 amendment. The
mandate of the MPs elected on April 29, 2001, was set to expire on May 17, 2006.
Meanwhile the President’s party raised the number of seats in the National Assembly
from 120 to 150. These changes required some redistricting. Unsatisfied with the
resulting redistricting, some opposition parties reached out to the Council of State that
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voided the redistricting law (on January 12, 2007) on the grounds that some demographic
criteria were not properly taken into account.
President Wade saw an opportunity to take another bite at the constitution. He
suggested amendment 2007-21 of February 19, 2007. This time the president proposed
that the presidential election and the legislative elections be held on different dates.
Unfortunately, the official rationale for the new amendment does not say where the
government suddenly got the money to hold separate elections. As a reminder, the
government argued earlier that it was postponing the legislative elections to have them
held together with the presidential election because it had no money to organize them
separately on time. A year later with amendment 2007-21 of February 19, 2007, the
government argued it needed to postpone the same legislative elections to hold them
separately from the presidential election. The initiators of the amendment argued that the
presidential election according to Article 31 of the Constitution had to be held at the
scheduled time. The legislative elections, however, could no longer be held at this time
because there was not enough time for the declaration of candidature that was supposed
to happen sixty days before the elections, according to Article 168 of the electoral code.
Therefore, the legislative elections were to be held on June 3, 2007. All these confusing
rationales make one feel that the constitution is just being toyed with. Notice that there is
no more mention of a lack of funding for the elections as suggested in the initial
amendment. The Senegalese executive had five years to get ready for legislative
elections.
The rationale presented does not mention any effort on the part of the government
to respect the elections timetable that is a constitutional commitment for any democratic
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country (Bratton, 1999). The 2007 law that modified the 2006 amendment states that the
presidential election had to be held on time and that the legislative elections could not be
held because of the provision of Article 168 of the electoral code. Since amendment
2006-11 of January 20, 2006, had already been passed to keep MPs in office, I argue that
Article 168 could have been modified to hold both elections altogether as planned
through amendment 2006-11 of January 20, 2006, if the government were serious about
holding elections altogether to save money. The point is that Article 168 (that is now
cited in the 2007 amendment as the reason for not holding the legislative and presidential
elections altogether) is an article from the electoral code. If the government were serious
about respecting its earlier amendment, it could have chosen to modify Article 168. An
electoral code is hierarchically inferior to a constitution that is the supreme law.
Therefore, if the ruling party can amend the constitution, it can also modify the electoral
code. Not doing so shows the lack of sincerity that is the common denominator for all
non-consolidating behaviors. The Senegalese authorities are using the electoral calendar
for political gains.29
The particular context that makes Amendment 2006-11 of January 20, 2006, and
Amendment 2007-21 of February 19, 2007, suspicious and non-consolidating of
democracy is that they occurred a few months before the elections were held. Analysts
(Fall, 2011; Bratton, 1999) argue that as elections approach, ruling parties in weak
democratic countries engineer all kind of techniques to make sure they have an upper
hand over the results. This is the main reason why the 2001 ECOWA (Economic

29

I have already discussed earlier how manipulating the electoral calendar can be used for political gains
(Bratton, 1999)

96
Community of West African States) protocol30 suggests that no substantial changes to the
electoral law be allowed within six months of elections, unless it is done with a popular
consensus. The Amendment 2007-21 of February 19, 2007, was adopted less than four
months before the Senegalese legislative elections on May 24, 2007. The amendment was
not consensual as shown in previous paragraphs. The motivations for the amendment are
confusing and not reliable. The two amendments show a non-commitment to
constitutionalism as they legalized an overstaying of legislative mandates. Moreover, the
practical implications of -a disturbed electoral calendar is known in the transition to
democracy and democratic consolidation literature (cited in the beginning of this chapter)
as a non-consolidating behavior of authoritarian regimes meant to secure elections.
Table 11: Extending the Presidential Mandate
Amendment 2008-66 of October 21, 2008
Specific context of the amendment
 The amendment of Article 27 was supposed to be done through a referendum
 The National Assembly was overwhelmingly dominated by the ruling party (131
seats out of 150)
Motivation for the
Consolidating Principle Non-consolidating aspect
amendment
 A longer presidential
Commitment to
Unreasonable extension of
mandate allows the
constitutionalism
presidential mandate (Fall,
president to get his
2011, 2012)
multiple projects done.

Amendment 2008-66 of October 21, 2008, made the presidential mandate longer,
taking it from five to seven years. Most democracies around the world have shorter
presidential mandates (in most Anglophone countries, the presidential mandate lasts four
years). France, whose model of governance is being adopted in most Francophone

30

Protocol ASP 12/1/2001 signed in Dakar in 2001 (Fall, 2011, p. 197)
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countries, has had a five-year presidential term since 2000. The tendency around the
world is to have a shorter presidential term in office (Fall, 2011). The presidential
mandate always creates passionate debates during constitution-making in democratizing
countries because it is considered an important constitutional principle to have a limited
presidential term in office due to the hegemony of the executive power (Prempeh, 2010;
Monga, 1999; fall, 2007; Walle, 2003). Once this key provision is included in the
constitution, modifying it becomes suspicious when it is done through a National
Assembly that is dominated by the ruling party. In Senegal, the amendment was easily
passed through the parliament although Article 27 of the Constitution stipulated that this
particular constitutional provision could not be changed without a referendum (Fall,
2011, p.59). This view is supported by Babacar Guéye and Demba Sy who together with
three others drafted the 2001 Senegalese Constitution. President Wade and his experts in
constitutional law found their way around the provision and amended the constitution
without a referendum.
At the end of his second term, President Wade argued that the 2001 Senegalese
constitution that limited the presidency to two terms in office could not apply to him as
he held his mandate under the 1963 Constitution. Therefore, he could be a presidential
candidate for two more terms after he ended his first two-term presidency under the 1963
Constitution. The Constitutional Council agreed on the grounds that the law is not
retroactive. In other words, a law that was made in 2001 could not apply to a president
elected in 2000. This decision of the Constitutional Council seems awkward, because
Article 104 of the 2001 Constitution clearly states that the President could continue his
current mandate to the end. The second clause of the Article says that all other provisions

98
are applicable to the sitting president, which means that after a second mandate President
Wade could not run for presidential elections again (Fall, 2011). Wade was allowed to
run for reelection in 2012. The point is that President Wade was interested in holding on
to power as long as he could. This is the logic that prevailed in Amendment 2008-66 of
October 21, 2008, that extended the presidential mandate to seven years. In countries
known for their strong executive powers and longer presidential mandates unlimited
terms in office are undesirable because of the potential abuses of power. With longer
presidential mandates presidents become all but kings with the only difference being that
ruling by heredity is not allowed (Louis Blanc cited by Fall, 2011).
“We have seen that under the changes to the 2001 Constitution, the
President is supreme over all other organs of government, and considers himself
"infinitely eligible". Wade has also fueled the high degree of paranoia that
surrounds his exercise of power by frequently appointing, then replacing, political
appointees…But since Wade was elected president in 2000, in the past ten years
alone he has had one hundred twenty-two ministers and six prime ministers, and
has reorganized the cabinet seventeen times. The most recent reorganization was
in June 2010. How could those appointees not be concerned about their survival
in Wade's political world? (Scales-Trent, 2011, p. 95)
The amendment 2008-66 of October 21, 2008, if passed in a well-established democratic
country, may not have raised any suspicion or any concern about a potential nonconsolidation of democracy, but in the context I just described, there seems to be good
reasons to be alarmed. In ten years, President Wade has made more non-consolidating
amendments than his two predecessors. This created a suspicious political environment as
almost all amendments are initiated by the executive and they are mainly aimed at
consolidating the grip on power of one person: President Wade endlessly increases his
power over the legislative and the judiciary (Thomas & Sissokho, 2005; Fall 2007, 2011,
2012; Scales-Trent, 2011). The motivation for the amendment in question seems very
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poor as an argument to extend a presidential mandate that was already set by the
Senegalese fundamental law. Moreover, the amendment was done in a non-consensual
political context. The real implication of extending a presidential mandate is that a
president may stay longer in power even when he becomes very unpopular. This raises
significant risks in democratizing countries where democracy is not necessarily the “only
game in town” and can jeopardize peace when an unpopular president is seen as being in
power forever. Most African constitutions have shorter mandates (Fall, 2012). By
extending the presidential mandate, although the new amendment does not apply to
President Wade, the non-consensual political environment of the amendment confirms
the lack of commitment to constitutionalism as a democratic principle. The initial
constitutional provision limiting the presidential mandate to five years was well accepted
as five years seems to be the norms in Francophone West African constitutions (Fall,
2011).
Table 12: Creation of a Vice-Presidency
Amendment 2009-22 of June 15, 2009
Specific context of the amendment
President Senghor used a similar maneuver to impose a new president when he was
leaving office.
 President Wade was 85 years old and could leave office any time allowing his
unelected vice-president to lead the country.
 President Wade was suspected of creating the office of Vice-President for his son.
Motivation for the
Principle in violation
Non-consolidating aspect
amendment
 To better involve
Commitment to
Use of the vice-presidency
citizens in public
constitutionalism
to hold on to power after
affairs
leaving office
 To reinforce
democracy
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With the Amendment 2009-22 of June 15, 2009, an office for the Vice-President
of Senegal was created. The rationale for the law states that the vice-president will be
nominated by the president and will exercise the missions given him by the president.
The vice-president can be fired by the president. He or she becomes the second highest
government official according to the country’s official protocol. The initiator claimed that
the creation of this office was justified by the desire to get citizens involved in public
affairs and to reinforce democracy in Senegal. But nowhere in the official motivation is
there any mention of how the creation of a vice-presidency stimulates citizens’
involvement in public affairs. The mission of the vice-president is not determined by the
constitution, but rather by the president who decides what the vice-president does. This
particular idea looks awkward. In constitutional democracy major institutions are part of
the initial constitutional design that creates a republic (Elster, 1993). The vice-presidency
is a major institution since the vice-president may at any time become the president of the
country. For the creation of an institution as important as the vice-presidency, common
sense would be for the ruling party to have a national debate in order to bless the new
institution with the basic national consensus necessary for its legitimacy and efficiency.
In political systems that are constitutional, in which constitutions are taken
seriously as limiting government and limiting the decision-making process
they describe, important modifications in the political system need to be
reflected in the constitution. (Lutz, 1994, p. 357)
Instead, President Wade and his party chose a constitutional amendment passed by a
National Assembly dominated by his party (131 seats out of 150). For the sake of
practicality a political regime with a president and a prime minister, there is no need for a
vice-president unless the office is created to solve a political crisis. Looking at the nature
of democratic political regimes, a vice-presidency usually exists in countries with
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monocephalic (presidential) regimes, not in countries with bi-cephalic regimes (Fall,
2011). There is already a panoply of institutions that make the role of a vice-president
unnecessary in Senegal. Besides the Senate and the National Assembly, there is the CES
with the mission of advising the president on important policies decision-making.
Moreover, the Constitution has already taken care of the process of succession of the
president in case of his unexpectedly leaving office (Article 39). This particular
amendment is part of the non-consolidating manoeuvers by former presidents to control
power after they are out of office. The proof of such a statement is given in another
amendment introduced by the president on June 23, 2011, to remove the second round of
the presidential election process and to have the president and the vice-president elected
on the same ticket as in the US.
The way the electoral process usually works in Senegal is that presidential
candidates are elected through a direct universal suffrage. In case no candidate obtains
the absolute majority of the vote, a second round is organized between the two candidates
who obtained the highest votes. With the new proposed amendment, the winner would
only need more votes than the other candidates, even if that means only 25% of the total
vote. An absolute majority is no longer required. This amendment was introduced only
seven months before the presidential election scheduled for February 2012. It was done
using what is known as the emergency procedure (which does not include extensive
debate by MPs). Why introduce such an important amendment a few months before the
presidential election? There is no need to answer this question because President Wade
intention to preserve his power seems obvious from the political context at the time.
President Wade was aware of his growing unpopularity, and he was trying to find a way
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to secure his stay in office (Fall, 2011, p.207). Informed of the president’s maneuver, the
Senegalese civil society, led by RADDHO (African Meeting for the Defense of Human
Rights) organized public protests under the name Y en a marre (enough is enough). The
pressure from this movement became so intense that President Wade had to withdraw the
amendment. Fall (2011) calls this mobilization of the Senegalese people against the
amendment the birth of Senegalese constitutional patriotism.
The context for the creation of the vice-presidency matters in assessing its
consolidating or non-consolidating nature. As summarized in table 12, President Wade
was 85 years old and could at any time leave office allowing an unelected vice-president
to lead the country. More disturbing to the Senegalese people was the fact that nobody
knew who President Wade was going to choose as his vice-president. This fueled the
rumors that the president was preparing Karim Wade, his son, to take power. Such
suspicions make sense when one considers the setting of the new institution of the vicepresidency. The prospect of the president retiring is not trivial. As a matter of fact, this
scenario happened before when President Senghor chose Abdou Diouf to replace him by
adding a second clause to Article 35 of the constitution in 1976. Diouf became president
without election and ruled the country for twenty years (Kanté, 1989). Senegalese
opposition argued that it was a violation of the right of the Senegalese people to choose
their leader since the people constitute the source of sovereignty for any constitutional
democratic government (Cheramy, 1976).
The motivation for the amendment stating that the vice-presidency would allow a
better involvement of the people in public affairs does not seem to make any sense when
one looks at the practical implications, which are that a vice-president could be imposed
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upon the people with no elections due to the creation of a non-consensual institution.
Such a vice-president could become president without legitimacy. The irony is that
President Wade vehemently criticized a similar manoeuver when he was in the opposition
(Fall, 2011). The author argues that this is a deliberate disregard of the Senegalese
constitution for political purposes on the part of President Wade whose attempted
amendment confirmed his determination to hold on to power. Aware of his unpopularity
he proposed an amendment that would allow him and his unknown vice-president to be
elected with no absolute majority as required by the initial constitutional provision. All he
would need would be to come out ahead of other presidential candidates, which
according to analysts was still possible due to the enormous advantages of incumbency in
democratizing countries with weak democratic culture (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
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Table 13: Summary of non-consolidating aspects of amendments
Country Overstaying a Constitutional
Mandate

Packing the
Parliament

Burkina 
Faso





Senegal




Amendment 002/97/ADP of
January 1997 (Extension of
presidential mandate)
Amendment 023-2012/AN
of May 18, 2012 (Extension
of MPs mandate)
Amendment 2006-11 of
January 20, 2006 (Extension
of MPs mandate)
Amendment 2007-21 of
February 19, 2007
(Extension of MPs mandate)



Amendment
033-2012/AN
of June 11,
2012
(Creation of a
Senate)
Amendment
2007-06 of
February 12,
2007
(Creation of a
Senate)

Amendment for
Clientelism

Amendment for
Revenge

Amendment for
securing Power after
End of Term









Amendment
2003-15 of
June 19,
2003
(Creation of
the CRAES)
Amendment
2008-32 of
August 7,
2008
(Creation of
the CES)





Amendment
2008-31 of
August 7, 2008
(Removal of the
president of the
CRAES)
Amendment
2007-26 of May
25, 2007
(Removal of the
National
Assembly
President as
Number 2)
Amendment
2008-67 of
October, 21 2008,
Shortening of
Macky Sall’s
Mandate



Amendment 200866 of October 21,
2008 (Extension of
presidential
mandate)
Amendment 200922 of June 15,
2009 (Creation of
a vice-presidency)

105

Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented all the constitutional amendments made in my case
study countries since the adoption of their respective constitutions. Benin experienced no
amendment, while Burkina Faso had six and Senegal fifteen. Details are given in table 14
below. I identified thirteen out of a total of twenty-one amendments to be nonconsolidating amendments. I did so by relying on five indicators of democratic
consolidation: the general context of governance in a given country; the specific context
in which an amendment is made; the motivations for the amendment; the consolidating
principle that the amendment can be tested against; and the non-consolidation aspect of
the amendment. The general context of governance is an important indicator in my work,
because non-consolidating constitutional amendments are prevalent in countries with
specific characteristics that violate principles of governance considered necessary for
democratic competition. That is why a similar amendment deemed non-consolidating in a
democratizing country may not be considered so in a country with a well-established
democratic tradition. The specific context of a given amendment sheds light on the real
and practical implications of the law. Such practical implications are not always
presented in the official motivation for the amendment. The motivation for an
amendment is the official defense for a given law. By comparing the official argument
for an amendment to the applicable constitutional principle, one is better positioned to
say whether or not a given law is made to advance democracy. After analyzing an
amendment in the light of the four indicators cited above, it becomes easy to point to the
particular aspect in a law that is problematic in term of constitutional democratic
practices.
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As a matter of fact, these problematic amendments, which I call nonconsolidating amendments, are not intended to reinforce democracy or the rule of law.
Non-consolidating amendments are mainly designed to reinforce the political power of an
individual or a group of individuals through targeted constitutional changes engineered to
manipulate electoral and other political laws in favor of incumbent power-holders. The
challenge in this chapter was to identify non-consolidating amendments and show why
they were non-consolidating of democracy.
I first presented the unusual African political context in which non-consolidating
constitutional amendments are made, a context where the executive branch dominates the
other branches of the government. Moreover, the party that holds the presidency is almost
always the same party that controls the parliament. The president’s party usually has
more than the required majority to amend the constitution. I discussed an electoral system
that not only makes it easier for a single party to be over represented in the parliament,
but also gives the president control over which candidate makes it to the legislative list
ballots. This particular practice makes MPs vulnerable vis-à-vis the president and often
pushes them to give the president a blank check for amending the constitution in
exchange for their seat in the parliament. This is what Good (2003) explains in his
analysis of South African elections:
The use of the party list system of proportional representation without
constituencies or provision for by-elections, placed great preferment in the hands
of the executive… Singularly and collectively, the ruling elite of Southern Africa
have shown that their chief concerns are with self-interest and retention of power
and constitutionalism counts for little. (p. 4).
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As I have shown, such practices vary among the three countries chosen for this study,
allowing us to view them in comparative perspective as they reflect various levels of
commitment to democratic principles.

Table 14: Number and percentage of amendments per country since the adoption of
the current constitutions

Benin
Burkina
Faso
Senegal

Year of
NonTotal number
Percentage of nonconstitution consolidating
of amendments consolidating amendments
adoption
amendments
1990
0
0
0%
1991

3

6

50%

2001

10

15

67%
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Chapter IV: Openness of constitutional adoption process
Introduction
Constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, constitutional conferences,
national conferences, representative legislative committees, constitutional commissions,
transitional legislative models, and peace negotiations are some of the concepts used in
the literature to talk about constitutional drafting and amendment processes (Fafard &
Reid 1991; Widner, 2005). As a matter of fact, the process that brings a constitution to
life is vital and often dictates the nature of the constitutional document that is produced
(Haysom 2007; Elster 1993, 1995; Santiso 1998; Banks 2008; Battharai & Subedi 2007).
The focus of this chapter is the process of constitution-making. I argue that an open
constitutional adoption process (a transparent and inclusive process) will lead to a better
substantial constitutional document; a document that is more consensual and that will
therefore be owned and accepted by the parties involved (Akiba, 2004). My assumption
is that a constitutional adoption process that is not inclusive and transparent would be
viewed as illegitimate and troublesome for a country. In such conditions, a country is
more likely to experience non-consolidating constitutional amendments mainly because
of the lack of consensus during the adoption process and also because of the indifference
citizens may show toward constitutional issues. This may give the government a free pass
to engage in undue amendments, since the people who are excluded from the process
would not feel any duty to defend or protect a constitution they did not own in the first
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place. I use two indicators to make my point about the openness of the constitutional
adoption process. First, I discuss the importance of having an inclusive and diversified
sample of participants in the constitution drafting process. Second, I show how sharing
information about the adoption process makes a difference when it comes to transparency
and the quality of the constitutional document produced at the end of the process. I show
how important the sovereign conference was in the constitutional adoption process in
Benin and how the lack of independence of the constitutional drafting body from the
sitting regime had a negative impact on the outcomes of the processes in Burkina Faso
and Senegal. I explain that in these two countries there was no national consensus on the
constitutional document itself, not only because the internal process wasn’t consensual,
but also because the process lacked openness from the beginning. A constitutional
drafting body that is controlled or numerically dominated by the sitting party, although its
internal decision-making process may happen to be consensual, does not produce a
national consensus. Basing my position on a concept of national consensus obtained
through a free and inclusive popular participation, I argue that the availability of
information to the public is not obvious in Burkina Faso and Senegal as the people were
excluded from the beginning and did not take part in the process until the referendum that
is the final step of the process. I conclude that the Beninese Constitution because of it
inclusiveness and relative transparency is substantially better than the constitution of
other two countries (table 15 below shows that only the Beninese constitution-making
process satisfies my two criteria of transparency and inclusiveness).
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Diversity of participants in constitutional drafting
Before making the point regarding inclusiveness and diversity of participants in
the constitution-making process, it makes sense to say a word about what a constitution
is. What is so important about constitutions that makes their adoption such a particular
event? Shortly defined, a constitution is the birth certificate of a country Verdussen cited
in (Badet, 2009). It is a set of fundamental principles under which a state, an association
or an organization is governed. Emphasis should be put on the words “fundamental
principles” as constitutions are particular documents that usually require a particular
process for their amendment, though this is not always the case. In New Zealand for
instance, ordinary legislative process suffices to amend the constitution. Constitutions can
be written or unwritten. The creation or adoption of new written constitutions usually
happens under particular conditions such as a social or economic crisis, a revolution, a
regime collapse, a fear of regime collapse, a defeat in war, a reconstruction after war, the
creation of a new state, or the liberation from a former colonial power. This is what Elster
(1995) calls waves of constitution-making. Regardless of the circumstances that lead to
the creation of a new constitution, the main objective of a constitution is to provide the
rule of law; a system of government in which everyone, including government officials,
is subject to the principle of legality (Merryman, 1985).
It can be observed that my focus in this discussion is on liberal democratic
constitutionalism, as there are totalitarian regimes that also use constitutions to govern
their people (Bonime-Blanc, 1987). For the purpose of my study, I define constitution
with an emphasis on the necessity of limiting state power by means of law, the reasoning
for adopting constitutions being that no government should ever be given unlimited
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power over its people. In a simple sentence, constitution means limited government. A
constitutional government is therefore, a government that exercises power according to
the limitations defined in the constitution (Akiba, 2004, p. 5). Any other use of
government power is a use of “power without right” (Paine, 1956, p. 302). As one can
see, the people are at the center of any liberal constitution that is created to curb
governments’ potential abuse of power in order to protect the people’s right. Moreover,
by delineating the commonly held core values and “aspiration of the people of a given
society, constitutions provide the citizenry with a sense of ownership and authorship, a
sense that we the people includes me” (Hanna, 2011, p. 19). This expression, “we the
people,” is included in most modern constitutions to give a sense of unity and
inclusiveness to the people in a given country.
As mentioned above, I am dealing with liberal constitution-making that intervenes
in democratic regimes. Liberal democracies are characterized by a core principle of
majoritarian decision-making (Lijphart, 1999). Should that majoritarian rule of decision
making prevail in the constitution-making process? In other words, should a majority’s
will be imposed on others in the process of constitution-making? Here is an important
and interesting question raised in the literature. In deeply divided societies and for the
sake of peace, a consensual approach would necessarily be more effective in protecting
minorities’ rights than a winner-takes-all scenario (Hanna, 2011). Since constitutions are
known to be successful when they are widely accepted as legitimate, the author suggests
that constitution-making should be based on broad popular support from both majority
and minority groups in a given country. Similar argument is made to account for the
failure of the Nepalese 1990 Constitution (Lawoti, 2007, p. 34). The author suggests that
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majoritarian rule has hindered the consolidation of democracy and created instability in
Nepal because the majoritarian decision-making process concentrated power within a
region and social group in the country.
Another important query raised in the literature on constitution-making has to do
with citizens’ participation in the process. The emphasis that is put on the people through
the famous expression “We the People” that figures in the first pages of most moderns
constitutions suggests that citizens’ participation in the constitution-making process is
necessary. Because constitutions are made for the people in the first place, any
constitution-drafting done without the people’s participation is necessarily illegitimate
and potentially troublesome for a country (Haysom, 2007; Ghai, 2007). Moreover, a
constitution is a supreme legal document from which all legislations and regulations
derive their legitimacy and power. Such an important document should be made to ensure
justice and good governance for the sake of peace in the country. This is why all
stakeholders at all levels must be involved in the process of constitution-making
(Bhattarai & Subedi, 2007). Actually, the new tendency is toward creating political
frameworks that captures the ownership of all citizens in the constitution-making process
(Akiba, 2004). This way of doing things establishes a fairer distribution of political
power. Also, because voluntarily agreed outcomes are more stable and more lasting than
imposed ones, promoting a wider stake-holding through the inclusion of minorities and
ordinary men and women would help create the sense of ownership necessary to
legitimate and protect the constitution (Haysom, 2007, p. 105).
I have been emphasizing how important it is that minorities and ordinary men and
women participate in constitution-making. However, this has not always been a priority
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mainly because the entity (whether a constituent assembly constitutional convention,
constitutional conference, national conference etc.) that drafts the constitution is usually
set by an external creator. It can be either Congress, such as in the case of the 1787 U.S.
Constitution, the King as in the case of the France’s 1789 Constitution or by a president
as it happens nowadays in many countries. These external creators that Elster (1995) calls
upstream actors often try to control the constitution-making process so that the outcomes
would be favorable to them. According to the author, the Continental Congress instructed
the Federal Convention to suggest changes to the Articles of Confederation, whereas in
France, some delegates came to the convention with instructions to vote for an absolute
veto for the king. In both cases, the drafters ignored instructions they were given. As a
matter of fact, a document produced by a drafting body can only be viewed and accepted
as legitimate if that drafting entity itself has come into being in a legitimate way (Elster,
1993). A constituent assembly whose members have merely been appointed by the
president or any single ruler does not pass this test of legitimacy. Moreover, there should
also be a process legitimacy. In other words, if the internal decision-making process is
not perceived by all stakeholders as fair and democratic, the resulting document might be
rejected as undemocratic and illegitimate. In this line of reasoning, a constitution that is
shaped by military force or threat from the military will necessarily lack legitimacy
The point made by Elster (1993 & 1995) is that by definition, the old regime is
part of the problem that the constitutional convention is called to solve. There would be
no need for any convention if the old regime were wise and were not flawed. If the old
regime acknowledges (by convening a convention) that it is flawed, why should its
instructions matter anyway? The lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that
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constitutions made based on the unwise instructions of an old regime are potentially
highly problematic compared to those in which the drafters happen to overcome the
imposed instructions from the old regime. This particular reasoning has been used by
several scholars and writers to make the point about the relatively successful constitutionmaking process in Benin (Loada, Badet & Fall, 2008: Santiso, 1998; Nzouankeu, 1993;
Adamon, 1994). Actually, the more or less consensual nature of the constitution-making
process in a given country is a determinant factor in how resilient a constitution will be
against undue amendments. In other words, the more consensual a constitution is the
harder it will be to amend it for political purposes (Loada, Fall, & Badet, 2008).
This is the case for the Beninese Constitution that has not been modified since its
adoption in 1990. Proof that the Beninese Constitution is considered consensual due to its
adoption process was given by the Constitutional Court in 2006 when the National
Assembly members voted 71 out of 83 for a one year extension of their mandate, arguing
that they would save money for the State by simultaneously having both legislative and
communal elections. On July 8, 2006, the Constitutional Court voided the amendment in
these terms:
In accordance with the provision of Article 80 of the December 11, 1990:
… Given the fact that the four year tenure which is a constitutional
established fact is the result of a national consensus …the safeguard of the
legal security and the national cohesion impose that all amendments take
into account the ideals that led to the adoption of December 11, 1990
Constitution, especially the national consensus, a principle of
constitutional value… (Loada, Fall, & Badet, 2008, p. 15) .
The importance of consensus during the constitutional adoption process is also
shown in another event when in 2005, a year before the end of his presidential mandate,
President Kérékou did not clearly express his desire to leave office. Rightly or wrongly,
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many Beninese assumed that they president wanted to modify the constitution to stay in
power. Thirty associations and network of associations promoting human rights created a
civil society movement that pressure President Kérékou to indicate in July 2005 that he
was not interested in overstaying his mandate (Adjovi, 2006). Other examples of public
outcry in support of the Beninese constitution can be cited. Because of the consensus
reached during the adoption process, the Beninese people feel a sense of ownership
toward their constitution that they are prompt to defend. Now, what makes the Beninese
constitutional adoption process more consensual and more legitimate when compared to
the situation in Burkina Faso and Senegal, which both experienced unilateral
constitutional adoption processes?
In December 18, 1989, President Kérékou, by a decree31, created a national
committee in charge of preparing the national conference. The committee was composed
of eight ministers from President Kérékou’s government. Because the committee was
created by the current regime, many Beninese were suspicious about the good and real
intentions of President Kérékou to hold a sincere national conference that would produce
real political reforms. The first act of the committee was to issue a press release inviting
political associations, professional, religious and social organizations, and any Beninese
willing to contribute to the democratization process of the country to send their concerns
in a written document to the committee. 487 letters were sent to the committee, some
were sent to make suggestions, while others were sent to inform the committee of intent
to participate to the national conference. Of these 487 letters, 203 came from individual
citizens, 57 were from political associations, 64 from regional development associations,

31

Decree N: 89-434 of December 1989
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15 from religious groups, 64 from workers unions, 61 from what was called other
associations (Beninese Red Cross, youth associations, political refugees), and 23 from
Beninese living outside of the country and from embassies. The committee decided on its
own to add 86 delegates representing peasants from the country’s 86 districts. Following
the publication of the list of participants on February 1, 1990, there was an outcry of the
people against the quotas that some viewed as too favorable to the current party in power.
The party was given fifteen seats while other political parties were only given two seats
each. On February 8, 1990, even though the committee initially said that the list and
quotas were definitive, it managed to come up with a new list that only gave 2 seats to the
current party like the others political parties. The new list is made up of 488 delegates.
The committee led by lawyer Robert Dossou has the merit of inspiring the Beninese to
get involved in the constitution-making process by inviting people to submit written
statements about their views on the past, present, and future of the country. These
documents were used as the first input and basis to start the national debate whose
ultimate outcome was the Beninese Constitution (Adamon, 1994).
After the opening speech of President Kérékou on February 19, 1990, the 488
delegates elected a three-member interim committee to conduct the elections for the
committee that would lead the national conference. On February 20, thirteen delegates,
led by the archbishop Isidore de Souza, were elected to conduct the national conference.
On the 21rst of February 1990, President Kérékou paid a quick visit to the conference and
suggested he was ready to make some changes in his administration at the ministerial
level, but he made it clear that he was never going to resign from the presidency
(Adamon, 1995 p. 56). The conference, even with no elected mandate from anybody,
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proclaimed itself sovereign and proceeded to suspend the constitution, and dissolve the
National Assembly. It also adopted plans for multiparty elections, and chose Nicephore
Soglo, a former World Bank official, as Interim Prime Minister (Robinson, 1994).
President Kérékou was allowed to stay in office until the next elections, but as we can
see, he was stripped of his most important executive powers. On December 2, 1990 the
constitution was approved with 96% of the vote. A year later, when the first multiparty
elections took place, Nicephore Soglo became the first democratically elected Beninese
president.
The process I just described is different from the unilateral constitutional adoption
process used in Burkina Faso. In Burkina Faso, the idea of creating a constitutional
commission to lead the drafting of a new constitution came from the Popular Front’s
meeting held in Ouagadougou from the 1st to the 4th of March 1990. The Popular Front, is
a revolutionary movement led by then Captain Blaise Compaoré, Burkina Faso’s sitting
president who came to power on October 15, 1987, through a deadly coup d’état that
ended the ruling of Captain Thomas Sankara. From the beginning, President Compaoré’s
revolutionary movement made it clear that the constitutional commission is all but an ad
hoc commission created by the Popular Front executive committee and working under its
directives (Ye, 1995). The mission of the constitutional commission was to provide a first
draft of a constitution that would be submitted to the officials of the Popular Front.
However, the commission was open to national political organizations and experts.
According to Ye (1995), participation in the commission was controlled by the Popular
Front.32 104 members of the commission including sixty four from the ruling party of

In his 1995 book page 34, Ye writes that “it is worth noting that the Popular Front had identified two
political organizations that could be invited to take part to the commission…” This quote I translate from
32
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President Compaoré, took part in the writing of the draft of the constitution. Four
delegates belonged to political organizations, thirteen came from workers unions, nongovernmental organizations had two delegates, and four delegates represented religious
communities. Seventeen experts (jurists, economists, scholars…) were part of the
constitutional commission created by decree on April 20, 1990.33 This particular decree
specifically mentions that the president and vice-president of the commission are
necessarily members of President Compaoré’s party. Moreover the decree emphasizes the
fact that the commission has to work under the directives put forward by the Popular
Front and that it has to work based on the initial input and documents provided by the
president’s party. On May 12, 1990, President Compaoré gave an opening speech and the
commission was set to begin working. On September 27, the commission held its last
meeting, and on October 14, 1990, the final draft of the new constitution was handed to
President Compaoré.
On December 14, 1990, a national conference was held to discuss the final draft
of the constitution. Around 2000 delegates from 30 provinces in the country were invited
according to unspecified criteria set up by the party in power to amendment the drafted
constitution. Amendments made by the conference mainly addressed revolutionary and
anti-imperialist concepts of that were removed from the constitutional document. The
final constitutional draft was then ready to be put to a referendum that was held June 2nd
1991. Of the 48.65% of voters that took part in the referendum, 93% voted yes. Unhappy
with the way, the constitutional adoption process was being conducted, newly created

French proves to what extent the participation in the drafting of the constitution was controlled by the
ruling party.
33
Kiti n: an VII 0279/FP du 20 avril 1990

119
political opposition parties got together in a coalition called Coordination of Democratic
Forces (CFD) to request from the Compaoré regime a national sovereign conference.
They also wanted legislative elections to be held before the presidential election. They
wanted Burkinabe from outside the country to be allowed to vote in these elections. On
September 30 and October 7, 1991, they organized protest movements in the country’s
two main cities, Bobo and Ouagadougou. In October 1991, the Compaoré regime and its
affiliated party members organized a demonstration against any national sovereign
conference on the ground that Article 172 of the newly adopted constitution stated that
the Compaoré regime would be responsible for leading the transition until a new
government could be set. None of the opposition’s wishes were fulfilled before the
presidential election that was held on December 1, 1991, and won by sitting president
Compaoré with only 25.12% participation. After the presidential election and because of
tensions between the opposition parties and the Compaoré regime, the newly elected
president suggested the idea of a national forum for reconciliation. In February 1992,
President Compaoré gave his opening speech at the National Reconciliation Forum in
which 348 people took part. Due to a debate that emerged during the Forum on the issue
of transparency, President Compaoré adjourned the forum. Some participants requested
that national media be present to witness the event. Others opposed the suggestion on the
grounds that it might incite violence.
The process in Senegal was unilateral but different from the one used in Burkina
Faso. Senegal is famous or infamous for the frequency of constitutional amendments in
the country (Fall, 2011). According to Marina Ottaway cited in Scales-Trent (2011), it is
difficult to think of a constitution that has been amended more often than the Senegalese
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Constitution. Actually, while other African countries used military coup-d’états to solve
political disputes, the Senegalese use constitutional amendments instead. The first major
political crisis in the newly independent Senegal in December 1962 opposed President
Senghor and Mamadou Dia, the president of the Council of Ministers. It was solved with
the law 62-62 of December 18, 1962. The law was introduced to temporarily amend the
constitution in order to make President Senghor the only chief of the executive power
(Fall, 2011, p. 126). In 1963, a new constitution was introduced to definitively change the
Senegalese regime from parliamentarian to a presidential. In 1984, due to internal
disputes in President Abdou Diouf’s Socialist Party, a constitutional amendment was
made aimed at Habib Thiam, then president of the National Assembly. The tenure of the
National Assembly presidency was reduced from five to one year, and the law was
immediately applicable to the sitting president of the National Assembly Habib Thiam
who ended up being removed. After he was removed, the law was reinstated in its initial
form (Diop, 2009). President Wade and his Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) used a
similar politically motivated amendment of the constitution to remove the now sitting
Senegalese President Macky Sall who was then president of the National Assembly.
After Mrs. Sall asked Karim Wade, President Wade’s son to present an accounting of the
money spent for the organization of the Islamic summit he led in 2008, President Wade
felt insulted and had Macky Sall removed using a constitutional provision (Scales-Trent,
2011). Actually, the executive branch in my case study countries is very powerful due to
their presidential regime type.
This particular type of regime became so unpopular in Senegal that a presidential
candidate, namely Abdoulaye Wade then an opposition party leader, made it a campaign
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promise to move the country from a presidential regime toward a parliamentarian regime.
Wade won the election on March 19, 2000, over President Abdou Diouf the second
president of the independent Republic of Senegal. As much as the Senegalese people
were happy about the political change they had just experienced, their expectations were
also high when it comes to the new path along which they wanted the newcomer to take
the country. The people were in the mood for a real change and the new president was
eager to deliver his campaign promise for regime change in Senegal, a change that would
happen by wiping the slate clean in order to set up a new style of government (Ngenge,
2010). The newly elected president had two main options for carrying out his promise to
the people. The first one was either a major or a minor reform to the 1963 constitution.
The second one that which could be seen as a more radical approach was to write a brand
new charter from scratch. Because of the political mood at the time, the country wanted a
radical change; President Wade was set to deliver a new constitution not only because
this option corresponded to the post-election mood, but also because it would have been
too hard a battle to win if President Wade had wanted to get the 1963 constitution
amended through the National Assembly, where the old regime of the Socialist Party (PS)
had a parliamentary majority. According to Article 89 of the Senegalese constitution in
use the prerogative to initiate constitutional amendments was split between the executive
branch and the parliament. A proposed amendment could become law after a referendum
vote or a positive vote in both houses of parliament should the president choose not to use
a referendum.
From a procedural perspective, writing a new charter was not the easiest option
for the new regime either. In case the new regime chooses to write a new constitution,
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one of the options is to create a constituent assembly that would be made up of the
members of the National Assembly as was the case when the 1959 constitution was
adopted. This option would still not have been safe for President Wade as the opposition
party held the Parliament. The other option left was for the new regime to get the green
light from parliament to initiate a process of new constitutional adoption. Either way,
President Wade had to deal with the opposition-held parliament. By decree n: 00/372 of
19 May 2000, President Wade initiated a technical commission led by the Senegalese
Minister of Justice with the mission to draft a new constitution (Ngenege, 2012). The
composition of the commission is as follows: two university law professors (Babacar
Guéye and Pape Demba Sy); a lawyer representing President Wade (Madicke Niang); a
magistrate representing the government and chosen by the prime minister (Taifour Diop);
a notary representing civil society (Papa Ismael Ka). This five-member technical
commission was given directives by President Wade as to what the main structure of the
constitution should look like. According to Fall (2009), President Wade personalized the
Senegalese 2001 constitutional adoption process as he controlled everything from the
beginning to the adoption in January 7, 2001. The first draft was submitted to an interministerial council headed by the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Senate and
National Assembly, and all political parties. These key actors have fifteen days to
propose amendments to the draft, and based on the suggestions of amendments made, the
commission would submit a final draft to President Wade, who alone is empowered by
the constitution to call for a referendum. On November 9, 2000, the Constitutional
Council gave its favorable opinion to allow the new constitutional adoption process to
pursue its course. The campaign of awareness before the adoption of the new constitution
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was very short, and it was made unimportant not only because of the political capital of
the newly popular elected president, but also because the major political parties in the
country adhered to the new document. Only one major party (the African Independence
Party) and three other parties; the Jef Jef Alliance, the MDS (Movement for Democracy
and Socialism) Naxx Jarinu and the PIT-Senegal (Party of Independence and Labour)
were for the boycott of the constitution (RADDHO, 2001).34 On 7, January 2001, the
Senegalese Constitution was approved through a referendum with 94% of voters in favor.

Information and transparency of the process
Procedure matters. If the internal decision-making process of the body that is
chosen to draft the constitution is viewed as undemocratic, the document produced from
such process would lack what Elster (1993) calls process legitimacy. In other words,
information-sharing about the adoption process makes a difference when it comes to
transparency and the quality of the constitutional document produced at the end of the
process. However, the choice of open versus closed proceedings has its pros and cons. In
a public process of constitutional adoption debate, delegates might be eager to show that
they champion common good, making them unlikely to engage in logrolling or any type
of compromises (Macey, 1986). In these kinds of situations delegates don’t negotiate.
Actually, they talk to the media instead of talking to each other (Haysom, 2007; Banks,
2008). The worst thing that can happen is that because of the public settings in which
people are watching or listening, the delegates might adopt rigid and inflexible positions

RADDHO means; La Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de L’Homme (African Meeting for
the Defense of Human Rights )
34
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and refuse to consider changing their position during the discussion even when someone
else offers a better proposition than their own. The truth of the matter is that flip-flopping
is not viewed as a moral virtue even though it can be a valuable behavior in a pluralistic
society where compromises are necessary for the government to function. This is the
point that James Madison was making when he suggested the following:
Had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they would have
afterwards supposed consistency required them to maintain their ground,
whereas by secret discussion no man felt himself obligated to retain his
opinions any longer than he was satisfied of the propriety and truth and
was open to the force of argument (Cited in Elster, 1993, p.181).
The author was quick to add that Madison missed the other part of the argument. He
suggests that if the Philadelphia convention were being held today in the same conditions
of secrecy as in the 18th century, it would certainly be viewed as undemocratic and nontransparent. Actually, the biggest danger of secrecy is the lack of legitimacy of the entire
process and consequently the illegitimacy of the outcomes. A good illustration of the
problem caused by the choice of secrecy was made by Cohen (1991) about the lakeside
conclave on the amendment of the Canadian Constitution in 1987. Prime Minister
Mulroney convened the premiers of the ten Canadian Provinces and decided to keep them
isolated from their advisers in order to pressure them to get a deal. This attitude was not
well received by the public and later undermined the legitimacy of the discussion’s
outcomes. As a remedy to the perceived lack of democratic process and transparency, a
number of alternatives have been suggested, among which are the use of constituent
assembly and public hearings (Fafard & Reid, 1991).
The key issue at stake here is transparency. What is viewed as fundamental to the
concept of transparency in the constitutional adoption literature is mostly about the
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decision-making process during the constitutional drafting time period. Most authors
writing about the African experience emphasize adoption of decisions through consensus
instead of majoritarian type of decision-making (Bhattarai, 2007; Haysom, 2007; Ghai,
2007; Ebrahim, 2001; Mugwannya, 2001). It is not only about popular participation, it is
also about people knowing how the outcomes are reached. However, and according to
Yash Ghai the chairman of the 2010 Kenyan Constitutional review commission,
consensus is not unanimity. “If 70-80% were for anything, that was enough…to move to
voting… in our case, a two-third majority was accepted as necessary for making
decisions” (Ghai, 2007). One of the most important aspects in “successful” constitution
making is that the constituent assembly or whatever body is chosen to lead the process
should have full control over its internal decision-making process. When the rules are set
from outside, the process is necessarily viewed as lacking legitimacy. In the case of the
2010 Kenyan Constitution, internal decisions-making was the constituent assembly’s
business. The reason, according to Ghai (2007), is that a constitution is not a contract
between the people and the rulers. Rather, it is a contract among the people, and
government is just a delegate of the people, elected to apply the contract.
To reach a higher degree of transparency, a country such as South Africa chose
for a constitutional assembly to lead the constitution-making process. However, having
such a drafting body is not enough; there should be openness at every step of the process.
Openness can be reached through participatory democracy (Ebrahim, 2001). According
to the author, the participatory type of constitution-making process is meant to reassure
people and create the trust that is necessary to legitimate the final document of the
constitution. The South African constitutional assembly was successful in doing exactly
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that by creating a program of awareness and engaging the public. The program of
awareness had three components: community liaison, media liaison, and advertisement.
The constitutional assembly initiated interactive face-to-face meetings between members
of the assembly and the public to educate about the process and receive input. The
assembly established a department of media that used prints, radio, television, and a
national advertising campaign. It also initiated an official newsletter called constitutional
talks, an eight-page publication that presented materials in an educative manner. The
constitutional assembly’s meetings were reported to the public through all sources of
media. Documents on the process and the first draft of the constitution were translated
into eleven different languages and distributed to the public, and a national constitution
week was initiated. Because people in rural areas do not always have access to media,
constitutional public meetings were held to inform the public and get input from rural
communities. What is more important is not so much the input of the rural community,
but rather the act of participation and the sense of ownership of the whole process that
follows (Haysom, 2007). This sense of ownership contributes to the legitimacy of the
process and consequently the legitimacy of the outcomes (Biggs, 2001; Ebrahim, 2001;
Haysom, 2007).
As a reminder, the overall goal of chapter IV is to show that constitutional
adoption process matters and that the openness and the transparency of such process lead
not only to a more substantial document, but also that a democratic constitution-making
process helps build trust (among stakeholders) that is necessary for the legitimacy of the
constitution. Actually, legitimacy is a key factor that can shield the constitution and
protect it against politically motivated amendments. There are two reasons for this claim.
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The first one is that when the constitution is considered legitimate it is usually due to the
adoption process that created trust, respect, and ownership of the final document. In such
conditions, citizens themselves become a shield against politically motivated
amendments to the constitution. Because they consider the constitution as their own, they
would feel the duty to defend and protect it. An illustration of this particular reasoning
was given above about the Beninese constitution through the civil protest now known as
“hands off my constitution.” The second reason for my claim that legitimacy constitutes a
shield against undue amendments is related to the strength of the institutions created
through a legitimate constitutional adoption process. When there is openness,
transparency and consensus during the adoption process the resulting document is one
with strong institutions, institutions with provisions that guarantee protection of the
constitution against politically oriented amendments. Illustration of this particular
reasoning will be provided in the next two chapters on the mechanism of constitutional
amendment and the independence of the constitutional court.
My specific goal in this section is to examine the constitution-making processes in
the three case study countries to see whether the public was well informed about the
constitutional adoption process. More importantly, I want to know whether measures of
public awareness taken by officials during the constitutional adoption process were
sufficient to create the public trust and ownership of the constitution that is necessary to
legitimate and defend the outcomes of the process. The brief review of the African
constitution-making literature done above, points out some keys elements that can be
considered ultimate conditions for public trust and ownership of a constitution in a given
country. One of them is the openness of the process through availability of information to
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the public. Another one is consensus decision-making during the whole process.
Consensus builds trust and prevents frustrations and rebellion. More importantly,
consensus delivers legitimacy, a key element for public ownership and confidence in the
fundamental law. The literature review also shows through specific examples (South
Africa and Kenya) how availability of information to the public could be measured. My
mission in this section is to show how my case study countries fare on these key
elements.
It can straightforwardly be argued that in the Beninese case, the public was
relatively well informed about the process and also about the substance of the
constitutional document. Actually, the Beninese people were involved in the process
from the beginning (Creevey, Ngomo, & Vengroff, 2005). The committee initiated by
president Kérékou on December 18, 1989, was quick to ask general public submission of
written statements about the new direction of the country. Although the Beninese were
skeptical of the intentions of president Kérékou, for he had nominated eight of his
ministers without any public consultation, people still made submissions: 487 letters. The
initial committee in charge of organizing the national conference reached out to peasants
in rural areas and included 86 delegates from this often underrepresented part of the
society in political decision-making. The first draft of the constitution (167 Articles)
included input from the 487 written submissions. After the first draft was ready, a
national committee for the vulgarization of the constitution was instituted on 14 June
1990. Six committees represented the six departments (Atacora, Atlantique, Borgou,
Mono, Oueme, and Zou). These committees were in charge of training people who in
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turn would be going to explain the constitution to peasants and other citizens in order to
get their opinion before the final draft (Adamon, 1995).
In Burkina Faso, the approach was different. The initial input that was used as the
basis for writing the first draft of the constitution was given to the constitutional
commission by the Popular Front (the president’s party). Nowhere were peasants
mentioned as participants in the initial draft. In other words, there was no particular effort
from the sitting regime to include the broad population in the initial phase of the
constitutional adoption process. There was no national awareness campaign or initiative
before 14 December 1990 when a national conference was called to amend the first draft.
Based on the very few and non-substantial amendments that were suggested during the
conference (Ye, 1995), it can be argued that the draft was not well-known and understood
by the people who were supposed to amend it, unless the 2000 delegates convened
without clear criteria for their selection methods were mainly supporters of the sitting
regime. Moreover, the only campaign with the mission of explaining the constitution to
the people was initiated and conducted by President Compaoré’s party. Opposition
parties newly created with no financial means did not take part in the vulgarization of the
constitution which adoption process they denounced from the beginning for being too
tightly controlled by the regime in power. In other word, there was no openness or
transparency compared to the Beninese process.
The constitutional adoption process that was used in Senegal was particular in
genre compared to what is known of Benin and Burkina Faso. The Senegalese used a
technical commission to write the first draft of the constitution based on directives
received from newly elected President Wade. Individual citizens were not invited to take
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part in the initial process, neither were political parties involved in the first draft. Political
parties were only called upon to submit amendments after they were faced with an initial
document. Of course there had been some background negotiations before the initial
document was produced, but officially no citizens or political parties were involved in the
first phase of the process. There was no sign of a particular effort made to associate the
public to the process by the new regime. The public was only called upon during the last
stage of the process: the referendum. According to the African Assembly for the Defense
of Human Rights, RADDHO (2001) the campaign for vulgarization of the Senegalese
2001 Constitution was made unimportant because the country’s major political parties
adhered to the document. Consequently, there was no major concern about getting the
public on board or taking enough time to explain what the constitution was about, and
how it came to be. In other words, it all happened as if there were hidden deals among
parties and citizens were kept away from a not so transparent process of constitutional
adoption in Senegal.
Table 15: Openness of constitution-making process by country
Benin
Burkina
Faso
Senegal

Constitution adoption
1990
1991

Diversity of participants Transparency
Yes
Yes
No
No

2001

No

No

Conclusion
The initial assumption in this chapter is that the openness and the transparency of
constitutional adoption process provide for a stronger and substantially better
constitution. The reasoning is that an open and transparent adoption process creates an
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environment that allows a diversity of participants in the constitutional debate. A strong
debate in which ideas are freely exchanged and discussed is more likely to deliver better
outcomes. More importantly, a constitutional document that is achieved in such
conditions is less likely to be rejected by any stakeholders or the people. In other words, a
constitutional document that is born from openness and transparency is more likely to
receive the seal of legitimacy, a key factor that serves as a shield against any politically
motivated amendment. As a reminder, the focus of my dissertation is to research and
understand why there are so many constitutional amendments in democratizing
Francophone West Africa. I am particularly interested in enumerating the factors that can
help protect against undue or politically motivated constitutional amendments. Openness
and transparency of the constitutional adoption process is one of them. Actually, the point
that I am making in this chapter is that the way a constitution is adopted is itself a major
factor in protecting the fundamental document against non-consolidating amendments. A
strong document is one arrived at through a minimum consensus, and that consensus
becomes a constitutional principle that shields the documents against any vicious revision
(Badet, 2009). This is what happened in Benin but did not happen neither in Burkina
Faso, nor in Senegal. How do I show that this is the case for Benin, but not for the other
countries? How do I prove that this particular factor of openness explains the fact that the
Beninese constitution has never been amended since its adoption in contrast with the
amendment histories of the Burkinabe and Senegalese constitutions? I make this claim
based on three major factors. The first is the sovereignty of the conference that drafted
the constitution. The second factor is the shield of constitutional protection offered by the
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consensual sovereign conference and the third one is the strength of the Beninese
institutions resulting from the consensual conference.
The old regime that initiates a new constitution always seeks to control the
constitution-making process in order to make the outcomes more favorable. However,
because the old regime is part of the problem that the new constitution is meant to fix,
overcoming the old regime directives or orders is the first thing a constitutional drafting
body should do to be successful. This is what the U.S. 1787 constitutional convention did
(Elster 1993: 1995). The Beninese National conference conducted itself in a similar
fashion. Against the will of President Kérékou who shown up in the conference room on
February 21, 1990, to make it clear that he was ready to make some changes at the
ministerial level of his administration in order to deal with the crisis in his country, the
conference declared itself a sovereign conference and went on to suspend the old
constitution and strip Kérékou of his major powers. This was a turning point in the
country’s history. Once the conference was declared sovereign, it was free to deliberate,
and its decisions were imposed upon President Kérékou. This did not happen in the other
two countries included in my study. In Burkina Faso and in Senegal the authorities had
control over the whole process of constitutional adoption. Studies of national conferences
in eleven African countries show that countries were more or less successful in their
transition to democracy depending on how the old regimes controlled or not national
conferences (Santiso, 1998). The point is that the success of the Beninese experience is
attributed mostly to the wise decision to ignore advice or recommendations from the old
regime in order to decide freely about the future institutions to be created through the
constitution. According to Santiso (1998), African leaders quickly learnt from the
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Beninese example and most national conferences taking place after the one in Benin were
tightly controlled by dictators who often ended up staying in power.
The sovereign conference offered a shield against undue amendments to the
constitution. As previously stated, the Beninese Constitutional Court, set a precedent in
2006 when the National Assembly voted to overstay its mandate. The Court’s argument
was based on the national consensus that led the country to democracy. According to the
Court, because of the spirit and ideal of the national consensus that created the
constitution in the first place, it would be seen as betraying that consensual ideal if the
National Assembly could get away with an amendment as vital as overstaying its
mandate. By establishing the national conference consensus as a principle of
constitutional value, the Court suggests that from now on any amendment to the
constitution could only be taken seriously if and only if the amendment fit the spirit and
ideal of the national consensus from which the new country of Benin was born. This is a
very high standard for constitutional amendments that the Court has set, and my point in
using this example is that the Beninese Court wouldn’t have had such a solid argument if
the national conference has not been held in open and transparent conditions. Moreover,
it is not just the Court that believes in the national consensus. The Beninese people also
do. The proof was given when, in 2005, President Kérékou, a year before his last
presidential term, was suspected of having intentions of overstaying his mandate by
amending the constitution. Even though President Kérékou never officially said that he
wanted to seek a third term, rumors that this suspicion created provoked an outcry among
civil society organizations. Thirty-three associations promoting human rights organized a
major campaign whose main message was “hands off my constitution.” The president
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was then forced in July 2005 to make a public announcement stating that he had no plan
for reelection. The point is that Beninese citizens were empowered by their national
conference, and that it is being used as reference to defend the Constitution and oppose
any malicious amendment. This is so because the people took ownership of the
constitution that they felt bound to protect. Such an opportunity was given neither to the
Burkinabe nor to the Senegalese who were not part of the constitutional adoption process
until the last step (the referendum). Consequently, they do not feel as strongly as the
Beninese about the ownership of the constitution and the duty to protect a product of
which they were not midwives in the first place.
The third point to be made about why the constitutional adoption process matters
is that the sovereignty and the freedom of Beninese national conference allowed the
delegates to provide the country with strong institutions compared to those in Burkina
Faso and Senegal. In his 1993 article Elster mentions a Norwegian historian Jens Arup
Seip who suggested that people never try to bind themselves when it comes to
constitution-making, because politics is about binding others. This way of looking at
constitution-making makes sense when one analyses the process used in my three case
study countries. In Burkina Faso and Senegal it can be argued that because the
government in power controlled the process, institutions were created to fit the sitting
power or at least to provide enough room to maneuver. For instance, in Senegal, the
president nominates all constitutional council members. In Burkina Faso, the president is
empowered by the constitution to nominate six of them plus the president of the Supreme
Court who is the president of the Constitutional Chamber. The three others members are
nominated by the president of the National Assembly who is usually from the president’s
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party. This is not the case in Benin. The main reason is that in Benin, the delegates
representing the president and his party were only ten percent of the 488 members of the
national conference (Widner, 2005). In Benin, the president only nominates three of the
seven members of the Constitutional Court. The rest are nominated by the National
Assembly. Furthermore, the president of the nation, is not involved in setting up the
interior rules of the Court whose president is elected by its members. In Burkina Faso, the
president of the Supreme Court is the president of the constitutional chamber, and he is
nominated by the president of the country. Because there are ten members, the view of
the president of the chamber prevails in any case where there is a split of five against
five. In Burkina Faso, the majority required to impeach the president (80% of the
National Assembly members)35 is higher than what is needed to amend the country’s
constitution (75%). In Benin, it is the other way around. It is harder to amend the
constitution (80% of the National Assembly members) in Benin than to impeach the
president (66%).36 In Senegal the percentage for impeaching the president or any member
of the government is identical to the one needed for a constitutional amendment (60%).37
The Beninese constitutional drafters because they had more leverage in deciding what
type of institutions to create and how strong they wanted them to be, offered their citizens
constitutional rights to control government’s actions. Unlike any constitutional court in
the world, the Beninese court is directly accessible to any citizens or individuals living in
the country.38 For instance, when on April 4, 1996, President Kérékou omitted a phrase of
his presidential oath, a citizen reached out to the Court to get the president to retake his
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Article 139 of Burkina Faso Constitution
Article 137 of Benin Constitution
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Article 101 and 103 of the Senegalese 2001 Constitution
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Articles 3 and 122 and 39 of the Beninese Constitution. Details on these articles are given in chapter VI.
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oath.39 The point is that the striking differences between the outcomes of the processes
that led to constitutional adoptions in my three case study is explained by the process
itself. In countries where the process was controlled, the outcomes happened to be more
favorable to the sitting government in contrast to countries where the process was more
transparent and open. Moreover, openness and transparency helped the framers in Benin
to create stronger institutions by including in the constitutional document provisions
known to provide balance and separation of powers, all things recommended by the
literature on constitution-making.40 For instance, it is not advised that any president be
given the right to nominate all constitutional court members because doing so weakens
the court, particularly in countries with presidential supremacy (Fall, 2008).

39
40

Details on this incident are given in chapter VI.
I am referring to the literature review done in chapters V and VI
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Chapter V: Mechanism of constitutional amendment
Introduction
In this chapter, I am looking at the mechanism of constitutional amendments used
in each country included in my study. My assumptions are that a rigid constitution will
lead to fewer undue or non-consolidating changes in the initial constitutional document.
In other words, constitutions with strong procedural constraints or numerous veto players
for amendments would experience fewer politically motivated amendments. Actually, the
stability of constitutional regimes and their performance (the ability to deliver wellbeing
to people living under them), are often perceived as consequences of constitutional
rigidity (Korenica & Doli, 2011). In other words, the more rigid a constitution is, the
more likely it is to provide regime stability that is needed for a people wellbeing. As
such, constitutional rigidity is a counter-balance for politically motivated amendments of
constitutional documents. The question then becomes what constitutes a rigid
constitution?
To discuss this question of rigidity, I examine three indicators I consider essential:
the different steps required for any constitutional amendment; referendums and petitions
(table 16 shows the amendment strategy used by each country). The point that I am
making is that the more steps are required for any single constitutional amendment, the
harder it would be to make changes to a constitution. My reasoning is that the more
difficult an amendment process is made, the less likely politicians would try to
manipulate it to their advantage. The argument about the referendum is its notion of
popular participation (a direct form of democracy) that carries great legitimacy. As such,
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the referendum can be a serious constraint on politicians who intend to use constitutional
amendments to their advantage, particularly if a referendum is required by their
constitution for any amendment. Referendums are financially and politically costly.
Popular petitions can also serve as constraints to slow down any process of constitutional
amendment as it is a form of direct democracy that allows citizens to check their public
officials.

Rigidity of constitutional amendment process
A rigid constitution can be defined as a constitution that is difficult to amend
(Loada & Ibriga, 2007, p. 99). A constitution is considered formally rigid to the extent
that it can only be amended through political procedures more complex than those used
for ordinary legislations (Ferreres-Comella, 2000). Constitutions that used ordinary
legislative process for amendments are labeled flexible constitutions (Viscount, 1901).
Constitutions can be more or less rigid depending on certain factors and constitutional
adoptions techniques mentioned in chapter two. One factor that can qualify a constitution
as rigid is the number of political institutions that are required to participate in any
amendment process. In federal system such as in the United States of America, there are
several institutions that are required to take part in the constitutional amendment process.
For the United States Constitution to be amended, it is necessary to obtain the consent of
the federal Congress (or a Convention that is called by Congress on the application of the
legislatures of two-thirds of the States). Beside the federal Congress’s consent, it is also
necessary to have the consent of the legislatures (or conventions) of three-fourths of the
States. To these requirements, one needs to add the supermajority or qualified majority
requirement that relates to the numbers of legislators or congressmen needed to adopt an
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amendment. A supermajority is always greater than the simple majority of fifty percent of
a given legislature. Considering all the requirements or veto players (Tsebelis, 2002)
needed for any amendment in the federal system, one can safely argue that federal
constitutions are per se more difficult to revise than unitary states constitutions (Korenica
& Doli, 2011).
Actually, some of the requirements needed for any constitutional amendment in a
federal system are also used in the unitary state system. This is the case for the
supermajority requirement that exists in all three cases I consider in my study. In Benin41
that supermajority requirement is 4/5 or 80% of the members of the National Assembly.
In Burkina Faso42, it is 3/4 or 75% of the members of the National Assembly, and in
Senegal43 it is 3/5 or 60% of the members of the National Assembly. As a reminder, my
goal in this chapter is to take a close look at the initial constitutional documents of the
three countries included in my work, to see what feature these documents have designed
to protect the ‘law of the land’ from politically motivated modifications. My assumptions
are that the trickier an amendment process, the greater chances a constitution is given to
avoid non-consolidating amendments. The description of federalism allows me to address
some features that are conventionally used to make constitutions rigid. Among those
features is the supermajority requirement that is also used in unitary states such as Benin,
Burkina Faso or Senegal. Besides the feature of supermajority requirement, constitutional
framers in these countries have also thought of the number of steps necessary for an
amendment as an additional obstacle or difficulty to the process. I am particularly
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Article 155 of the 1990 Benin Constitution
Article 164 of the 1991 Burkina Faso Constitution
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Article 103, clause 5 of the 2002 Senegalese Constitution
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interested in this feature, as more steps mean more obstacles for any amendment success,
that is, the greater the number of steps for a single amendment, the more rigid a
constitution would be.
In Benin, the amendment process is made of two steps. For each step, there is a
peculiar supermajority requirement. In the first step, the amendment project44 or
proposition needs to be worthy of consideration by the National Assembly. It needs to be
taken into consideration45. The supermajority as a feature of constitutional amendment is
applied in Benin when dealing with a constitutional revision and also for organic laws. It
is not applied for ordinary laws that only need a simple majority46. The second step that is
described in Article 155 states that amendments are approved through referendum.
However, a referendum may not be needed if the project or proposition of revision is
approved by 4/5 or 80% of the National Assembly members.
In Burkina Faso as in Benin, the amendment process happens in two similar steps.
The first step happens through a vote on the principle of the amendment itself. The
National Assembly decides whether to accept to take a look at a draft or proposal or to
reject it. At this step absolute majority is required47. The second step consists in voting on
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When a constitutional amendment initiative comes from the president of the country, it is called a draft
of revision. When it comes from the National Assembly, it is called a proposal of revision.
45
The first step of the amendment process resembles the Rule of Four in the US Supreme Court. According
to this rule, four of the nine justices must agree to hear a case in order for it to be accepted on appeal. If at
least four justices believe a case is worth the Court's attention, a writ of certiorari is issued ordering a lower
court to send to the Supreme Court the case files to be placed on the docket (Epstein & Jack, 1998). In
Benin, it is the rule that 3/4 or 75% of the members of the National Assembly needed to agree to take into
consideration any initiative of constitutional amendment.
46
Article 105 of the December 1990 Benin constitution deals with ordinary laws while Article 154 states
the first step of the constitutional amendment process.
47
Absolute majority is used here in contrast with simple majority (a majority of those voting). In this
particular context, it refers to the majority of all electors, not just those who participate in the vote, but also
those who do not participate due to their not being there at the time of the vote or just because they opted
for abstention.
It is important to mention that Article 163 of the June 1991 Burkina Faso constitution is vague on the issue
of the required majority for the first step of the amendment process. It only states that a project or

141
the modifying text. This vote can be done through a referendum. However, for any
reason, the president of the country can choose not to use the referendum path. He can
decide to submit any constitutional amendment directly to the National Assembly and
that amendment is deemed successfully passed if approved by 3/4 of the members48.
The amendment procedure chosen by Senegal, even though it follows a two-step
process seems a little different from those used in Benin and Burkina Faso as it is not
quite so binding. In the first step, the amendment is adopted in the same way as an
ordinary law (by a simple majority). In the next step, an amendment is adopted by the
National Assembly by a low majority49 of 3/5 or 60% if the president chooses not to use
the referendum. Now that we know what steps are needed in each country for a
successful constitutional amendment, the question becomes, what makes one country’s
system better in preventing non-consolidating amendments than the other? In other
words, what is the explanatory power of constitutional rigidity as a protective feature
against undue or politically motivated amendment of the constitution?
My initial assumption was that the number of steps designed by constitutional
framers in each of the three countries would set them apart when it comes to the ability of
each document to defend itself against undue modifications of the original constitutional
documents. Obviously, this is not the case when reading Articles 154 & 155 (Benin),
Articles 163 & 164 (Burkina Faso), and Article 103 (Senegal). Actually, all three

proposition of amendment should be submitted to the National Assembly after the review by the Chamber
of Representatives. That is so, because from the beginning a broad and vague article namely Article 162:
“La loi fixe les conditions et la mise en oeuvre de la procedure de revision,” states that the law determines
the conditions of the amendment process. This article because of its imprecision and vagueness was used in
1997 to create some non-consolidating amendments to the constitution (Garané, 1997). The idea of an
absolute majority vote to accept or reject a proposition is not clearly stated in the initial constitution, but it
came up in the January 23, 1997 constitutional amendment.
48
Article 164 of the initial constitution of 1991.
49
Fall (2011,.p.45)
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countries have the same number of steps required for any constitutional amendment: two
steps. The first one consists of the National Assembly’s accepting to put any proposed
modification on the floor, the second one is the stage of decision on the particular issue.
Should I infer from this observation that the number of steps required for a constitutional
amendment does not matter as a tool designed to protect against undue amendment? The
literature shows that the number of steps does matter (Lutz, 1994; Tsebelis, 2002;
Korenica & Doli, 2011; Viscount, 1901). In this particular case study though, the number
of steps for the amendment process does not help me make any significant comparative
argument, as it is the same number for the three countries. What sets the countries apart is
the required majority.
The qualified majority for each of the steps for amendment does matter. In Benin,
75% of the National Assembly is required to consider an amendment. In Burkina Faso
that first step requirement is done at the absolute majority; in Senegal it is done at the
simple majority. Looking at the number of non-consolidating amendments in each
country, the qualified majority is a factor that deserves attention. In previous chapters, I
mentioned that there has not been any non-consolidating amendment in Benin since the
adoption of its constitution in 1990. There have been fewer non-consolidating
amendments in Burkina Faso compared to Senegal. From zero undue amendments in
Benin to fewer amendments in Burkina and amendments every seven months or so in
Senegal, the observation is that in the country with the highest qualified majority
requirement, we see no occurrence of any non-consolidating amendment. In Burkina
Faso where absolute majority is the required majority, there are fewer amendments (only
six) since the adoption of the constitution in 1991. As we know an absolute majority is a
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higher majority compared to the simple majority that is used in the case of Senegal where
there are more amendments than any of the three countries under consideration. The
conclusion here is that there is a link between the required majority and the number of
constitutional amendments. Where the requirement is higher, there are no or fewer
amendments compared to where the requirement is lower as in Senegal (Loada, Fall, &
Badet, 2008). I argue from the observation above that reformists or politicians supporting
non-consolidating amendments are discouraged by the extent of the requirement or the
difficulty of the process, since a comparative look at the three countries shows that as the
required majority for constitutional amendments goes up, the number of nonconsolidating amendments decreases. Does my analysis show that there has been no
amendment in Benin because of the country’s choice for a higher required majority? The
answer to this question might not be as simple as it looks since the required majority is
not the only factor that counts when analyzing the reason for non-consolidating
amendment occurrence. However, it is safe to say based on constitutional literature (Lutz,
1994; Loada, Badet & Fall, 2008; Tsebelis, 2002; Viscount, 1901) that the harder a
constitutional amendment process is, the better chances the constitution has to be
protected against politically motivated amendments.
My analysis shows that there are more obstacles designed by Benin’s
constitutional framers than those in Burkina Faso or in Senegal. My study also shows that
the Burkinabe framers engineered a harder to amendment constitution than the
Senegalese framers, the absolute majority required by the Burkinabe framers being more
difficult to obtain than the simple majority vote needed in Senegal for a constitutional
amendment. In conclusion, there is not much difference among Benin, Burkina Faso and
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Senegal when it comes to the number of steps for constitutional amendment. The
differences emerge as a function of the qualified majority designed by each country’s
framers to protect the constitution against undue amendments. My comparative study of
the three countries confirmed what other scholars (Loada, Badet & Fall., 2008; Fall,
2011) have suggested. As the qualified majority increases, the number of constitutional
amendments decreases (80% qualified majority in Benin with zero amendment; 75% in
Burkina Faso with one amendment and 60% in Senegal with eleven amendments).
Consequently, the Beninese Constitution is made safer against non-consolidating
amendments than the other two countries’ constitution. However, qualified majority is
not the only factor that is known as a safeguard against undue amends. A referendum can
also play a similar role depending on how it is handled.

Referendum as a constitutional safeguard
A referendum is a direct vote that offers an opportunity for an entire electorate to
either accept or reject a particular proposal. It is a mechanism designed to produce a
popular and unfiltered opinion on a given important issue. I am using the word
“unfiltered” to emphasize the difference between a referendum vote and a vote made by
representatives of the people through a legislative body, as a referendum vote is direct. In
representative democracy, votes made through a National Assembly are indirect votes
since legislators are representatives of the people in the name of whom they vote.
According to Suksi (1993), democracy is direct only to the extent that citizens themselves
initiate issues for discussion and vote on them.50. In other words, in representative
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From this particular understanding of what direct democracy is, a person elected by the people to vote
and decide on their behalf is a delegate if he acts strictly according to the instructions of his constituency. A
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democracy citizens are not given the opportunity to decide as often as might be expected.
To remedy this lack of public direct participation in politics Dicey (1894) suggests
referendums as an alternative to other democratic checks on politicians. The author sees
referendums as a popular safeguard against encroachments by elected politicians.
Arguing for the adoption of referendum in England, Dicey (1890) explains that
referendum without being a substitute for a representative form of government
strengthens it. For him, elected representatives would pay closer attention to citizens’
concerns if the fate of any controversial law ultimately depended on referendums. The
idea is that constitutional issues should be given obligatory referendums. Actually, this is
what I am arguing in this particular section of my study.
I suggest that initial constitutions in the countries I study can be designed in such
way that there are safeguards against undue amendments. One of these safeguards I am
referring to is the referendum. The idea is that from the initial constitutional document it
can be made absolutely clear what issues must be decided through referendums and only
through referendums. Actually, it is the raison d’être of the referendum that it should be a
constitutional safeguard (Qvortrup, 2002). As the author explains, however, there is no
guarantee that referendums will always provide citizens with the check they expect on
parliaments, because the initiative for referendums is often left to politicians. Politicians
mainly use referendums to reinforce their legitimacy and empower themselves on given
issues (Morel, 2007). The author calls this particular use of the referendum powerreinforcing, because the initiator uses the referendum for a personal purpose. He can also

politician is called a representative to the extent that he is free to decide how he votes on the behalf of his
constituency (Institut Africain pour la Démocratie, 1997, p. 18). In the three countries included in my
study, National Assembly members are representatives as defined above.
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use it to weaken opponents as did the minority government of President de Gaulle in
1958 to obtain a popular legitimation of his presidency that was going through some
tough times. In 2000, the Chirac government requested a referendum on the reduction of
the presidential mandate from 7 to 5 years. Although a point can be made that it was
somewhat forced upon him (Morel, 2007), the request was used to reassert President
Chirac’s preeminence over his socialist Prime Minister. By presenting himself as the
initiator of the referendum, he showed himself as a leader who was so concerned about
democratic values that he allowed the French people to decide on the length of his own
mandate. The French government’s use of referendums is what Morel (2007) calls
plebiscite. The term plebiscite also refers to the ad hoc (unplanned) nature of a
referendum that can be a vote of confidence about a government’s policies (Suksi, 1993).
The timing of such a vote is not dictated by the constitution, but is based on political
calculations. According to Lijphart (1984, p.221), politicians will only use referendums
when they expect to win. Butler and Ranney (1978) have similar views. They suggest that
referendums are used infrequently by governments usually when politicians expect them
to help provide a useful ad hoc solution to a pressing issue.
As we can see, there is no consensus in the literature on how effectively a
referendum can serve as a “people veto” in a way Dicey (1890) would prefer to see
referendums being used. Whenever referendums are used on the initiative of political
leaders, they are likely to deviate from their original mission, which is to allow ordinary
citizens to check their representatives. For political reasons government officials will
allow referendums only when they are sure to come out safe from a referendum vote. In
such conditions, referendums can only benefit leaders since they are used as an elite
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strengthening device (Santori, 1989, p.130). Actually, it is widely accepted in the
literature that obligatory referendums (those not controlled by governments) and also
popular initiatives are less politicized and consequently produce higher democratic
quality than plebiscites and other types of governments-initiated referendums
(Papadopoulos 199551; Qvortrup 2002: Lijphart 1984; Morel 2007). The argument comes
down to the notion of referendum control. Whoever controls a referendum determines
how efficiently and effectively that referendum will fulfill its mission of checking elected
representatives.
Butler and Ranney (1978) argue that since the mid-1970s, experience has shown
that referendums are held primarily at the initiative of elected officials. Only a few
referendums were held as obligatory or compulsory referendums mainly for
constitutional amendments. Qvortrup (2002) tests this assertion using Gordon Smith’s
typology of referendums. Smith (1976) divides all referendums into two categories: the
controlled and the uncontrolled referendums. Uncontrolled or obligatory referendums are
those initiated by opposition parties and by citizens. Referendums initiated by
governments and elected officials are considered controlled. Given that the results of a
referendum can be either favorable or unfavorable to a government, Smith distinguishes
between two sub-categories: the pro-hegemonic and the anti-hegemonic referendums.
Pro-hegemonic referendums are those supportive of elected officials. The anti-hegemonic
are those referendums that are unfavorable to governments and that can potentially be
politically damaging to elected officials who campaigned against them. In contrast to
Lijphart (1984) assumptions that most referendums are not only government-controlled,
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but also pro-hegemonic, Qvortrup (2002) argues that most referendums (104 out of the
128 included in his study) are uncontrolled. The author agrees however, that there is
enough support for the assertion that governments submit issues to referendums only
when they expect politically favorable outcomes for themselves.
Thus a study of the general concept of referendums shows that they are an
important constitutional feature that can be used against undue revisions of constitutions.
As a tool of direct democracy, referendums are a supplement, not a substitute to
representative democracy. Referendums can be viewed as a people’s veto against their
representatives’ tendency to abuse their mandate. Furthermore, there seems to be a
consensus among specialists that referendums strengthen representative democracy and
the rule of law when used appropriately. This confirms my initial assumption that
referendums as a constitutional feature can be used effectively to prevent nonconsolidating constitutional amendments. How effectively and efficiently can they
protect against undue amendments? The answer to this question according to the
literature is that everything depends on how referendums are used. In the Westerns world,
researchers seem concerned about why politicians use referendum and which type of
referendum use is more efficient (Morel, 2007). In the cases I am studying, the big
concern is rather why politicians don’t often use referendums. Before further analysis of
this phenomenon of avoidance of referendums by West African elected officials, let’s
take a look at the provisions on constitutional referendums in the three countries.
Article 154 of the Republic of Benin’s Constitution states that the initiative of
constitutional amendment belongs to the President and the members of the National
Assembly. However, for any project or proposition of amendment to be taken into
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consideration, it must have the approval of 3/4 of the national members. Article 155 of
the same constitution clarifies that an amendment only becomes law when it is finally
approved through referendum or when it is voted for by 4/5 of the National Assembly
members. In Benin, the concept of referendum is addressed in title XI that deals with
constitutional amendments. In Burkina Faso, this matter is addressed in title XV. Article
161 states that constitutional amendment initiative belongs to the President, to the
members of the National Assembly and to the people once at least thirty thousands of
people in voting age introduce a written and signed petition to the National Assembly.
Article 163 clarifies that any amendment project must go through the National Assembly
first52. Article 164 of the Burkinabe constitution states that a constitutional amendment is
deemed adopted through referendum once it obtained the majority of the popular votes.
However, an amendment can also be adopted without referendum once it is approved by
3/4 of the National Assembly. In Senegal, Article 103, the single article in title XII that
deals with the amendment process, states in its first clause that the initiative of
constitutional amendment belongs to the President and the National Assembly members.
As in Benin and Burkina Faso the Senegalese constitutional requires that any amendment
go through the National Assembly first. In the third clause of Article 103 it is stated than
amendments are adopted through referendums. However, as in the other two countries,
there is a provision in the Senegalese constitution that helps avoid referendums since it
allows the president to directly submit any amendment to the National Assembly if he
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project, no matter where it comes from, needs to be approved by the National Assembly first. That is what
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chooses to do so. In such a case the amendment is deemed adopted if approved by 3/5 of
its members.
It is worth mentioning that in the three cases included in my study I am first and
above all dealing with constitutional referendums. The description of each country’s
provision on referendum shows that these features are only mentioned in relation to
constitutional amendment. Actually, in these countries the only time referendums are
used is when new constitutions are being adopted. Otherwise, amendments to
constitutions are primarily done through the legislative body, since provisions in initial
constitutional documents allow politicians to do so. In Benin it is Article 155 that does
the trick; in Burkina Faso, it is Article 164 that allows the president to adopt any
amendment to the constitution without using the path of the referendum; and in Senegal it
the third clause of Article 103 that allows the president to avoid referendums. Even
though the literature shows that a referendum carries a greater advantage of legitimacy
compared to legislatives votes (Adams 1980; Morgan 1988), Francophone West Africans
leaders prefer to adopt constitutional amendments through national assemblies. Of the six
amendments done in Burkina Faso since 1991 and of the many others done in Senegal
since 2001, not a single one was done through a referendum. In contrast with the Western
world where referendums are used by government officials to their advantage Morel,
2007), in West Africa, government officials are avoiding referendums to their advantage.
One can make the point that referendums are costly; therefore it makes sense for
poor and developing countries to avoid them. When looking closely at the phenomenon
of referendum avoidance in the countries I study, however, one will certainly realize that
there are other hidden reasons behind it. It is noteworthy to understand that in Burkina
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Faso and Senegal the provision allowing presidents to get constitutional amendments
approved by parliament instead of by referendum is included in the constitutions as
optional. The primary path for adoption of amendments to the constitution is referendum.
In other words, adoption through referendums is the regular or normal way and adoption
through parliaments is a secondary or exceptional way of getting to the same results of
amending constitutions. In a weird move, West African presidents prefer to use the
secondary or exceptional path instead of using the normal way (referendum) to amend
constitutions. Parliamentarian adoption is now the normal path while referendum
becomes secondary or exceptional way of adopting amendments. This is not the initial
intention of the framers (Fall, 2011). Actually, the systematic use of a subsidiary way for
amendments is a fraud to the constitution as suggested in Kanté's work (Cited in Fall,
2011). In the two countries where there have been some non-consolidating amendments,
the party in power always has the required majority in the National Assembly to make
any modification to the constitution. When using the legislative path, the government in
power does not need to face the popular vote. Due to party discipline53 in these countries
it is easier for a government whose party is in control of the parliament to use the path of
the National Assembly for amendments, particularly when these amendments are
contentious and might attract international observers’ attention. African leaders might
also prefer to avoid referendums as an unsuccessful referendum can be of great political
damage to a government.

I am using the expression of party discipline to refers to the often unwritten or ‘invisible party rules’ that
make the allegiance to a party obligatory. Elected representatives usually vote in the line of their party. This
is particularly true in Francophone Africa where the president is known to be the one running the show even
in semi-presidential countries like Burkina Faso and Senegal, Benin having chosen for a presidential system
(Fall, Le pouvoir Exécutif dans le Constitutionalisme des Etats d'Afrique, 2008)
53
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The question now is to know how the description of the referendum provision in
the constitutions I am studying helps my argument. As a reminder, my intention in this
particular section is to show that the avoidance of referendums as a people veto against
their representatives’ misuse of their mandate facilitates the emergence of nonconsolidating constitutional amendments. Literature has shown that referendums can be
good remedy against undue amendments of constitutions. Moreover, referendums are
used efficiently when uncontrolled by government officials. However, my analysis of the
three African countries reveals that referendums are almost never used. In fact, leaders do
not have to use them since there is a constitutional provision that allows politicians to do
away from referendums. Whenever referendums are used, it is always through the
initiative of politicians. Politicians have a monopoly on the initiative of referendums and
they usually don’t call for referendums unless they are convinced it will work out to their
advantage. Consequently, constitutional referendum votes have happened only once in
each of the countries studied and that was during the adoption of new constitutions.
Adoption of new constitutions cannot be considered as uncontrolled referendums
(Qvortrup, 2002). After all, governments in power during the adoption period usually
decide when the referendum takes place. The other issue to be raised is that in Burkina
Faso for instance, the military government in place at the time of the new constitution
adoption not only initiated the referendum, but also decided who would take part at the
drafting stage the government giving directives about what could be included or not in
the new constitution (Ye, 1995).
Let’s make it clear, my point in discussing the avoidance of referendums is not to
claim that the use of constitutional provisions to circumvent referendums is
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unconstitutional. What I am suggesting is that in the context of West African politics
where the government in power usually has well beyond the required majority at the
National Assembly, and can therefore modify the constitution any time it sees fit, making
constitutional amendments through legislatures and only through legislatures facilitates
the occurrences of non-consolidating amendments. Had referendums being used and used
properly to fulfill their original mission (discussed above), it would have helped
considerably in curbing the great number of undue constitutional amendments in Burkina
Faso and Senegal. One can argue that the use of referendums would not have made any
difference against non-consolidating amendments. In other words, with the same kind of
constitutional provision (Article 155 in Benin, Article 164 in Burkina Faso, and Article
103 in Senegal) in the three countries, why has Benin not had any successful amendments
since 1990 while Burkina Faso had at least five and Senegal has many more
amendments?
My response to this question would be that the possibility of referendums as a
constitutional device all by itself is not enough to prevent all types of non-consolidating
amendments. Therefore it cannot be the only variable to account for any single
amendment. Along with other factors it contributes in preventing non-consolidating
amendments. Along with other factors it helps explain the failure to prevent undue
amendments. When analyzing the nature of referendums one can understand that if
properly used the device can be effective against constitutional frauds. In the countries I
study, referendums have not been used enough for me to make any useful comparisons
between countries, but based on the studies done by authors (Qvortrup 2002; Dicey 1890;
Lijphart 1984; Morel 2007) it appears that referendums are valuable tools when used
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appropriately. The fact that they are not used very often in the countries included in my
study does not make this particular section unimportant. It only makes the comparison
between countries shorter, since there are more similarities than differences. It does not
mean that referendum is not a good explanatory variable when it comes to curbing nonconsolidating amendments in the particular countries chosen. Actually, the avoidance of
referendums facilitates the occurrence of non-consolidating amendments. In other words,
non-consolidating amendments can be prevented through a regular and proper use of
referendums. No study shows that referendums if used in the West African cases would
not have helped against undue modifications. In contrast, literature shows that
referendums are useful constitutional features designed to give the people a say in public
affairs and to prevent elected officials from overusing their public mandate. The same
philosophy of giving citizens a say in the conduct of public affairs is behind the
introduction of public petition as an important tool in the hands of people. How useful is
this other constitutional device? This is a question I will try to answer in the next section.

Public right to petition
Petition as it exists in the 1991 Burkina Faso constitution54 can be defined as an
initiative. An initiative is known in the US as a request signed by a number of registered
voters to get public officials to consider a particular issue: a constitutional amendment, an
ordinance or a statute or any other issue (Suksi, 1993). There are two types of initiatives:
direct and indirect initiative. Under a direct initiative, a petition is put to a vote once it
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Article 161. Also, Burkina Faso is the only country among the three countries included in my study to
have a constitutional provision giving citizens the right to constitutional amendment.
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satisfies the required number of signatures. An indirect initiative has to be approved by a
legislature before it is put to a vote. Initiative or public petition is considered a feature of
direct democracy. “Men love power…Give all power to the many, they will oppress the
few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have
power, that each may defend itself against the other.” Alexander Hamilton cited in
Cronin (1989, p.7). A major debate about referendums and initiatives is whether it is
desirable to give more power to the people in public affairs. In other words, is active
participation of citizens in public business through diverse forms of direct democracy
desirable? According to Cronin (1989) populists and progressives in America are calling
for more direct democracy in order to achieve a more robust and healthier democracy in
the US. The assumptions behind these calls are that the cure for the ills of representative
democracy is more democracy, and more direct democracy in any forms: referendums,
initiatives, and recalls.
For Cronin, Americans are torn between the desire of letting responsible and
informed leaders make decisions for them and the idea that ordinary citizens should also
be allowed to make decisions, since on important issues, the public can be trusted to do
what is right just about as often as elected politicians can be trusted. In a survey with a
sample of 1026, participants were asked whether they think that elected officials know
more than ordinary citizens about issues and should be allowed to make whatever
decisions they think best. Only 8 percent believe that elected officials know more that
citizens and that they deserve to make whatever decision they think is best for the
country. 68 percent think elected officials would misuse their power if they were not
watched and guided by the voters (Cronin, 1989, p. 9). On the question about whether
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people with more knowledge and character should have greater influence over the
country’s decisions than other people, only 39% answer yes, with 45% responding with a
negative answer, because according to them every citizen must have an equal right to
decide what is best for the country. From the few answers provided here, the tendency
seems to be going for more direct democracy.
Actually, proponents of initiative argue that it would promote government
responsiveness and accountability, because this particular feature of direct democracy
offers the people the right to make laws. Initiatives and referendums are means for
citizens to participate in public affairs. They can be used to fix unwanted laws made by
elected representatives who are subject to corruption by special interests. The assumption
is that it is harder and even impossible to corrupt an entire people of a country than to
corrupt a few representatives of those people. One major argument made by proponents
of direct democracy through initiative and referendum is that they increase voters’
interest on public issues due to the publicity that always arise during these kind of events.
Moreover, initiatives are necessary in a political world where officials always try to avoid
tough questions for fear of losing their seats.
For proponents of direct democracy, because elected officials are representatives
of the people, there should always be a mechanism that allows the people to have a direct
say any time an issue is known to be of a great importance to the country. People come
first. Governments are instituted to protect and improve the wellbeing of their citizens.
This particular argument was known in colonial America as the doctrine of consent.
Governments exist because people first consented to be governed. A representative
government should not be so important as to deny the right to the people to express itself
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through direct democracy (Cronin, 1989). So goes the argument for the use of initiative
referendum and recall. As strong as these arguments can be, there are also some
compelling arguments against initiatives.
The first and most basic argument against direct democracy in all forms is that
direct democracy isn’t practical. A country cannot be governed through referendums,
initiatives and recalls. Secondly, ordinary citizens do not have the necessary time to
devote to a particular issue in order to have as much knowledge as professional
politicians or elected officials. Moreover, initiatives and referendums do not allow the
deliberation needed for decision-making on a complicated and serious issue such as a
budget or a constitutional amendment that may require specialized knowledge on a very
particular issue. Cronin (1989) analyzes both arguments for and against direct democratic
practices such as referendums, initiatives and recalls in the American context. He
concludes his chapter on ordinary voters’ knowledge with a very interesting question.
Since critics of direct democracy see ordinary citizens as an uninformed and unworthy
mob to be kept out of any serious decision-making process, Cronin asks “How is it that
they can choose between good and bad candidates, but cannot choose between good and
bad laws?” (Cronin, 1989, p. 87). Similar to Dicey (1890) position on referendum, Cronin
seems to come to the conclusion after studying voters’ competence in the US and
interviewing legislators and political scientists that there is no evil in the use of such
direct forms of democracy as initiatives, recalls and referendums. None of these authors
advocate for a substitution of direct democracy for a representative form of democracy.
Both authors acknowledge the usefulness of direct democracy as well as representative
democracy with an emphasis on the fact that both forms of democracy as complementary.
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Actually, it does not seem desirable or even helpful to use any of these forms of
government as a substitute for the other. The reasonable solution that comes from the
literature review I just did on referendums and initiatives suggests that direct democracy
should be given more attention in order not only to keep representation democracy going
but, above all, to make it better serve its purpose of delivering wellbeing to the people.
How does initiative works in the Francophone West African context, and how does it
contribute to my argument about using constitutional features such as the initiative to
protect against political revisions of the original constitutional document and how does it
help the rule of law in democratizing countries?
Table 16: comparison of constitutional amendment strategy
Constitutional
rigidity

Referendum

Public Petition

Benin

Yes

Yes

No

Burkina Faso

Yes

Yes

Yes

Senegal

Yes

Yes

No

To begin, let’s point out that initiative does not exist in Benin as a constitutional
device allowing citizens to propose laws to the National Assembly, neither does it exist in
Senegal. As mentioned above, constitutions in both countries state that only the president
and the members of the National Assembly are allowed to submit laws for adoption.
These countries’ constitutions do not provide for any initiative or recall as known in the
US. As a reminder, a recall is a procedural device that offers voting age citizens the right
to discharge and replace a public official. An initiative, a close relative of the referendum
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according to Qvortrup (2002, p.58) enables citizens to propose constitutional
amendments. As such, it is called a constitutional initiative. When it allows people to
propose laws, it is called a direct legislative initiative. It is called an indirect legislative
initiative when it only enables citizens to propose laws that will need to be debated or
modified by members of parliaments before any adoption. Article 161 of the Burkina
Faso constitution provides the people with for a constitutional initiative. Besides the
President and the members of the National Assembly, voters in Burkina Faso can submit
constitutional amendments to the National Assembly. However, no proposed amendment
is voted on unless the National Assembly decides to do so. Initiative as it exists in
Burkina Faso is therefore an indirect constitutional initiative according to the terms of
Article 163 that states that any project or proposition of amendment is first submitted to
the approval of the National Assembly members.
The Benin Constitution does not provide for any initiative or recall. However, it
offers a great opportunity to the people of Benin that is worth mentioning. Article 122
provides citizens of Benin with the ability to oversee the constitutionality of the country’s
laws. Any person citizens or not who live in Benin (Adenauer, 2009; Salami, 2005 p.201;
Tama, 2009 p.160) can access the Constitutional Court either directly or through another
court in order to challenge the constitutionality of any given law. Such a provision does
not exist in the other two countries I am studying. Actually, there are noticeable
differences in the three constitutions. Only Burkina Faso has included the device of
initiative in its constitution, although it has never been used since the constitution was
adopted in 1991. To briefly summarize my findings on initiative in Benin, Burkina Faso
and Senegal, let’s put it this way: the Beninese Constitution through its Articles 3 and
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122 gives power to its citizens to check on the constitutionality of laws, such an
opportunity does not exist in Burkina. It does not exist in Senegal either. Article 161 of
the Burkinabe constitution provides for initiative. Citizens through a petition of at least
thirty thousand signatures can submit a constitutional amendment to the National
Assembly. This opportunity does not exist in the other two countries. Based on the
literature in this section of my work initiative is an important constitutional device.
Burkina Faso’s having included this device in its constitution is a plus for the country.
Like the referendum, the initiative device has shown its virtues. My discussion on
this particular issue made the point that initiatives are useful tools for direct democracy
(Cronin 1989; Qvortrup 2002; Suksi 1993). This makes it a good concept to consider
when studying safeguards to constitutional amendments. Since the literature shows the
importance of initiative for a healthy democratic system, I argue that the lack of this tool
in any democratizing country can be interpreted as a weakness in the constitutional
document when it comes to providing citizens with what they need for a vigorous and
strong democratic system. This assertion has some shortcomings when it comes to
making a comparative argument such as: there is a reduced number of non-consolidating
amendments in Burkina Faso compared to Senegal due to the use of initiative. One
cannot make this kind of argument as there is no initiative in Senegal or in Benin and
even in Burkina Faso where it exists it has not been used. Consequently, it becomes
almost impossible to measure the effectiveness of initiatives in preserving one country’s
constitution against non-consolidating amendments compared to the other countries. The
fact that I am not able to make a comparative argument does not weaken my main
argument. It reinforces it! Remember, my initial assumption has been that the occurrence
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of non-consolidating amendments in the countries I am studying is being facilitated in
part, by the absence of importance constitutional devices such as initiatives and
referendums. The virtues of these features are known from their use in well-respected
democracies such as in the US (Cronin, 1989; Qvortrup 2002; Suksi 1993).

162

Table 17: Steps for constitutional amendment
The initiative of
Two-step
amendment belong Process of
to:
amendment
Benin
-

President
National
Assembly
members

Yes

-

President
Majority of the
National
Assembly
Thirty thousand
voting age
citizens

Yes

President
National
Assembly

Yes

Burkina Faso

-

Senegal
-

Step 1: Required
majority for considering
an amendment
75% of MPs

Step 2: Required
majority for adopting
an amendment
80%

Number of Nonconsolidating
amendments
00

Absolute majority

75%

03

Simple majority

60%

10
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Conclusion
The objective in chapter V was to show that the procedure of amendment adopted
in my case study countries would make a difference when it comes to preventing undue
constitutional amendments. The country with stronger constraints on the process is
expected to experience fewer non-consolidating amendments compared to the others. I
examined three of such constraints: the number of steps for a constitutional amendment;
referendums and petitions. For the number of steps required for any constitutional
amendment, my comparative analysis shows that there exist two steps in each country.
Although all three countries have the same number of steps required for amendments,
there are important differences among them when it comes to the qualified majorities for
each step. While in Benin 75% approval of the National Assembly is required at the first
step to move any proposal of amendment forward in Burkina Faso only an absolute
majority is needed and in Senegal a simple majority does the trick. At the second step
80% of the National Assembly is required in Benin; 75% in Burkina Faso and 60% in
Senegal. The interesting observation I made is that the number of amendments decreases
as the required majority increases (see table 17 above). My conclusion is that although all
three countries (Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal) have the same number of steps
required for any constitutional amendment, the single important factor that explains the
difference among the number of their non-consolidating amendments is the required
majority. Regarding the referendum, I noticed that all three countries only used
referendums once and that single time was during the adoption of their initial
constitutions. Since then, politicians are avoiding referendum as a path to constitutional
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amendment. According to Article 164 of the Burkina Faso Constitution and Article 103
of the Senegalese Constitution, referendum is the normal and first path for constitutional
amendment. However, because referendums are financially costly and mainly because
they can be politically damaging (for reasons mentioned above), they have never been
used for constitutional amendments. I argue that the avoidance of referendums by
politicians has contributed to their successful experiences of non-consolidating
amendments. I make similar claim about the absence of public petition as a provision in
the Senegalese Constitution. In Burkina Faso, the provision exists, but it has never been
used. Even if it were to be used, there is another provision (Article 163) that allows the
National Assembly to block any popular initiative. Consequently, public petition can be
considered as a window dressing provision in the Burkinabe Constitution.
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Chapter VI: Independence of the Constitutional Court
Introduction
My general goal in chapter VI is to show, that Constitutional courts can play an
important institutional role in protecting a constitution against undue amendments. For a
court to efficiently fulfill such a mission, however, it must be given real powers,
preferably constitutional powers. Simply put, a Constitutional court needs to be
independent. My assumption is that the more independent a court is the more effective
and efficient it would be in preventing politically motivated amendments to the
constitution. The question is how independent should a constitutional court be? Can a
court ever be independent and how do we know a court is independent? I measure the
independence of constitutional courts using three indicators: the appointment of
constitutional court judges, their term in office and the way they are removed from office.
The reasoning behind the choice of these indicators derives mainly from concerns about
transparency, and the balance and separation of powers. In this study, for instance, a court
is not considered independent when all his members are nominated by a single
government official. What is in jeopardy in such a situation is the fundamental
democratic principle of the separation and balance of powers. This same principle is also
in jeopardy when politicians are given the authority to control judges’ salaries or their
removal from office. In this chapter, I comparatively examine constitutional powers
given to my three case study constitutional courts. I look at the relationships of the courts
with the other government branches. I also take a look at the courts’ internal rules of
decision-making to see whether the court is controlled from outside. For example, a
provision in Burkina Faso states that if in deciding a case the court is split five against

166
five, the opinion of the court’s president prevails.55.Such a provision regulating the
internal functioning of the court can be a serious obstacle to the court’s independence,
since the president of the court is nominated by the president of Burkina Faso. I conclude
the chapter by acknowledging that a constitutional court can be a strong safeguard against
undue constitutional amendments as long as it is given real constitutional powers like
those of the Beninese Court. I also hold for true, based on my comparative analysis, that
the constitutional courts in Burkina Faso and Senegal are less effective due to the weak
constitutional powers given to them by their initial constitutions (see table 18 below for a
succinct summary). To this weakness is added the control by the executive power and the
lack of courage on the part of the constitutional courts to take on politicians in these
countries (C.G.D, 2009).

Selection of Judges to the Court
Article X of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that an
independent Judiciary is a fundamental human right. Much of the literature on judicial
independence fails to clearly say what constitutes judicial independence even though
there is a consensus on how valuable it is (Cross, 2008). According to the author, judicial
independence is more a matter of degree. It should not be understood in the sense of a
binary determination of dependent or independent. Broadly speaking, independence can
be defined as the freedom to act with no constraints. If the judiciary is to be independent,
from whom or from what should it be independent? Assuming that the judiciary is one
branch of an entire body namely the government, the answer to this question might be
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Details on this provisions are given later in the text
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that the judiciary needs to be independent from the other branches of government: the
executive and the legislative.
How can the judiciary be independent from other institutions with which it
constitutes one unique body: the government? Put differently, can one think of a judiciary
that exists with no executive or legislative branches of the government? Actually, judicial
independence does not mean that the judiciary should be completely isolated from the
other parts of the government. An absolute independence is certainly unrealistic (Russell,
2001, pp. 11-12). The judiciary is like a referee, a neutral referee with the mission of
presiding over the game of governing. Judicial independence is more about the courts’
freedom from control by others governmental institutions and from any outside pressure.
It is better understood when thought of as a notion of conflict resolution by a neutral third
party, a third party that can be trusted to impartially settle controversies (Shapiro, 1981).
The rational for judicial independence is to be found in the theory of separation of
powers. In the Federalist, Hamilton (cited in Panizza, 2001) argues that “there is no
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislature and the executive
powers.” Quantitative evidence exists to assert that the separation of power actually
reduces governmental corruption (Panizza, 2001).
The typical approach to securing judicial independence is through constitutional
provisions, such as life tenure and guarantee for judges’ salaries (Cross, 2008; Keith,
2002). Constitutional protections alone, however, are not always enough for judicial
independence. For instance, in the former Soviet Union, despite the existence of a
constitution, a phenomenon known as “telephone justice” was a recurrent practice of
authorities that consisted of calling judges to tell them how they should vote on a
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particular case. In contrast with this example, Russell (2001, p. 22) talks about the United
Kingdom where judicial independence is fairly preserved even with no written
constitutional protections for judges. As a strong advocate for political insularity56 of the
judiciary (Fiss, 1993) acknowledged that constitutionalizing judicial independence is an
important step toward reaching judicial independence. The author cites Article III,
Section 1 of the US Constitution that offers life tenure and protection against diminution
of pay as a guarantee of judicial independence. Some researchers argue that once politics
is involved in the selection of judges, no matter the level of transparency, judicial
independence is compromised (Peretti, 2002). Actually, the judiciary is both a legal
institution and a political one. As such, judicial independence cannot be perfect per se.
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the US Constitution gives the president the power
to appoint the US Supreme Court Justices. Presidents usually delegate the initial phase of
the selection to their attorney general, their chief of staff or other top advisers and many
things happen behind the scenes (Segal, Spaeth, & Benesh, 2005). Presidents receive
recommendations from interest groups or politicians and filter them. Once a name is
retained, it is passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for investigation before
the nominee is announced by the president. Because of the crucial role played by the US
Supreme Court as a policy-maker, presidents usually pay close attention to the ideology
and partisanship of potential nominees. A president is more likely to choose someone
whose vision of justice approximates his own, someone who is likely to support his
administration’s policies (Fiss, 1993). Segal Spaeth and Benesh in their 2005 study found
that (87 percent) of nominees have been member of the president’s party. President
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Fiss (1993) uses the term political insularity to refer to the independence of the judiciary from all
political institutions and also from public in general.
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Reagan is known for his 1990 campaign platform that clearly favored nomination of
justices who “were harsh on crime, opposed abortion, and favored school prayer” Segal
Spaeth and Benesh (2005, p. 249). The same study argues that about 3/5 of those nominated

at the US Supreme Court personally knew the president who appointed them. “The most
important appointments a President makes are those to the Supreme Court of the United
States” (Richard Nixon cited in Segal Spaeth and Benesh 2005, p. 247). It can be interpreted
from this statement that judicial appointments are highly political, since the president has
every interest of having a judge that would support his view on the Court, especially
when the president is no longer in office, provided that the US Supreme Court Justices
are nominated for life. After a president has made his choice of a nominee for the US
Supreme Court, the next step is the Senate confirmation. Of the 147 nominees considered
in Segal, Spaeth, and Benesh (2005) 120 or 82 percent have been confirmed.
There are significant differences between the US justices’ appointment process
and the one used in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal countries with a civil law tradition.
More importantly, in the US, we are dealing with a unique judicial system whereas my
cases study countries use a particular type of institution called Constitutional council or
Constitutional court. Constitutional courts are often more political than judicial
institutions, but because most of them are empowered to oversee the constitutionality of
laws, there are often viewed as having the power of the American Supreme Court, which
is not true (Ferejohn, 2002, p. 49). Constitutional courts or constitutional councils are a
particular type of institutions separated from the judiciary and with the unique mission of
caring only about the constitution. They are courts of first and last resort. As the highest
courts in their domain of competence they look like supreme courts, but unlike the US
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Supreme Court which can take on any given issue, constitutional courts are concerned
with constitution only. These specialized courts adopted the Kelsenian57 model of judicial
review (Beyme, 1988). The model differs from the decentralized American judicial
review model that allows posteriori decisions. The Kelsenian model of constitutional
court is centralized because there is a single court that decides on constitutionality, and it
mainly has a priori decision powers. It decides on laws not yet promulgated. In the
Kelsenian model, we are dealing with “constitutional review” not judicial review
(Volcansek, 2007).
The historical context in which the Kelsenian constitutional court model was born
was that of the nineteenth century Europe which was dominated by the doctrine of
legislative supremacy which held that the legislature was the only legitimate
governmental body representing the people and therefore the legislature was the only
supreme expression of the general will. Kelsen’s innovation was to create a court that
without opposing the idea of parliamentary supremacy still allows control of the product
made by the legislature: laws. Unlike in the US where ordinary judges can review and
even strike down legislations, in the Kelsenian model, only specialized court can do so.
These courts are called58 the Constitutional Court in Benin, the Constitutional Chamber
in Burkina Faso and the Constitutional Council in Senegal.
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Hans Kelsen, an Austrian jurist was famous for being a co-drafter of the 1920 Austrian Constitution. As
an expert of constitutional law, he is known for having written the six main parts of the constitution
detailing the organization and procedures of a constitutional court. Australia then became the first to
introduce a specialized constitutional jurisdiction that later served as a model for many Europeans
countries.
58
I am using the names used in the initial constitution as things have changed over the time. The reason is
that my study is mainly interested in knowing whether the initial constitutional designs have contributed or
not in protecting the constitution against non-consolidating amendments.
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Table 18: summary of Judges nomination process
Judges’
selection
Benin

Burkina Faso

Senegal

President & the
National
Assembly
President & the
president of the
National
Assembly
President

Nominees’
year of
experience
At least 15
years.
Not specified
in the 1991
constitution
Not specified
in the 2001
constitution

Number of
Nominees &
expertise
3 magistrates,
2 legal experts,
2 personalities
3 magistrates,
6 personalities

Selection of
Term in office
court president

Removal
procedures

Vote among
members

Cannot be
removed

By the president 9 years nonrenewable

Cannot Be
Removed*

Five judges,
Expertise not
specified in the
initial 2001
constitution

By the president Six years nonrenewable

Cannot be
removed

5 years
renewable once

*In 2007, the President of the Constitutional Council was removed through a presidential decree.
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The Benin Constitutional Court is composed of seven members of which, four
members are appointed by the bureau of the National Assembly and three by the
President of the Republic for five years renewable once59. Article 115 of the Beninese
constitution states that to be member of the constitutional court one needs not only to
show professional competence, but also he or she needs to be of good morality and good
integrity. The court is made of: three magistrates with at least fifteen years of experience
two of which are appointed by the National Assembly bureau and one by the President of
the Republic; two legal experts with at least fifteen years of experience one of which is
nominated by the president and the other by the bureau of the National Assembly; two
personalities of great professional reputation one of which is appointed by the president
and the other by the bureau of the National Assembly. The court is accessible to anybody.
One does not need to be a Beninese citizen to access the Constitutional Court. The
members of the Constitutional Court cannot be removed while in office unless they have
committed an offence and were caught in the act. In this case the President of the
Constitutional Court and the President of the Supreme Court should be informed in no
later than forty-eight hours. In Benin, the President of the Constitutional Court is elected
by his colleagues. This is not the case in Burkina Faso where the President of the
Constitutional Chamber is the President of the Supreme Court, who is appointed by the
President of the country.
In Burkina Faso, the term used to refer to the special court that oversees the
constitution is Constitutional Chamber that is part of the Supreme Court. The Supreme

59

The composition is spelled out in Article 115 of the Benin 1990 Constitution.
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Court is composed of four chambers: the constitutional chamber, the judiciary chamber,
the administrative chamber, and the court of auditors. The Constitutional Chamber of
Burkina Faso is composed of: three magistrates nominated by the President on
suggestions from the minister of Justice; three personalities named by the President; three
personalities named by the president of the National Assembly. Beside the President of
the Supreme Court,60 who is also the president of the Constitutional Chamber, the rest of
the members are appointed for nine years non-renewable. The members are renewed for a
third of them every three years. There are five personalities allowed to access the
Constitutional Chamber: the President, the President of the National Assembly, the Prime
Minister, and the President of the Chamber of Representatives and 1/5 of the National
Assembly members61.
In Senegal the court is called Constitutional Council, as in France. It is composed
of five members: a president, a vice-president and three associate justices. They have a
non-renewable six-year mandate. The Council is renewed every two years. Either the
president is renewed or two members of the Councils are renewed. The five members of
the Senegalese Constitutional Council are all appointed by the President of the country.
The 2001 Constitution states62 that conditions for eligibility as a member will be decided
through an organic law.
There is a consensus in the literature that judicial independence is a valuable asset
for the rule of law and good governance (Cross, 2008). Judicial independence is better
understood as a notion of conflict resolution by a neutral third party that can be trusted to
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impartially settle controversies (Shapiro, 1981). Although there is not a single best
definition of judicial independence, the literature gives us some clues that are the key
elements, or indicators used to determine judicial independence in a given country (Keith,
2002). Among these indicators are the: selection of judges, the constitutional guarantee of
their term in office, their salary, and their removal from office. In this particular section I
am focusing my attention on the appointment of constitutional judges. My working
assumption is that the more independent a constitutional court is the better equipped it is
to protect the constitution against politically motivated amendments. Now that I have
described how judges are appointed in my case study countries, time has come to answer
the two-fold question of whether the selection of judges shows some judicial
independence in Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal and whether that judicial
independence contributes in helping the courts protect the constitution against undue
amendments. Which country seems better equipped constitutionally speaking?
According to the Francophone Constitutional Courts Association, ACCPUF63, the
appointment process is one of the most important elements of judicial independence. I am
paying a particular attention to the criteria endorsed by this association as the most
important signs of judicial independence, because all my case study countries are
members of the association whose main goal is to promote the rule of law in the
respective member countries. At their 2006 meeting at Bucharest (Romania)64, the

ACCPUF means Association des Courts Constitutionnelles ayant en Partage l’Usage du Français. This
association of Francophone constitutional courts has more than forty members. Information about the
association can be found at http://www.accpuf.org/. I am using the association’s concept of judicial
independence. Who else than the members of this association knows what independence means for a
constitutional court? Moreover, my case study countries are all members of this association which main
goal is to contribute to the consolidation of the rule of law in its member countries.
64
It was May 31 and June 1rst. Information on the meeting can be found at the association website:
http://www.accpuf.org/
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members enumerated what they believe are the most important indicators of judicial
independence: the Judge’s selection process, the inability of politicians to remove judges
from office, judges’ salaries, and the constitutionalization of constitutional courts. When
it comes to staffing the court, diversity among government officials who get to select
judges is viewed as a way to preserve judicial independence. In other words, it is not
recommended that a president be given the authority to appoint all members of a
constitutional court, as it happens in Senegal. This is against the spirit of judicial
independence as Hans Kelsen, the father of the constitutional court, designed it (Salami,
2005, p. 312).
According to this author, the case of Senegal is made worse when considering the
irrevocability element. In Senegal even though the law states that judges are not
removable while in service, government officials can circumvent the law using the
Superior Council of Magistrates to move magistrates against their will. This happens
because the Superior Council of Magistrates, which is the institution in charge of
disciplining and checking on judges, is presided over by the President of the country. It
makes one wonders how a judicial independence can be effective when the authority that
judges need to be protected from is the one to lead the highest institution with the power
to oversee judges (Salami 2005, p. 299). Moreover the Justice Minister is the one with the
power to designate judges who get to move into higher hierarchical positions and who
consequently get better pay. As one can notice this particular remark refers to ordinary
judges, but it is worth mentioning as the Senegalese Constitutional Council unlike the one
in Benin is hosted inside the judiciary institution.
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The Beninese court is separated from the judiciary. The constitution provides a
whole title65 for the Constitutional Court. Four of its court members are appointed by the
bureau of the National Assembly and three by the president of the country. An interesting
aspect that worth noting is that the members selected by the bureau of the National
Assembly are not chosen by one person, namely the president of the National Assembly
as it happens in Burkina Faso or in France.66 In Benin, the decision is made by a group:
the bureau of the National Assembly. The jurisprudence of the court gives us a sense of
how it works. In a 199867 opinion, the Beninese Constitutional Court voided all the
nominations made by the National Assembly bureau on the grounds that the presidents of
the Assembly committees were not consulted according to Article 18-b of the National
Assembly rules of procedures. The Benin constitution is the only one (among my three
cases) to state clearly what conditions are required to be a member of the Court. It also
requires that the president of the Court be not only chosen by the members of the Court,
but that she or he be chosen among the high quality law specialists and the magistrates
appointees. Actually, the qualification requirement in the Beninese Constitution supports
the idea that the Beninese constitutional framers intended to make this institution a strong
one (Fondation Konrad Adenauer, 2009, p. 200). The Senegalese Constitution only
mentions that these conditions will be determined later through an organic law. The
Burkina Faso Constitution, after indicating that three magistrates are appointed by the
president, vaguely adds that three other personalities are names by the president and that
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the National Assembly president also gets to nominate three personalities, without saying
what is enclosed in the concept of personality.
In the light of this quick comparative look at the three countries I argue that the
Beninese Constitutional Court is better equipped to deal with unwanted amendments than
the other two courts. Taking into account that the Francophone Constitutional Courts
Association advises diversity among the authorities allowed to select the constitutional
court members as a factor of judicial independence, I argue that the setting chosen by the
Beninese framers68 is closer to the ideal of judicial independence. In these three countries
as in other Francophone African countries, the executive power is known to dominate the
other two branches of the government (Fall, 2008). Giving constitutional powers to the
president to appoint all members of the court, as it happens in Senegal, does not seems to
favor the kind of judicial independence that is known to be important for the prosperity of
the rule of law. Due to the domination of the executive power, the choice made by the
Burkinabe framers does not look very promising either when considering the concept of
judicial independence and how to secure it. In Burkina Faso the president gets to choose
six of the constitutional chamber members plus the president of the court who happens to
be the president of the Supreme Court. And we know how important the role of any
president of a court is. She or he is generally the one to control the court’s procedures and
to choose among the members who gets to draft the court opinions (Rotman, 2004, p.
297). Moreover, Article 18 of the 2000 organic law on the Constitutional Council gives
exceptional voting power to the president of the Council69. When the Burkinabe Council
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This is called Shared Appointment (Volcansek, 2007, p. 376)
Article 18, third clause: « En cas de partage égal de voix, celle du Président est prépondérante ». It is worth
mentioning that the Burkinabe Constitutional Council has changed its name to become the constitutional
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members are equally divided on an opinion (5 versus 5, since there are 10 members), the
opinion of the president prevails. Three members of the court are chosen not by the
bureau of the National Assembly as in Benin, but by the President of the National
Assembly who usually happens to be member of the sitting president’s party, the same
party that has the majority in the parliament.
The precision makes sense, because one can argue when it comes to Burkina
Faso, that all members of the constitutional council are chosen by one person, namely the
president as he and his party chose all the members. Judicial independence seems more
compromised in the case of Burkina and Senegal as there is no confirmation process
through the Senate as it happens in the US. In Benin, the process is more transparent not
only because the National Assembly gets to choose more members (four) than the
president, but also as the 1998 case shows, the National Assembly nominees are chosen
by the bureau of the Assembly and through a process in which the members of the
parliament take part. The constitutional setting chosen by the Beninese framers when it
comes to the selection of the constitutional court members mirrors or reflects the ideal of
constitutional court. In conclusion, I think the Beninese selection process is more
transparent and that this transparency translates into a better quality of its members and
more independence for the Court. As a result the Benin court is better equipped to fight
against undue amendments as it has been given more constitutional powers than the other
courts.

council when the organic law mentioned here was passed. This is why I am using constitutional council
instead of constitutional chamber as it was initially called in the 1991 Constitution.
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Tenure of Constitutional Judges
As with the selection, the debate on the tenure of judges takes place in the context
of the desire for judicial independence. The question is how to design judges’ terms in
office that insulates them and their office enough from external pressures so as to allow
them to freely do their business of adjudication. To tackle this equation various countries
have various solutions. Common law countries are known for their lifetime or longer
tenure time for judges compared to civil law countries. In the United States, Article III
judges70 enjoy life tenure. Today, there is an ongoing debate about how wise the practice
of life tenure for judges is. Is it not too high a price to pay for judicial independence?
How efficient is life tenure in securing judicial independence, as this practice of life
tenure exists nowhere else in the world besides the US and Russia (Calabresi &
Lindgreen, 2006, p. 819).
Often when debating life tenure in the US people tend to focus on the nine
justices of the Supreme Court even though the many other US Courts of appeal judges
are also Article III judges. Actually, Article III does not state explicitly that federal
judges serve for life. It is only implied in the provision that “The judges, both of the
Supreme Court and inferiors Courts, shall hold their Offices during Good Behavior.”
“Good behavior” is a concept borrowed from English law (Mazza, 2003, p. 132). The
author cites the spring 1788 Hamilton federalist argument that ties judges’ life tenure to
judicial independence. After all, the judiciary is the least dangerous branch of the
government as it exercises “no influence over either the sword or the purse.” This
assumption has since then been attacked by anti-federalist Robert Yates who argued that
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Article III judges is jargon used to refer to the US federal judges that have traditionally enjoyed life
tenure (Mazza, 2003, p. 131)
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life tenure put judges above any control and that men put in such conditions will certainly
feel “independent of heaven itself” (Mazza, 2003, p. 135). The argument here is that
judges do not need such a high degree of insulation to efficiently fulfill their mission
(Ferejohn, 2002, p. 59). Independence is a cardinal virtue for the judiciary, but complete
insulation is necessarily a bad idea, because there should always be some political control
over the judiciary. This is called optimizing rather than maximizing judicial
independence (Fiss, 1993, p. 66). There are many arguments against life tenure for
judges. One of them is that appointing judges for life does not respect the spirit of
representative democracy that requires holding officials accountable to the people. With
life tenure judges stay too long on the Court and because of their insulation from the
public, they become too detached from reality. Who then are judges accountable to, once
appointed for life? Plus, judges as policy makers act like legislators, why should they not
be submitted to periodic elections or recalls like other legislators (Senators,
representatives, and the president)? Critics of life tenure judgeship also point to mental
and physical problems due to age that might negatively impact judges’ decisions.
Moreover, judges have, in the past, used strategic retirement, only leaving office when
the party they support is in power so that the president can get to appoint a judge of
similar views to the one who is retiring.
Proponents of life tenure usually defend the practice on the grounds of judicial
independence. Life tenure for judges has the invaluable advantage of insulating judges
from outside pressures. Article III judges have reached the end and the top of their career
and have no concerns about any future political appointment. They do not need to please
any political party in an effort to secure reappointment. Life tenure provides stability as
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individual judges usually do not reverse course on decisions they make (Ward
Farnsworth cited in Stras and Scott 2006). With shorter term limits for judges,
constitutional law would change more rapidly putting at risk public trust in the legal
system as a whole. The Supreme Courts records of Rhode Island and New Hampshire,
the only two states in the US with life tenure show that they overruled themselves only
two times and six times respectively (Stras & Scott, 2006, p. 1424). Actually, the slow
legal change that goes with lifetime tenure is consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis
that is characteristic of the common law tradition. Moreover slow legal change carries a
powerful message of consistency in the law, which in turn helps build trust in the
judiciary, particularly, when the judiciary is consistent in its decisions. Critics of life
tenure argue that long term limits can be as effective in providing necessary
independence for the judiciary as life tenure does. The problem with this assumption is
that without life tenure judges will need to think about their life after office. Judges might
be led to cast their votes not necessarily according to the law and to their conscience but
rather according to some serious calculations that improve their prospect for future
employment once out of office.
Critics of life tenure have various solutions on how to address the issue. Some
suggest term limits for federal judges through a statute (Mazza, 2003; Carrington &
Cramton, 2006), while others believe the appropriate way should be through
constitutional amendment (Kurland, 1969; Calabresi & Lindgreen, 2006) who remind us
that constitutional amendment is how presidential tenure was resolved with the 22nd
Amendment to the US Constitution. Proponents of life tenure such as Stras & Scott
(2006) agree that few scholars came in defense of life tenure even though there is no real
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compelling argument against it. Others believe that life tenure is the greatest mistake the
US constitutional framers made (Powe, 1998) and that it is an outdated practice from
England. The prevalence of this practice in the US is certainly due to the false American
assumptions that life tenure is necessary to preserve judicial independence (Calabresi &
Lindgreen, 2006, p. 774). Without going further in the US debate on life tenure,
describing it helps me set the stage by reviewing the major questions related to judges’
tenure. Are judges given too much power so as to create what is known in France as Le
gouvernement des juges?71 How much should judges be insulated to efficiently do their
job? Does life tenure achieve the goal of judicial independence as its proponents suggest?
How can one isolate life tenure and confirm that it is the only strongest factor that secures
judicial independence? If life tenure is the greatest factor of judicial independence why is
it not so popular around the world?
According to Calabresi & Lindgreen (2006), even England from where the US
founders obtained the practice of life tenure has gotten rid of the practice. There is a
mandatory retirement age of 70 years after which a judges is not allowed to serve.
Constitutional judges serve nine years non-renewable in France. Judges in Italy,
Germany, Portugal and Spain serve fixed terms of between six and twelve years. In Italy
and Germany it is 12 years with a 68 years mandatory retirement for the Germans. In
Spain, judges serve a twelve-year renewable term. In Portugal it is a six-year term. In
Canada there is a retirement age set at seventy-five, while in Australia it is set at seventy.
In India, it is sixty-five. In the US, beside the federal government and Rhode Island, all
the rest of the states in the country rejected life tenure for their courts of last resorts
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(Calabresi & Lindgreen, 2006, p. 820). The authors use these examples to make their case
that life tenure for judges is undesirable. They suggest that if the US framers were
reconvened today they would probably not go for this practice, because the US Supreme
Court is far more powerful than what Alexander Hamilton anticipated when he suggested
that the judiciary was the feeblest branch of the government. According to the literature
presented above, there are more countries and states without life tenure judgeship than
with life tenure. Many common law countries such as Canada, England, South Africa,
and Australia have chosen for a mandatory retirement age.
None of my case study West African countries has a life tenure judgeship. Article
115 of the 1990 Beninese Constitution sets the tenure of judges at five years renewable
once. Article 153 of the Burkinabe Constitution provides for a single term of nine years
for all the members of the Constitutional Chamber, but the president. Every three years a
third of the members are renewed. In Senegal, Article 89 of the 2001 initial Constitution
provides for a six-year non-renewable membership of the constitutional council.
According to a survey done by the Francophone Constitutional Courts Association72
among its members, the major aspect pointed out as a sign of independence is the
inability of government officials to remove judges from office. Le Principe
d'inamovibilité is a French concept used to describe a set of conditions related to judges’
terms in office considered to provide independence. This principle includes the principle
of no reduction of salary and the inability to remove judges without adequate procedures.
The notion of removal here is interpreted to mean that judges cannot be offered
promotion that might require them to move from one city to another or from one office to
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a different one. In Senegal, constitutional judges have the same type of immunity given to
the members of parliament. Life tenure is not mentioned as a major factor of judicial
independence. However, renewal of tenure is viewed as a factor against judicial
independence as judges could make decisions in the hope of tenure renewal.
My initial assumption in this section is that constitutional courts with unsecure
tenure settings would easily be influenced, because judges that fear for their job would
tend to vote in favor of the authority holding the power of reappointment or removal.
Consequently, judicial independence would be jeopardized and without judicial
independence, constitutional judges are powerless when it comes to protecting the
constitution against politicians’ activism. These particular assumptions are supported by
the literature (Farnsworth, 2006; Stras &Scott, 2006). None of the three countries under
my study provides for life tenure however, the principe d'inamovibilité in these countries
serves the same purpose of offering judges enough independence while in office. My task
in this section is to analyze the three cases (Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal) in the light
of the literature and the practices in advanced democracies such as the US to see whether
the settings of their respective constitutions favor judicial independence.
The Francophone Constitutional Courts Association raises the issue of tenure
renewal as limiting independence for the judiciary. Benin is the only country of the three
where renewal of tenure is offered. Moreover, there is a problem with the renewal notion
as all the judges arrive at the court at the same time. The prospect of their leaving at the
same time poses the question of waste of experience (Fondation Konrad Adenauer, 2009,
p. 203). In five years of tenure judges acquire experience that they could share with new
comers if they were to stay on the court. In Burkina Faso this particular issue is addressed
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through a renewal of one third of the council members every three years. This suggests
that judges do not come to the courts at the same time. In Senegal either the president of
the council or two of the judges are renewed every two years.73 Does this means that
constitutional courts in Senegal and in Burkina Faso are more independent than the
Beninese Court? Actually we should not read too much into the tenure of judgeships in
these countries. The conclusion that can safely be drawn from the tenure settings in the
three countries is that the design adopted by Senegal and Burkina Faso is closer to what is
done in the majority of countries with constitutional courts74. The question of what
constitutional court is more independent, however, cannot be answered here as the
discussion continues through the analysis of other factors of judicial independence such
as the removal of judges from the court. In the next section I take a look at the procedures
that are used in each of my study countries for removing judges. How do these
procedures impact judicial independence?

Procedures for removal
The justification for studying judges’ removal is similar to the one used for
judges’ appointments. If judges can be removed from office at the pleasure of some
politicians, their decisions on the court would necessarily be influenced, particularly in
cases where the authority with the power to remove them is involved. Article III, section
1 of the U.S. Constitution states:
“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme Court and inferior
Courts, shall hold their offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
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times receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”
Even though this article seems clear enough to understand, because Congress is
mentioned in the article, some lawyers and lawmakers have construed it to mean that
Congress has the power to remove judges for anything which two third of the Senate
finds to be “ill behavior” (Brant, 1972, p. 9). According to the author, this was never the
intention of the framers who debated the issue and came out with the clause “high crimes
and misdemeanors” that is in the Constitution.
The first time impeachment against a judge was used in the U.S. was in 1805 with
Justice Samuel Chase. One of the grievances in the 1776 Declaration of Independence
against the King of England was that king George “has made Judges dependent on his
Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries”
(Steven, 1984, p. 218). The reasoning here is that judges beholden to the king were not
providing protection against arbitrary behavior by the king and his government. The
American Revolutionaries wanted an independent judiciary. Thomas Jefferson is well
known and respected for being the author of the 1776 Declaration of Independence. Yet
after he became president in 1801, he wanted to replace judges appointed by George
Washington and John Adams. Since 25 of the 34 Senators were members of the
Republican Party, President Jefferson knew he could use impeachment as a way to
remove Federalist judges in order to appoint judges who shared his views. Justice Samuel
Chase, even though he violated no law, was impeached by the House of Representatives
and placed on trial before the Senate in February 1805. He was acquitted on all counts.
What happened is that the American people realized the importance of what was at stake.
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It was not just Justice Chase who was on trial. Actually, it was the independence of the
judiciary that was on trial (Steven, 1984, p. 220)
In 1970, there was an attempt to impeach Justice Douglas. In his speech of April
15, 1970, Republican Minority leader Gerald C. Ford stated that: “the only honest answer
is that an impeachment offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considered it to be at a given moment of history; conviction results from whatever
offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to
require removal of the accused from office.” This interpretation is far from the truth
according to Brant (1972). Actually, impeachment, as it is known in the US Constitution
finds its origins in the fourteenth century England where it was used. The United States
constitutional framers readapted the concept of impeachment to prevent abuses made of
this concept by kings in England.75 On August 27, 1787 at the Philadelphia Convention,
John Dickinson of Delaware proposed that to the sentence “The Judges of the Supreme
Court and of the inferior courts, shall hold offices during good behavior” there should be
added the words “provided that they may be removed by the Executive on the application
of the Senate and House of Representatives”, Governor Edmond Randolph of Virginia
replied by making the point that adding this clause would significantly weakened the
independence of the judges. Passion if not restricted by constitutional safeguard, can
always work its way from politics into law, since laws are interpretable by politicians. If
let to their own sense of self-restraint, the House and Senate (particularly when in the
hands of one political party) can twist the concept of “high crime and misdemeanors” into
an unlimited power of impeachment (Brant, 1972, p. 23). The American framers by
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making Congress responsible for judicial discipline certainly did not want to leave judges
in precarious conditions of being removed for any misbehavior. In fact, the Philadelphia
convention did not approve misbehavior as a constitutional ground for judges’ removal.
Was it wise to hand the responsibility of judicial discipline to the legislative branch? Who
should judge the judges? This is a question that Braithwaite (1971) tackled without any
definitive response.
By going through American history to discuss impeachment procedures, I am
making the point that judges’ removal procedures constitute an important factor for the
independence of the judiciary. In the US where the federal system provides for many veto
players and checks and balances, it still happens that politicians under passion, try to
abuse their powers. The lesson to be drawn from the attempt impeachment of Justice
Chase is that constitutions can be well-designed to protect judges against politicians’
abuses, but it often takes support from well-intended individuals to save the day. In the
case of Justice Chase, members of the Republican Party knowing what was at stake,
decided to vote independently of their party to acquit him for the sake of judicial
independence. This scenario would be unlikely in any of my case study countries, not
only because there are few strong individualities as in the US, but also because of the too
strong party discipline that could prevent any individual Senator from acting
independently. However, if there is not much to expect from individual politicians when
it comes to protecting judicial independence, is there any hope on the institutional side
that can help protect judicial independence when it comes to judges’ removal? This is the
question I am taking on by presenting the constitutional designs of my case study
countries that address procedures of judges’ removal from their office.
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Article 115 of the Beninese Constitution states that constitutional court judges
cannot be removed from office during their tenure. They cannot be subjected to law suits
or put under arrest without the authorization of the constitutional Court and the bureau of
the Supreme Court sitting in a joint session except, for the cases of flagrant
misdemeanors. In such situation, the president of the constitutional court and the
president of the Supreme Court should be immediately informed not later than forty-eight
hours. The real meaning of this article is that the Beninese Constitutional Court is fully
responsible for the discipline of its members. According to the constitutional design
chosen by the framers, no politician should be involved in the business of disciplining
judges. It is a choice made to guarantee judicial independence for constitutional judges
(Fondation Konrad Adenauer, 2009, p. 202). As the Association of the Francophone
Constitutional Court suggests, this is a common trend of policy-making in the matter of
constitutional judges’ discipline in civil law countries.76 In other words, contrary to the
practice in the U.S. where Congress is responsible for judges’ discipline, in most civil
law countries with constitutional courts, the matter of judges’ discipline is in the hands of
judges themselves. Actually, in certain countries like Senegal there is no procedure for
disciplining judges. Because members of the Senegalese Constitutional Council are
subject to a 40-year77 minimum age and a 25-year professional experience requirements,
they are supposed to be wise enough to stay out of troubles. This is supposedly the reason
why there is no disciplinary procedure (Salami, 2005). The Beninese and the Senegalese
courts seem to be independent from other government branches on the matter of judges’
removal. Are there clear cases in the jurisprudence of these courts to attest such
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independence? This particular question was used by the Francophone Association of
Constitutional Courts that includes all my case study countries. The association asked it
member courts to answer the question whether they are really independent from the
executive and the legislative branches. The answer needed to be supported by concrete
examples of cases to attest to that independence. The association regularly conducts these
types of surveys for comparative constitutional analysis purposes. The Beninese Court
provided many examples of cases, the Senegalese court gave a few cases, but the
Burkinabe court did not provide any answer to the question.
Because the Beninese Constitution78 allows citizens to access the constitutional
Court either directly or through a procedure called l’exception d’inconstitutionnalité79,
Mme Soglo and also the Pan-African women’s association WILDAF (Women in Law
and Development in Africa) section of Benin, on Jun 24, 2002, called on the
Constitutional court80 to review the constitutionality of the Beninese family code. In its
article 143, the Beninese family code allowed two forms of marriages: monogamy and
polygamy. The second clause of the cited article provides for polygamy for men, but

Article 22 states: “tout citoyen peut saisir la Cour constitutionnelle sur la constitutionnalité des lois, soit
directement, soit par la procédure de l’exception d’inconstitutionnalité invoquée dans une affaire qui le
concerne devant une juridiction. Celle-ci doit sursoir jusqu’à la décision de la Cour constitutionnelle qui
doit intervenir dans un délai de trente jours. Article 3 in its second clause states : « Tout loi, tout texte
réglementaire et tout acte administratif contraires à ces dispositions sont nuls et non avenus. En
conséquence, tout citoyen a le droit de se pourvoir devant la Cour constitutionnelle contre les lois, textes et
actes présumés inconstitutionnels.
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L’exception d’inconstitutionnalité is a way that can be used to access the constitutional judges when an
individual citizen or a corporation raises a prejudicial question of unconstitutionality during a trial. In other
words, a citizen can put in doubt the constitutionality of a law by suggesting that a law, as it is, goes against
his individual rights. When that happens, the trial needs to be put on hold until a decision is made on the
issue of unconstitutionality raised. There are two ways to deal with the issue. The first one is that the judge
responsible for the trial responds to the question of unconstitutionality and proceeds to take on the initial
issue at trial (this is how it works in the U.S.), or he must refer the question of unconstitutionality to the
constitutional Court before he can proceed to decide on the initial problem at trial. The second way is how
things happen in countries with constitutional courts, because there, the constitutional court is the only
court with the power to decide on constitutional matters.
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adopted monogamy for women. The Beninese Constitutional Court struck the law down
on the ground that it violates Article 26 of the country’s constitution that clearly provides
for equality between men and women. The Court also voided the first clause of Article 12
of the same code, on the ground that it does not allow women to keep their family name
once married, while men can keep theirs. According to the Court, marriage should not
make women lose their identity. This decision made headline in the news and put many
National Assembly members on the defensive. Some of them suggested that the Court
abused its power and considered the Court’s decision a “coup d’état” (Salami, 2005, p.
281). By declaring the two articles void, the Court made suggestions on how the National
Assembly could correct the code to make it constitutional. The Court suggested that the
National Assembly members could keep polygamy in the code if they wanted to, but they
would also need to allow polyandry for women. That way, there would be no
discrimination between men and women. These suggestions were viewed as offensive to
the National Assembly which opposed the suggestions. Some (Nestor Hossou of the
Social Democratic Party) suggested that women were taking control of the country
considering that the president of the Beninese Constitutional Court (Mme Ouinsou) was
also a woman. On June 14, 2004, accepting the suggestions from the Court, the National
Assembly passed the law with 57 votes for, zero votes against and eight abstentions. This
case is particularly interesting, as it shows how the Beninese Court was able to use its
power to advance women rights. Actually, the Court did not prohibit polygamy. It
suggested that the National Assembly add polyandry for the sake of equality between
men and women if the members wanted to keep polygamy. The legislators chose not to
accept polyandry, as it does not exist in the Beninese culture. Having chosen to reject the
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notion of a woman with multiple husbands, the immediate consequences for them was
that they could not keep polygamy. The country ended up with a family code with neither
polygamy nor polyandry which is okay with the Court. The Beninese constitutional Court
jurisprudence includes plenty of daring cases that challenged and disciplined both the
executive and the legislative.
Article 53 of the Beninese Constitution requires that before taking office, the
newly elected President of the country take an oath “before God, the souls of our
ancestors, the nation and before the Beninese people, the only sovereign…”81 During the
Beninese revolution led by President Kérékou in 1972, and due to his Marxist-Leninist
views, all religions including vodu (the country’s traditional religion) were forbidden. In
1990, Kérékou became Christian (a protestant) and he was well-known for his devotion
and zeal for this religion. When taking his presidential oath on April 4, 1996, he omitted
the following portion of the Oath dealing with “the souls of our ancestors” a phrase
purposely included in the constitution by the framers to remind the Beninese about their
attachment to their ancestral culture and religious beliefs. Two citizens immediately sent
requests to the Constitutional Court in order to void and restart the presidential oath as
the now protestant president might have intentionally decided to omit the portion of the
oath that stresses the Beninese traditions. Actually, there is nothing in the Beninese
constitution that suggests that the Court has the authority to control or make the president
do his oath over. The Court still found a way to void the presidential oath and make
President Kérékou take it again on the ground that the presidential oath is indivisible and
had to be read entirely. No modification or omission is allowed. President Kérékou took
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the oath a second time and said this: “In Benin, even generals bow down before the
Constitution” (Salami, 2005, p. 115). Another decision82 about a decree made by a
minister on amnesty given to soldiers, was voided by the Court on the ground that Article
98 of the constitution states that amnesty is a domain of the law and a decision about
amnesty cannot be made through a ministerial decree. The attitude of the Beninese Court
and the extended power that it seems to have given itself, made some scholars talk about
la “Republique des juges.”83 The same notion used by former France president de Gaulle
to describe the power of the judiciary in the United States (Salami, 2005)
The fact of the matter is that the Beninese Constitutional Court seems dynamic
and very active in fulfilling its role of consolidating democracy. From June 1993 to July
2008, the Court decided more than 1700 cases, of which 1200 dealt with constitutionality.
602 cases were about human rights and public liberty (Tama, 2009, p. 161). This activism
of the Beninese Court is in part due to the key constitutional power given to citizens to
access the Court (Rotman, 2004, p. 294). The author points out that Article 121 of the
Constitution allows the Court to act on its own motions84 and that the Benin’s Court
marks a radical departure from the French model and also from the German model that
allows citizens to call on the Court to review laws. The German model institutes a filter,
because petitioners have to prove that they have exhausted all other legal remedies before
the Court can take a look at their case. In Benin, petitioners do not need any particular

Décision CC96-064 du 26 septembre 1996: l’arrêté n°356/MDN/DC/SP-C du 30 juillet 1996.
Stéphane Bolle at: http://afrilex.u-bordeaux4.fr/ . For a deeper understanding of the notion of République
des juges or Gouvernement des juges see a book written in 1921 by the French scholar Edward Lambert
entitled: le gouvernement des juges et la lute contre la legislation sociale aux Etats Unis. The book
denounces the empowering of judges in the U.S. to set aside legislation as unwise (Tushnet, 2008, p. 1227).
It might also be constructive to see Landfreid (1987, p.7)
84
This jurisdiction is called l’auto-saisne.
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motif to request a constitutional review, a situation that allows the Court to be as activist
as it is.
The activism of the Beninese Court went so far as to get its own president out of
the Court. In 1998, at the end of her mandate Justice Pognon, the sitting president of the
Beninese Constitutional Court was nominated by the bureau of the National Assembly for
reappointment as a high-level jurist. A citizen in the name of Y. Kotchikpa called on the
Court to review the constitutionality of this particular nomination which he believed was
unconstitutional because Justice Pognon was initially nominated and served on the Court
as a Magistrate. The constitution created three categories of members to sit on the Court:
magistrates, high-level jurists and, personalities with great reputation for their
professionalism. Since Justice Pognon was initially nominated as a magistrate, she cannot
be reappointed as a high level jurist. On May 29, 1998,85 the Court decided that citizen Y.
Kotchikpa was right. Consequently, Justice Pognon, the sitting president of the Beninese
Constitutional Court was not reappointed. She was ousted (Salami, 2005, pp. 137-138).
Compared to the Burkinabe and the Senegalese courts, the Beninese Court has a
richer jurisprudence. On the particular issue of the judges’ discipline or their removal, I
already mentioned that the Senegalese Constitution designed no specific procedures,
since as Constitutional Council members the judges are deemed wise. In Burkina Faso,
the 1991 Constitution did not design specific procedures for the Constitutional Chamber
members since the now Constitutional Council was part of the judiciary before the
organic law of 2000. Judges were being disciplined by the Conseil Superieur de la
Magistrature, an institution headed by the President of the country and his Justice
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Minister who is the vice-president. In 2000 an organic law86 was passed to change the
status of the Constitutional Chamber, which became independent for the rest of the
judiciary and now has a new name: Constitutional Council. From 1991 to 2008, the
Constitutional council of Burkina Faso has examined around 490 cases with 426 cases in
which the court’s role was only to give opinions (see appendix 2). Twenty-four cases
were on the control of constitutionality, and forty were on electoral issues (C.G.D, 2009,
p. 135). These numbers show that the Burkinabe Constitutional Council functions more
as a council than as a court due to its high number of opinions compared to cases where
the Court actually made decisions.87 Moreover, when the Burkinabe Court was asked by
its peers in the Francophone Constitutional Courts Association (ACCPUF) to provide
examples of cases that can show the independence of the court either from the legislature
or from the executive, the court replied that nothing shows that the Burkinabe court is not
independent. The court did not or could not provide a single example to attest its
independence vis-à-vis the legislature or the executive.88 Furthermore, on September 5,
2007, a presidential decree was used to remove the president of the Burkinabe
Constitutional Council from office.89
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Loi organique N: 011-2000/AN portant organisation, Attribution et Fonctionnement du Conseil
Constitutionnelle et Procédures Applicables devant lui.
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I am trying to make the point that the concept of opinion does not mean exactly the same in English and in
French when it comes to the legal jargon. In English, the Court’s opinion is not different from the Court’s
decision. In French, the word avis means opinion, it does not necessarily mean decisions. It only means that
the Court was consulted about an issue, and it gave its opinion. The term “decision” is used by legal experts
only when referring to the control of constitutionality of laws. It is also used when the court deals with
electoral disputes (C.G.D, 2009, p. 135).
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http://www.accpuf.org , bulletin n:7, November 2006, section II, p.161
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The initial constitution does not provide for the irrevocability of the Constitutional Chamber’s members.
It only sates in Article 160 that an organic law would regulate how the chamber functions. An important
thing to be mindful of is that the president of the Constitutional Chamber is the president of the Supreme
Court. There seems to be a gray zone left by the constitutional framers on the statute of this particular member
of the Constitutional Council. Is he or she fully treated as a Constitutional Chamber’s member or is he or she
treated as a regular magistrate? If the council’s president is a full member of this particular institution, it
seems unconstitutional to remove him through a presidential decree
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In its study of the Burkinabe constitutional court’s opinions and decisions, the
most comprehensive recent study of this type, the Center for Democratic Governance,
mentioned how difficult it was to access information about the court. This is due in part
to the undeveloped nature of archives, but more importantly it is due to what the authors
call the cult of secrecy90 in the Burkinabe judiciary, which makes any study on the system
particularly difficult. But still, with the information gathered on the constitutional court
cases from 1960 to 2008, it is difficult for any researcher to point to particularly strong
cases decided by the court in which the court challenged the legislature or the executive,
the way the Beninese Court has done in numerous occasions. In contrast, it is easy to find
cases in which the Burkinabe court has shown some lack of independence. In April 5,
2007, the Burkinabe Prime Minister91 called on the Constitutional Council to give its
opinion on the contract of loan signed between Burkina Faso and the Islamic Bank of
Development (IBD). The contract was signed in Ouagadougou on January 15, 2007. The
first clause of Article 22 of the loan contract states that the contract is set to be executed
under the Islamic Sharia law.92 On April 20 2007, the Council argued that according to
Article 31 of the Burkinabe Constitution,93 Article 22 of the contract is unconstitutional.
In other words, Burkina Faso is a secular state, and accepting a contract that requires
officials to use a loan according to Islamic sharia law might compromise this principle of
secularity. On July, 05 2007, the Prime Minister contacted the Constitutional Council
again for its opinion94 about the same contract with the Islamic Bank of Development. On
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Lettre n:2007-133/PM/CAB/ du 05 Avril 2007
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« Le présent accord est soumis, pour son exécution et son interprétation, aux principes de la charia
islamique » (C.G.D, 2009, p. 117)
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Article 31 states: « le Burkina Faso est un Etat démocratique, unitaire et laïc. Le Faso est la forme
républicaine de l’Etat ».
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Lettre n:2007-381/PM/CAB/ du 05 Juillet 2007
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July, 20, 2007, the court reversed course. It argued that Article 22 of the contract earlier
declared unconstitutional was now constitutional, even though Article 22 has not been
modified (C.G.D, 2009, p. 117). According to the second clause of Article 159 of the
Burkinabe Constitution, opinions or decisions of the constitutional council are not subject
to appeal, since the Council is a court of last resort. Why did the Prime Minister submit to
the Constitutional Council the same contract twice? On April 20, 2007, the Burkinabe
Court made clear that Article 22 of the loan contract with the Islamic bank was
unconstitutional. Under the Burkinabe Constitution, the Prime Minister did not have any
authority to ask the Council for a second opinion, the opinions and decisions of the court
being final, there is no appeal. If a Prime Minister has the power to make a constitutional
council reverse its opinion, how independent such constitutional council actually is?
Other examples that raise serious doubts about the Burkinabe Constitutional Council
independence exist.
When asked by the Francophone Constitutional Court Association (ACCPUF),
whether the Senegalese Constitutional Council thinks it is independent, the response was
yes. Examples were given to substantiate that independence. In his March 28, 2001,
decision,95 the Constitutional Council was asked by opposition parties - Parti Socialiste
(PS), L’Alliance pour les Forces du Progres (AFP) and l’Union pour le Renouveau
Democratique (URD) - to declare unconstitutional the fact that President Wade’s name
and picture were printed on a voting ballot in non-presidential elections in which
President Wade did not take part as an individual. The Council agreed with the
opposition parties and voided the voting ballot as unconstitutional. On August 13, 2003,
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thirteen opposition members of the Senegalese National Assembly called on the Council
to invalidate an organic law that raised the number of the members of the Council of the
Republic from 90 to 100. The opposition parties argued that the party in power was
creating financial charges without appropriate financial means. On August 29, 2003,96 the
Senegalese Constitutional Council agreed with the opposition parties and declared the
amendment to the organic law void. Other examples of the Senegalese Constitutional
Council cases exist to show that at times the Council has challenged elected officials.
However, as the former vice-president of the Court Babacar Kanté has pointed out,97 the
Senegalese high court on constitutional matters is well known for its endless declarations
of incompetence. In the fifteen years98 of its existence, the Senegalese Constitutional
Council has only issued a little over hundred opinions and decisions (an average of seven
opinions or decisions per year). Among these hundred opinions, about twenty cannot
even be called decisions since they are just declarations of incompetence.99 Out of the
hundred decisions or opinions of the Council, about half were issued on electoral matters.
Thirty decisions or opinions were issued on the constitutionality of organic laws.100
Fifteen were issued on the constitutionality of ordinary laws. Two decisions were issued
on international commitments. Four decisions were issued by means of l’exception
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Affaire n: 2C/2003 du 29 aout 2003
(Fall, 2008, p.15). I am referring to the attitude of a Court that has the tendency to declare itself incompetent
in deciding issues. This has happened so many times that the Senegalese Constitutional Council is often
mocked for its constant declarations of incompetency.
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The Senegalese constitutional Council was created by the constitutional law 92-22 of May 1992.
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(Fall, les Decisions et Avis du Conseil Constitutionnel du Senegal, 2008, p. 26)
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With the adoption of the January 22, 2001 Senegalese Constitution, important changes were made. Article
78 of the Constitution does no longer require anymore a check of the constitutionality of organics laws before
their promulgation as required earlier by the March 7, 1963 Constitution.
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d’inconstitutionnalité.101 Three decisions were issued on the constitutionality of
constitutional laws, and three on the consultative opinions.
The problem is that judges in Burkina Faso and Senegal are not as audacious as
their colleagues in Benin. They often chose for a literal interpretation of the constitution
(C.G.D, 2009, p. 3). This can be explained by the scope of power given to these two
courts compared to the Beninese Court. The Constitutional Council in Burkina and
Senegal do not have auto-saisine (original jurisdiction) power. Any opinions or decisions
on their part have to come from elected officials such as the Prime Minister, the President
of the National Assembly, the President of the Chamber of Representatives, or the
president of the country. Moreover, individual citizens are not given authority to call on
the courts in these two countries as it happens in Benin. In other words, these courts were
initially and maybe purposely weakened by the framers of their constitutions who did not
provide them with enough power to guarantee their independence. In a brief conclusion, I
will argue that when it comes to the removal of judges the Beninese Constitution
provides for more protection than the other two constitutions. Consequently, the
jurisprudence of the Beninese Court is not only richer, but it is also more dynamic in
challenging the other two branches of the government for the sake of the rule of law and
the consolidation of democracy.

Conclusion
This chapter intended to show that constitutional courts can be reliable
institutional safeguard against politically motivated amendments if there are not used by
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politicians just as window dressing institutions with no real power. In my study, I show
that for a constitutional court to fulfill a mission of protection against undue amendments
it must be given real constitutional powers that make it independent enough to freely
conduct its business of control of the constitutionality of laws made by the executive and
legislative branches of the government. I used three indicators to identify judicial
independence. These three indicators are: the selection of judges, their term in office and
their removal from office. My comparative analysis of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal
led me to conclude in regard to the selection procedures used in these countries that the
Beninese process shows more transparency mainly because of the diversity of the
authorities with constitutional power to select judges to the court. In Benin, not only is
the legislative branch given more judges to select (four) compared to the executive
branch (three), but the Beninese constitution instead of giving power to one person such
as the president of the National Assembly to nominate judges, made it a shared
responsibility among members of parliament. In other words more people are given
authority to examine the selection process, which necessarily add to the idea of
transparency in contrast to the Senegalese process that allows the president alone to select
all five members of the constitutional Council. Moreover, the initial Senegalese
Constitution does not give a clear idea of the qualifications of the members that the
president is allowed to choose. This looks like too much discretion given to the executive
branch already known for its overreaching behavior. In Senegal, almost all constitutional
amendments come from presidential initiative 14 amendments out of 15 from 2001 to
2009 (Fall, 2011). The executive branch is too powerful (Fall, 2008). In Senegal, the
parliament’s agenda gives priority to the executive according to Article 84 of the
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Constitution (Thomas & Sissokho, 2005). Based on this article proposal of amendments
coming from parliamentarian can be postponed forever while executive drafts are
examined. Article 82 is also another burden102 for the parliamentarians that show the
supremacy of the executive (Thomas & Sissokho, 2005, p. 106). In Burkina Faso,
although there seems to be a diversity of authorities selecting judges to the Constitutional
Chamber, the matter of fact is that because of the very powerful nature of the executive
(the president’s party is usually dominant in the parliament), the selection process ends
up being done by officials from the same political party, which dilutes the diversity that is
being sought for the sake of transparency. Moreover, in Burkina, other members of
parliament have no business in the selection process. Only the president of the National
Assembly is given constitutional power to select judges.
On the tenure of constitutional judges, my study shows that the Beninese Court
because it allows a renewal of a five-year term for its judges does not fare well on this
particular issue. The reasoning is that when judges hold renewable terms in office they
tend to be lenient toward the authority with the power to renew their mandate. Another
issues with the Beninese Court is that judges who get to the Court at the same time might
be leaving altogether, which seems to be a waste of experience for the country. Such an
issue finds a solution in the Senegalese and Burkinabe settings where a third of the courts
members are renewed at certain intervals. Moreover, these two countries have a fixed
term for constitutional judges. They only serve once, but unlike the Beninese Court
whose members’ salaries are set through a constitutional provision, the Senegalese and
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Burkinabe council members have no constitutional guarantee of their salaries. This issue
is addressed through a lower level of law (organic law). On this particular section of
judges’ tenure I conclude that the settings in Burkina Faso and Senegal look better that
the ones in Benin not only because of the renewable term in office, but also because of
the potential loss of experience that might occur if all Constitutional Court judges in
Benin left at the same time.
Judges cannot be removed while in office unless they are accused of serious
wrong doing. In such cases their removal is done with the consent of the Constitutional
Court. They are not subject to law suits or arrests unless allowed by the Constitutional
Court. This is how things are set through Article 115 of the Beninese Constitution. In
Senegal and Burkina Faso the removal of judges was not clearly addressed in the initial
constitutions as these institutions were part of the judiciary as a whole. The issue was
addressed later through organic law on the Constitutional Council. In Senegal,
constitutional judges have immunity similar to parliamentarians, however, there is no
particular provision on how to treat a constitutional judge accused of wrong doing. The
reason is that judges are deemed wise enough to avoid trouble. In Burkina Faso, before
the year 2000, judges were being disciplined by the Superior Council of the Magistrates,
which was led by the president and his Justice Minister. In other words, judges were
being disciplined by an institution led by politicians. This does not augur well for
transparency. Based on provisions from the initial constitutions, I conclude that the
Beninese Constitution offers more protection and guarantees for its judges compared to
the other countries’ constitutions. From the analysis of the three indicators used in my
discussions of this chapter including the comparative study of the three constitutional
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courts jurisprudence presented above, I conclude that the Constitutional Court in Benin
with a dynamic and more aggressive judicial demeanor is more effective and efficient in
protecting the constitution against politically motivated amendments compared to the
other courts in Burkina and Senegal.
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Chapter VII: The implications of non-consolidating amendments in
Francophone Africa
Introduction
The 1990s’ waves of democratization brought great hope for positive political
change in Africa. Many African countries experienced transition periods marked by the
adoption of new constitutions. Two decades after the waves of democratization, there is
“a new reverse wave” (Huntington, 1997), a retreat, and a negative trend of democratic
practices (Diamond & Plattner, 2010). This dissertation has shown that one of the most
vivid signs of the retreat of democracy in Africa is the phenomenon of non-consolidating
constitutional amendments. Non-consolidating amendments are not intended to
consolidate neither democracy nor the rule of law. Instead, they are designed to reinforce
and perpetuate the reign of incumbent power holders.
In this chapter, I conclude with a review of my work. After summarizing the main
findings, I argue, based on the general context of governance in democratizing countries
described above, that the findings are generalizable beyond the three cases used in my
study. I conclude the chapter by mentioning some limitations of the dissertation.

Summary of findings
In the introduction of my work, I set out to answer a two-fold question: why are
there so many constitutional amendments in newly democratizing Francophone West
African countries and what facilitates this phenomenon? Before I answered the question,
I explained that I am not just interested in the reasons for non-consolidating amendments’
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occurrence in democratizing countries. I am specifically interested in analyzing one
particular type of amendment; the amendments that are not intended to advance
democracy or the rule of law, but are rather, solely designed to help one individual or a
group of individuals hold on to power by manipulating the constitution and electoral laws
in their favor. These are the kind of laws that I refer to as non-consolidating amendments.
In chapter 3, I showed how to identify them using five indicators. The first one is
the general context of governance. This indicator is important as it consists of describing
the state of democracy in a given country. Once the state of governance is known it can
be contrasted with the fundamental principles that any country claiming to be a
constitutional democracy should obey. These principles (that I enumerated in chapter 3)
require free and fair elections held in a timely fashion, a commitment to constitutionalism
by all parties in the democratic game, the separation and balance of powers, and the
renouncement to the use of informal rules such as clientelism in the conduct of
government business. Any country where these basic principles are not respected is a
potential victim of non-consolidating constitutional amendments, and democratizing
countries, due to their fragile political context are, in general, vulnerable to nonconsolidating amendments. The other indicators of non-consolidating amendments are as
follows: the specific context in which the amendment is made; the motivation for the
amendment, the constitutional democratic principle (the principle in violation) that the
amendment can be tested against, and the non-consolidating aspect of the amendment.
After I identified six constitutional amendments in Burkina Faso and fifteen in Senegal, I
evaluated them following the process I just described and I found three (50%) nonconsolidating amendments in Burkina Faso and 10 (67%) in Senegal.
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The importance of these findings is that I am able to shed light on a phenomenon
neglected or not well-known in the democratic consolidation literature. My work shows
that non-consolidating aspects of constitutional amendments are not always obvious to
outsides observers of politics in a given country. Scholars such as Huntington (1991)
emphasized the electoral process for the consolidation of democracy in democratizing
countries. While this is obviously an important part of constitutional democracy, I
showed that free, fair and timely held elections do not suffice to produce democratic
consolidation in countries with fragile and weak democratic culture. As a matter of fact,
the debate about democratic consolidation often misses the sophisticated nonconsolidating practices that prevent democratizing countries from reaching the level of
consolidated democracies.
One of these practices is the uneven playing field (the incumbent power holder
control of state resources, the media, and the legal system). By engaging in this type of
non-consolidating behavior between elections, an incumbent power holder does not need
to resort to electoral fraud to win elections (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Although 81% of
Africans would like to see incumbents removed, as Diamond (2010) suggests,
incumbents in Africa are almost always sure to be reelected to continue their single partylike governance against democratic consolidation. I argued that although alternation in
power is not a recipe for democratic consolidation in countries long ruled by authoritarian
regimes, change can stimulate a new beginning of practice of the rule of law. The
tremendous advantages of incumbent power holders, the executive hegemony, and the
politics of clientelism prevent such democratic consolidation from happening. Actually,
non-consolidating constitutional amendments constitute a legal manifestation of the
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practice of the uneven playing field, as the incumbent power holders who control the law
often use it to advance their personal political agenda. Why does this phenomenon exist
in the first place, and why is it prevalent in democratizing countries?
I have designed three possible explanations as a response to this question: the
openness of the constitution-making process, the mechanism of constitutional
amendment, and the independence of the constitutional courts. The openness of the
constitution-making process is a path dependency argument in which I argued that the
constitution-making process determines the quality of the constitutional document that
comes out of it. I hypothesized that an open, transparent, and inclusive constitutional
adoption process would lead to fewer non-consolidating amendments, as a consensual
process has the potential of producing a constitutional document that would be owned,
accepted, and defended by the parties involved.
As a matter of fact, my findings confirm this view. Comparing Benin, Burkina
Faso and Senegal, I find that the more consensual and transparent the constitutionmaking process is, the less politically motivated amendments a country experiences.
Benin has experienced no constitutional amendment since 1990, while Burkina Faso has
experienced six amendments with a constitution-making process a little more transparent
than the Senegalese. Senegal experienced fifteen amendments since 2001. In Burkina
Faso, the process, although it was not as transparent as the one in Benin, was relatively
more transparent than the Senegalese as the opposition was selectively103 implicated in
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the constitution-making process. In Senegal, five experts drafted the constitution and the
document was later submitted to the opposition for comments.
I have shown in chapter 4, that one of the major reasons the Beninese constitution
has not experienced any amendment since its adoption in 1990, had to do with the
transparency and consensus experienced in the constitution-making process (Badet,
2009). In my work, I showed as Elster (1993) argues, that a constitution-making process
controlled by a sitting regime is more likely to produce less positive results compared to
one done independently as the old regime is often part of the problem that the new
constitution is seeking to fix. This was the particular merit of the Beninese national
sovereign conference, i.e., it ignored advice from President Kérékou in order to freely
create strong democratic institutions.
Moreover, the constitution-adoption process itself, because of its perceived
consensus by the Beninese people, has been raised to the level of constitutional principle
by the Constitutional Court in its 2006 decision against the overstaying of MPs’ mandate.
The court set a precedent by suggesting that any constitutional amendment should respect
the consensual spirit of the 1990 sovereign conference. This offered a strong shield
against future undue amendments to the Beninese Constitution. Such a shield exists
neither in Burkina Faso, nor in Senegal where citizens did not feel strong ownership of
their respective constitutions. Examples cited in chapter 3 show individual Beninese
citizens who offered money, cars, computers, and other personal services to prevent their
constitution from being modified. In 1997, the Burkinabe National Assembly
successfully amended Article 37 of the constitution to allow an open-ended presidency
for President Compaoré without any similar public outcry, although a vast majority of the
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Burkinabe people (according to Afro-barometer104) opposed the amendment of Article
37. In Senegal, President Wade, more than any of his predecessors, manipulated the
constitution for personal political gains without major hurdles until 2012.
Compared to my other two variables, I argue that the openness of the constitutionmaking process has a stronger explanatory power. As a reminder, I suggested that the
way a constitution is made (its openness, inclusiveness, and transparency) determines the
value and the success of the document that comes out of it. The idea is that the strength of
the democratic institutions such as the National Assembly, the presidency, the judiciary
and the rules that regulate their internal functioning, depend on the success of the new
constitution. The freer the constitution-making body is, the more likely it will be to create
strong institutions that are able to protect the constitution.
In Benin, the national conference was able to engineer a constitutional
amendment process that has a higher majority requirement than the Burkinabe and the
Senegalese due to the will of the original drafters to make the fundamental document
secured from easy and trivial amendments. In Benin, the final process for a constitutional
amendment requires 80% approval of MPs. But before that final step, there is another
requirement of 75 % MPs approval to examine105 for any draft or proposal of
amendment. These requirements are lower in the other two countries and I have shown,
in chapter V how they have made a difference when it comes to protecting the
constitution against politically motivated amendments.
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same chapter.
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In chapter VI, I showed that the Beninese Constitutional Court have been given
more constitutional powers than its peer institutions in Burkina and Senegal. For instance,
the institution was created as a full and independent institution separated from the rest of
the judiciary, which was not the case in Burkina Faso and Senegal. The salaries of the
Beninese Justices were set by a constitutional provision that put them on the same rank as
government ministers. I explained how important such a provision is for the
independence of the Beninese Constitutional Court vis-à-vis the executive. I also used
several court cases challenging the executive power in Benin to show the independence
of the court compared to the courts in Burkina and Senegal.
The mechanism of constitutional amendment (which is my second independent
variable) and the independence of the constitutional court (my third variable), are created
by constitutional provisions. The strength of these institutions, therefore, depends on the
strength of the constitution, which in turn, derives its power from the process that brings
it to life. If the internal decision-making of the constitutional drafting is viewed as
undemocratic, the resulting document would necessarily lose democratic legitimacy, a
key element for the legitimacy of all institutions deriving their power from the
constitution. This can be better explained using an example: when in 2006, the
constitutional court voided the first successful constitutional amendment in Benin, it did
so based on the national consensus that created the 1990 constitution. In other words, the
court was referring to the consensual Beninese constitution-making process that it
presented as a principle of constitutional value.106 Although, the court was the institution
that ultimately stopped the non-consolidating amendment of 2006, it was helped by the
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See arguments presented in the court’s decision in chapter 3.
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national constitution-making context. Even with a high majority requirement that was
supposed to prevent any unnecessary or politically motivated amendment, the Beninese
National Assembly gathered enough support to amend the constitution for MPs to
overstay their initial mandate. This, however, does not suggest that the rigidity of the
amendment process is inefficient in protecting against undue amendments. Constitutional
rigidity does positively affect the occurrence of non-consolidating amendments as it
significantly reduces the amendment rate.
I used the mechanism of constitutional amendment as my second research
question to make sense of the phenomenon of non-consolidation constitutional
amendment. I argued that a rigid constitution would lead to fewer undue constitutional
changes. Rigid constitutions are defined in opposition to flexible constitutions that use
ordinary legislative process.107 The degree of rigidity depends on the strategy of
amendment used (Lutz, 1994). In other words, constitutions with strong procedural
constraints would experience fewer politically motivated amendments. My findings
support this view. I showed in Chapter 5 that a requirement for a high majority for
constitutional amendment correlates with a low number of non-consolidating
constitutional amendments. In Benin, I observed that the qualified majority for any
constitutional amendment is 80% approval from the National Assembly members. The
country has experienced no constitutional amendment since the adoption of its
constitution in 1990. In Burkina Faso, the required majority for a constitutional
amendment is 75%. Six amendments of which three are non-consolidating were
experienced in that country. Sixty percent is the qualified majority in Senegal, the
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New Zealand is an example of countries with flexible constitutional amendment process
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country with the youngest constitution (2001) among my case study countries, and yet a
country with the highest number of amendments (fifteen in 2012). What makes these
findings interesting is that all my three study countries have similar amendment processes
and the same number of steps for any amendment (two steps), with the only major
difference being the required majority. In other words, making the constitutional
amendment process harder does matter in preventing undue amendments.
The third research question I used for the analysis of non-consolidating
amendments in West Africa, is the independence of constitutional courts. My working
hypothesis was that the more independent a constitutional court is, the better equipped
and the more efficiently it can prevent politically motivated constitutional amendments. I
defined the independence of constitutional courts using three indicators: the process of
judges’ selection, their term in office and the way they are removed from office. My
comparative analysis of Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal led me to conclude that
because of its initial constitutional powers such as its original jurisdiction, its freedom to
choose the chief justice, and the right for ordinary citizens to call upon the court, the
Beninese Constitutional Court is not only more dynamic, but it is also more independent
than its counterparts in Burkina Faso and Senegal. While in Senegal, the president is
given power to nominate all constitutional council members, in Burkina Faso the
president shares that responsibility with the parliament. However, because the parliament
in that country is always led by the ruling party (since 1992, see appendixes 3-7), all the
constitutional council members end up being nominated by the same ruling party. In
Benin, the nomination process is shared by the president and the parliament. Unlike in
Burkina Faso where the president shares the nomination power of judges with the
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president of the National Assembly, in Benin, the process is made more deliberative as
the president of the National Assembly is not the only individual MP to nominate judges.
While in Benin, the salary of constitutional court judges is set through a constitutional
provision, in Senegal and Burkina Faso the issue is addressed through an organic law.
Similar patterns exist when it comes to the protection of judges and their removal from
office. In Benin where the constitutional court is an entire institution separated from the
rest of the judiciary, judges have constitutional protection against any law suits or any
illegal removal from office, which is not the case in the other two countries where the
initial constitutional councils were part of the judiciary. Examples of the dynamism and
activism108 of the Beninese court given in chapter 6 and the court docket confirm that the
court is a big and serious player in the institutional landscape of the country.
I showed in chapter 6, that the Burkinabe and the Senegalese constitutional
councils used judicial techniques to avoid giving opinions on tough cases involving the
government or the president, due to their lack of independence. The techniques consist of
the court declaring itself incompetent to decide certain cases. For example, in 2003, the
Senegalese opposition reached out to the constitutional council for a decision on the
creation of the CRAES. The argument was that the ruling party waited for the opposition
MPs to leave the National Assembly then fraudulently passed a law on the creation of
this important institution in their absence. The Senegalese Constitutional Council
responded that it was incompetent to decide the case. This is what Fall (2011) calls the
lack of audacity from the Senegalese Constitutional Council whose members don’t
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It is the court decision that ended polygamy in the country. It is also the court that prevented the 2006
non-consolidating amendment that would have allowed MPs to overstay their mandate
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practice what is known in France as le devoir d’ingratitude (the duty of betrayal). The
expression is used to refer to individual judges who decide against their nominating
authority in order to show their independence. In Burkina Faso and Senegal, when the
court does not declare itself incompetent, it usually decides in favor of the ruling party.
This was the case when President Compaoré and President Wade were challenged
regarding their right for reelection after completing their second terms. Both presidents
were declared eligible by their respective constitutional councils and were allowed to run
for a third mandate in Burkina Faso and Senegal. Actually, the Burkinabe and Senegalese
councils are less active than the Beninese court due, in part, to their lack of original
jurisdiction.
My analysis supports the claim that the more independent a court is, the better it
can fight against undue constitutional amendments. Actually, because the Beninese court
is more independent than the other courts in my case study, it was able to protect the
constitution against politically motivated amendments. Constitutional justices in Benin
showed some degree of audacity and independence by behaving as protectors of the
constitution, which is needed in democratizing countries with fragile and weak
democratic culture (Fall, 2011). In my work, I argued that due to the hegemony of
presidential and semi-presidential regimes in my study countries, an activist
constitutional court would be welcome in order to protect basic constitutional principles
such as the balances and separation of powers, free and fair elections, the respect for
constitutional mandates by government officials, etc. My findings show that this is a
reality only in Benin where the court dares to challenge Congress and the executive
power.
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In conclusion, the findings support my three claims that an open constitutionmaking process provides a shield against politically motivated amendments; that a
difficult amendment process leads to fewer non-consolidating amendments and that a
vibrant and independent constitutional court can efficiently protect a country against
amendments aimed at individual political gains. None of these three factors taken alone,
however, can prevent non-consolidating constitutional amendments. The openness
(transparency and inclusiveness) can provide an opportunity for a better constitutional
document endowed with the necessary legitimacy. It can create an opportunity for
stronger democratic institutions; for the ultimate goal of preventing politically motivated
amendments, however, this is not enough. My study has shown that in the case of Benin
where the process was viewed as fair and legitimate, there still was a successful nonconsolidating amendment that actually passed the test of the high requirement majority
for amendment (80%). It was only stopped thanks to the Beninese Constitutional Court.
This not only suggests that rigidity of the amendment process as a factor in
fighting against undue amendments has some limitations, but it also suggests that the
amendment process could be made more difficult by using a combination of techniques
such as the intervening legislature (double vote),109 the legislative complexity (use of
referendums) or other devices110 mentioned in Lutz (1994) and that I have discussed
earlier in my literature review section. The effect of a constitution that is made too easy
to amend is the incentive given to politicians to use the fundamental law for their
personal political agenda. Examples were given in chapter 3, where I explained that the
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Article 168 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution is a good illustration of what I am referring to.
Article 290 of the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution is another illustration of the types of difficulties that can
be used to slow or prevent unnecessary amendments.
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Senegalese leaders used their constitution not only to remove their opponents from
power, but also for retaliation. Making a constitution hard to amend, however, is not
necessarily a good thing (Lutz, 1994). It only seems to be the best thing to do in the
particular context of weak democratic culture that prevails in democratizing countries. I
argue that in such context, the negative effects outweigh the benefit of having an easy to
amend constitution, mainly because an easy to amend constitution creates a permanent
situation of non-consolidating constitutional democracy. Politicians can use the
constitution to discriminate against their opponents. I have cited in the introduction the
case of Allassane Dramane Ouattara who was prevented from taking part in the 2000
Ivoirian presidential election due to a constitutional amendment (Article 35). Later, there
was a rebellion in the country that cost lives of many Ivoirians. One negative impact of
easy constitutional amendments in a country is the environment of uncertainty that it
helps create due to the fact that the rules of the democratic games are often modified and
skewed toward the ruling party. A ruling party can use the law to starve the opposition by
punishing businessmen who support their opponents. An easy amendment process is a
receipt for any type of constitutional abuses from political leaders who are more
concerned about the consolidation of their grip on power than the consolidation of
democracy in their country.
The findings make the point that my three independent variables (openness of
constitution-making, rigidity of amendment process, and the independence of the
constitutional court) have a negative effect on the consolidation of democracy in Senegal
and Burkina Faso, but not in Benin. As a reminder, my general theory is that in countries
where all the three variables are positive, there should not be any non-consolidating
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constitutional amendment. In other words, if the constitution-making process is inclusive,
transparent and consensual and if the constitution is difficult to amend, and if the
constitutional court is independent with activist judges willing to defend the constitution,
then there should not be any non-consolidating constitutional amendments. My finding
showed that this happened in Benin only. In Burkina Faso and Senegal where the
conditions mentioned above were not fulfilled, basic democratic principles such as the
balance and separation of powers, the respect for constitutional mandates, the
commitment to judicial independence, and the commitment to abide by democratic rules
instead of informal rules of clientelism etc. were frequently violated. Consequently,
Burkina Faso and Senegal experienced high level of non-consolidating constitutional
amendments (three and ten, respectively), whereas Benin experienced none.

Generalization of findings
In this dissertation I did a qualitative study using data from three Francophone
West African countries. The findings support the claims that non-consolidating
constitutional amendments are mainly done for the conservation of power. Moreover, I
made the point that the occurrence of non-consolidating constitutional amendments slow
down or prevent democratizing countries from moving toward the consolidation of
constitutional democracy. I demonstrated that non-consolidating constitutional
amendments as a political disease can be cured, since we now know why the
phenomenon exists and what can be done to stop it. More importantly, we know that nonconsolidating amendment as a political phenomenon happens in countries with specific
characteristics of governance. In other words, it does not happen only in Benin, Burkina
Faso, and Senegal. We know from chapter 3, that non-consolidating amendments
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constitute a common political disease for all countries that share certain characteristics of
poor governance such as the practices of informal rules of clientelism, the prevalence of
an uneven playing field in the practice of the democratic game, the creation of a political
environment with an hegemonic executive power and a dominant ruling party that has no
respect for the constitutional right of the opposition or the civil society. Nonconsolidating amendments flourish in the type of regimes with immeasurable
incumbency advantages. The difference between countries that meet the above criteria
and those considered consolidated democracies is that the former show signs of
instability.
While my work is based on research done in three countries, it can safely be
generalized to all countries with similar characteristics. In other word, any country
showing signs of the political instability mentioned above are potential candidates for
non-consolidating constitutional amendments. Politicians are often obsessed with power
and any country where the rules of the democratic game are not well set or respected can
easily contract this political disease called non-consolidating constitutional amendments.
I argue that the three solutions against the phenomenon that are part of my findings can
also be applied to any country that experiences non-consolidating amendments. I am
referring to my claims that an open constitution-making process provides a shield against
politically motivated amendments; and that a difficult amendment process lead to fewer
non-consolidating amendments and that a vibrant and independent constitutional court
can efficiently protect a country against amendments aimed at individual political gains.

Extending the Dissertation
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My findings have shown that there is no single factor that can account for the
occurrence of non-consolidating constitutional amendments in democratizing countries. I
have explained how two factors were combined in the Beninese 2006 Constitutional
Court decision that prevented the first successful politically motivated amendment in the
country. In my explanation of how the court voided the amendment for the overstaying of
MPs’ mandate, I mentioned the role of civil society organizations. I showed that the
Beninese civil society created a movement called Hands off my Constitution to fight
against any undue amendment (Adjovi, 2006; Banégas, 1995). This suggests that civil
society is a stakeholder when it comes to the conduct of public affairs in a given country.
It can be an important variable to consider when studying factors that can help prevent
the phenomenon of non-consolidating constitutional amendments. In democratic regimes,
civil society organizations can play the role of watchdog due to their ability to constrain
politicians in matters of policy change. My work could consequently be extended to
include civil society as an entire variable that could be studied in order to see the degree
of influence this component has on the fight against unwise amendments.
In the introduction to this dissertation, I mentioned the important influence of
France on its formers colonies (Reynjens, 1991; Clark, 1997). I also suggested that the
multilateral partners such as the IMF and the World Bank can influence politics in
developing countries. Aid has been used by developed countries (bilateral and
multilateral partners) to influence governments around the world (Collier, 2007; Leather
& Foster, 2004; Eide & Kracht, 2005; Drèze & Sen, 1989; Barrett & Maxwell, 2005).
The point is that the international community can exercise greatly influence countries
heavily reliant on foreign aid (Akiba, 2004; Akindele, 2003). Therefore, the influence of
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the international community is an important factor that can be used as a variable, as a
strong opposition of the international community to a particular constitutional
amendment can deter political leaders from moving forward with it, either because of the
reputation cost they might face, or simply because they heavily rely on foreign aid.
Future research can investigate these two factors using the analysis developed in this
dissertation, for better results on how to fight against non-consolidating constitutional
amendments for the advancement of democracy and the rule of law in democratizing
countries.

Conclusion
This dissertation has investigated the phenomenon of non-consolidating
constitutional amendments in Francophone West Africa. I demonstrated that the
phenomenon constitutes a retreat of democratic consolidation in democratizing countries
due to the negatives effects it has on the rule of law. The comparative study of three
countries allowed me to show that an important factor for the consolidation of democracy
in a given country has to do with the initial process of constitution-making, because that
process lays down the foundation for a country future democratic life. Such a process has
to be viewed and accepted by all stakeholders as legitimate. This is a difficult task for
many countries as the drafting of new constitutions often happens under less than ideal or
difficult political, economic or social conditions (Elster, 1993). I showed that the initial
process, when done properly (if it is inclusive and transparent) can provide a country with
strong institutions such as a strong (independent) constitutional court and a strong
parliament well-designed to preserve the democratic principles of separation of powers.
This is important because the mechanism of constitutional amendment and the
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constitutional court as institutions are all created through constitutional provisions.
Institutions created by the constitutions and that derive their just powers from the
fundamental law cannot be strong or legitimate if the constitution that creates them is
viewed as weak or illegitimate. This, led me to argue that the openness of constitutional
amendment as a factor has a broad explanatory power that includes my other two
variables. A combination of the three factors discussed in this dissertation is, however,
necessary for a successful fight against corrupt amendments. I argue that it is not a bad
idea to have activist constitutional judges in democratizing countries, because they can
efficiently fight against politically motivated changes to the fundamental law. Besides
constitutional powers, constitutional court judges need some audacity to protect basic
democratic principles in country where democratic practices are not well-embodied in the
daily life of politicians who are often inclined to use informal rules to skew the
democratic game in their favor.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Votes on constitutional amendments in Burkina Faso
Amendments
002/97/ADP
du 27 janvier
1997
0032000/AN du
11 avril 2000
0012002/AN
du 22
janvier 2002
0152009/AN du
30 avril 2009
0232012/AN du
18 mai 2012
0332012/AN du
11 juin 2012

Voters

Yes

No

Abstention

Absents

Total

106

87

14

05

01

107

97

97

00

00

14

111

108

108

00

00

03

111

103

96

06

01

08

111

107

104

01

02

04

111

94

88

06

00

17

111

Source: Registre des délibérations de l’Assemblée Nationale

Appendix 2: Burkina Faso Constitutional Council opinions and decisions from 19912008
Opinions

426
Control of constitutionality

24

Electoral decisions

40

Decisions

Adapted from Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique, CGD (2009, p. 135)

Appendix 3 : First Legislature of Burkina Faso (1992-1997)
Party
ODP/MT
CNPP/PSD
RDA
ADF

Seats
78
12
06
04
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PAI
MDP
MDS
PSB
RSI
UDS

02
01
01
01
01
01

Appendix 4: Second Legislature of Burkina Faso (1997-2002)
Party
CDP
PDP
UDF/RDA
ADF/RDA
CDF

Seats
102
05
02
01
01

Appendix 5: Third Legislature of Burkina Faso (2002-2007)
Party
CDP
ADF/RDA
PDP/PS
UNDD
UPR
PAI
UNIR/MS
PCP
PDS
PAREN
CNDP
CPS
CDS
CDF
UPD
FDS
RDEB
RDF

Seats
57
13
10
06
06
05
03
03
02
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01

Appendix 6: Fourth Legislature of Burkina Faso (2007-2012)
Party
CDP
ADF/RDA
PAI
UPR
UNIR/MS

Seats
73
14
01
05
05
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FASO METBA
PDS
RPC
RDS
UDPS
FFS
CFDB
RDB
PARENT

01
02
01
01
01
01
03
02
01

Appendix 7: Fifth Legislature of Burkina Faso
Party
CDP
UPC
ADF/RDA
UPR
UNIR/MS
CFD-B
PDS Metba
CNPB
Le Faso autrement
RDS
RDB
ODT
UNDD

Seats
70
19
18
05
04
03
02
01
01
01
01
01
01

Appendix 8: First legislature of Senegal (2001-2005)
Party
Coalition Sopi
AFP
PS
URD
AJ-PADS
PIT
PLS
PPC
APJ/JJ
RND

Seats
89
11
10
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
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Appendix 9: Second Legislature of Senegal (2007-2012)
Party
Total Seats
Plurality
Coalition Sopi 2007 131
90
Coalition
Takku 3
0
Défaraat
Coalition And
3
0
Defar
Coalition Waar Wi 3
0
RP
2
0
Parti
socialiste 1
0
authentique
CRC
1
0
UNP
1
0
Alliance Jëf Jël
1
0
RES
1
0
MRDS
1
0
FSD-BJ
1
0
PSD - Jant bi
1
0
Source : Parline : http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/arc/1277_07.htm

proportional
41
3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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